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3Abstract
It is widely recognised, both locally and internationally, that poor or bad 
governance is a major impediment to the effective performance of public 
sector institutions in Pakistan. A careful analysis of the literature suggests that 
good governance is a sine qua non for achieving human development in the 
country.
From the standpoint of providing an empirical understanding of the above 
assessment of the role of governance, the literature and current scholarship 
analyse problems of governance in Pakistan with reference to normative 
literature on good governance and public administration. This normative 
literature predominantly reflects principles and conceptions drawn from 
Western political systems. As an ideal type, these systems reflect liberal-
pluralistic societies in which there is a clear separation between the executive 
and the legislature. Moreover, they highlight the significance of technical 
expertise, managerial competencies and effective public sector institutions. 
The literature compares the experience of countries like Pakistan to this ideal 
construct, and therefore encourages a ‘subtractivist’ and normative approach 
in its assessment of governance. In so doing, it points to practices of 
corruption, political interference, lack of accountability, and patron–client forms 
of behaviour as explanations of Pakistan’s poor or bad governance trajectory. 
My thesis offers a very different perspective on governance in Pakistan. It 
adopts an interactionist-epistemological stance in order to develop a 
framework which focuses on the actual behaviour of state bureaucracy. Using 
ethnographic data collected from three distinct case studies, the thesis 
demonstrates the significance of informal social norms: in particular, 
clientelism, personal relationships and moral attachments. These social norms 
deeply affect the actual behaviour of public officials. In the implementation of 
policies and development interventions, public officials both deploy and are 
exposed to these informal social norms. This can result in behaviour or 
decisions which run counter to official or expected norms. In this thesis, I 
argue that the challenges of governance in Pakistan are firmly situated in the 
historical account of the state’s formation and in the deeper structures of 
4society. This characterisation better captures state–society relationships and 
allows for the development of a more realistic insight into real governance 
trajectories in the country. In Pakistan, the operations of public administration 
are complex and require a close examination of porous public–private 
boundaries. These boundaries constantly shape administrative practices as 
well as stakeholder interactions and negotiations. This is the actual landscape 
of governance in which citizens have to negotiate access to public and 
collective services.
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7Glossary of Terms
Abbasi a common name by which the tribe Dhoond is 
addressed. People living in most parts of Abbottabad 
district prefer the name Abbasi to Dhoond
Awan name of tribe
Amirs nobles 
Attab a curse
Choak junction
Choakidar guard
Darbar a Mughal term, the darbar was the centre of social 
activities, where aristocracy and influential people 
would meet
Dhoond name of tribe
Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, obligatory for every Muslim at 
least once in his/her lifetime
Jadoon name of tribe
Jagir Fief
Jamhoory Democratic
Jis Ki Lathi Us Ki 
Behance
“Might is power”
Khans people who are traditionally well-off due to their 
historical roots, social capital and inheritance of land 
from their forefathers
Khallils sub-clans of a tribe such as Jadoons
Pakhtoon/Pathan an ethno-linguistic group of people primarily living in 
the province of Khyber PakhtoonKhwa 
Panchayat constitution of a forum known as a council, consisting 
of five members
Mohala
Nazim
Street
Mayor
8Naib Nazim Deputy Mayor
Sardar name of tribe
Shaheed Martyred
Tribe/Biradari a tribe is organised according to kinship ties and 
family linage. Sometimes biradari and tribe do appear 
to have the same connotation in the Pakistani 
genealogical perspective. Tribe and biradari share 
common characteristics for multiple reasons, such as 
social standing, common culture and language.
Zamendar landlord
9Figure 1: Pakistan, showing Abbottabad District (Adapted from a Report 
prepared by Japan International Cooperation Agency)
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Introduction
In this thesis, I discuss how official business1 is actually performed in three 
different institutional contexts. There are two primary reasons for focusing 
upon the ‘actual’ situation. The first reason relates to my previous experience 
of working with state officials in improving their official practices through 
capacity-building workshops. What was of significant importance in these 
workshops was that, despite my delivering innumerable training sessions, 
capacity remained weak and the officials performed their jobs as usual. On 
one hand, there was a tendency in these workshops to underemphasise how 
state bureaucracy performed official business in practice; and on the other 
hand, there was emphasis on technical and managerial solutions, designed to 
align official practices with official norms and service-delivery processes. 
Moreover, written documents obstructed a realistic understanding of how state 
officials discharged their administrative tasks in the everyday functioning of 
state.
Secondly, through informal meetings and from my own personal experience, I 
have noted that before a civil servant takes up the formal administrative 
business of the day, he has various informal meetings and transactions, often 
with people known to him. He attends to such tasks as discharging his 
personal (i.e. not officially sanctioned) obligations to people, receiving friends 
and slacking with colleagues. The office of a civil servant represents a darbar2
for holding personal and informal discussions, and demonstrating the 
existence of a system of informal governance by granting favours to close 
family members, influential individuals and people with whom he/she has 
close ties. Moreover, the structure of the known official meetings would in 
practice often be characterised by informal performance of official tasks, and 
the taking of decisions that are at odds with rule-bound norms. To public 
                                                       
1 The term ‘official business’ is used in the context of administrative/bureaucratic business and 
should not be confused with private business. Moreover, I use the term ‘bureaucratic’ as a 
type of functioning which does not bear any semblance to the term ‘bureaucracy’.
2 The term darbar connotes the legacy of Mughals: the darbar was the centre of social 
activities, where aristocracy and influential people would meet.
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officials, personal acquaintances, social relationships and family ties are 
ranked above the bureaucratic universe that is based on formal rules and 
procedures. An unknown person would be treated by deploying delaying 
tactics and referring to little-known stocks of official norms.3 These were my 
primary concerns, since most of my time resources and efforts were spent on 
understanding why the actual practices of state officials do not correspond to 
expected official behaviour, and how certain citizens get access to public and 
collective services more expediently than others.
The term ‘official business’ requires a brief introduction. Official business 
means performing official tasks to achieve development, policy outcomes, 
state ambitions and plans directed at meeting the welfare needs of the 
citizens. It incorporates certain requirements such as goals, interventions, 
priorities, official rules and regulations. These requirements involve structures, 
institutions, organisations and state actors with public authority. The exercise 
of public authority in the state is largely a subset of bureaucratic administrative 
structures and political ambitions, under which the state becomes the main 
policy maker and the bureaucratic polity a major stakeholder in the 
implementation of policy and development interventions (Christopher, 2002;
Parkin, 2002 cited in Willott 2009). Moreover, state bureaucracy acts 
according to rules. There is a high conformity to official laws and regulations, 
and an official performs in a system which functions “either in the form of its 
Weberian ideal-type or European experience” (Willott 2009, p.3). The title of 
this thesis indicates the anti-thesis of this description of official business, as it 
assumes that official business is constitutive of well-performing public sector 
institutions, clearly defined development goals and a performance-oriented 
organisational culture of state bureaucracy. In essence, the dispensation of 
official business is based on the normatively established principles of good 
governance. 
                                                       
3 This particular treatment cannot be universally applied. State officials perform several 
functions—such as budgeting, monitoring and other officially designated tasks—in a routine 
and expected manner.
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There is a well-established and exhaustive literature on Pakistan’s institutional 
performance, indicating the problems of governance and their impact on 
public sector institutions. The profusion of knowledge on Pakistan’s 
institutional performance adopts customary approaches which are more 
formalistic and less exploratory. First, the existing approaches engage with 
normative discourses and generalised forms of explanations of dysfunctional 
public sector performance in Pakistan that are associated with the doctrine of 
good governance. This assumes Weberian notions of bureaucracy, 
meritocracy, impartiality and rationality. Second, the existing literature 
archetypically evaluates, judges and examines problems of governance with 
reference to the formal model of governance, and cites patron–client relations, 
a culture of impunity, corruption, lack of accountability and structural problems 
in local government as key explanations of ineffective public sector 
performance. The ubiquitous nature and the universal application of the 
formalistic analysis are in fact based on the paradigmatic models of Western 
countries. These explanations and analyses are deficient in many ways when 
applied in the context of Pakistan. I deal with these models in more detail in 
the thesis. From the outset, I emphasise that this literature is based on 
‘subtractivist’4 approaches/models which compares bureaucratic behaviour 
with ideal-type behaviour. 
This thesis moves away from the normative analysis and engages with how 
official business is performed in the state of Pakistan by examining the actual 
practices of the state bureaucracy through an ‘interface’ approach. The 
interface approach adopts an actor-oriented analysis to understand the social 
embeddednesses of these practices in society, and not within the normative 
concepts of good governance. In pursuing this approach, the research also 
seeks to engage critically with the forms of explanation offered by other 
scholars in the field and thereby assess their validity. The approach is 
exploratory and non-normative, and challenges the existing normative 
                                                       
4 The term ‘subtractivist’ is not recognised in the standard literature. The term comes from 
Graham Brown, who was one of the assessors during my progression from MPhil to PhD. 
Brown uses the label ‘subtractivist’ to refer to theoretical frameworks which evaluate official 
behaviour in Pakistan by taking ideal-type bureaucratic behaviour as the normative point of 
comparative reference.
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explanations of state performance in Pakistan on the presumption of Western-
liberal states and Weberian bureaucracy. 
My research is based on the examination of three case studies5 pertaining to 
the delivery of public and collective services which involve state bureaucracy 
and citizens. While the delivery of social services is an important function of 
the state, the existing corpus of literature has paid inadequate attention to the 
complex relationships and interactions between civil servants and service 
users. Moreover, issues of accountability, patron–client relationships, and 
corruption within the administration and public services constitutes a central 
place in the current and future debates about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance in 
Pakistan.
The subtitle of the thesis draws attention to my research stance, which draws 
on an interactionist epistemology in order to assess actual practices and 
informal behaviour. Initially, the application of my actor-oriented approach was 
a problem for me as well as for the state officials. My initial interactions with an 
official of the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA) created a methodological 
impasse in terms of looking for a social interface between officials and 
citizens. In the office of the official, we both discussed how interactions take 
place between officials and citizens and expressed our desire to know what 
transpires from these interactions. Whereas the actual intent and substance of 
these interactions are seldom discussed, the official was telling me the official 
versions, and the entire discussion was focused on the official processes of 
service delivery to local communities and how state officials deal with citizens 
according to official rules. During these interactions, a citizen known to the 
official frequently visited the officer. This citizen watched my anxiety and 
frustration building for almost a week. Eventually, it turned out that the citizen 
was from an urban locality called Nawansher. After discussing my research 
with him in layman’s language he seemed to understand my research aim. 
The citizen told me “that what you are looking for is to visit Nawansher and not 
this office. You will not get anything from these officials”. I soon began to 
                                                       
5 In providing justification and rationale for selecting three distinct case studies, I have used 
Harry Blair’s framework of the “long and short route to accountability”.
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realise that my interface required social interactions in an environment where I 
could observe events and talk to people and officials. I faced the same 
situation in the case of education when I held discussions with male and 
female officials, who revealed a variety of conflicting stories. Interpretations of 
these stories required observation of events and discovery of actors’ 
perspectives in different locales.
Over a period of eight months, I tried to get as many narratives as possible 
across three case studies namely education, water supply and refuse 
management. Inductive and deductive approaches were used to decipher 
events, verbiage and complex social realities in different sites and contexts. 
Both approaches have helped in trying to look at social events and 
perspectives both objectively and subjectively. The objective reality conveys 
facts which need to be complemented by subjective understanding of people’s 
life experiences. This entailed combining traditional ethnography with other 
research methods.
I was facilitated by state officials in securing access to policy documents and 
getting information on planned interventions both verbally and by visiting sites. 
The research conducted in three different institutional contexts required 
persistence and entailed my constant engagement with state officials, citizens 
and non-state actors. My research contacts were initially state officials who 
shared with me important/classified documents and narrated to me their own 
experiences. Besides the fact that I am from Pakistan, this research would not 
have been possible without knowing the right people. On many occasions it 
was sheer luck that certain events were observed, and on other occasions my 
existing contacts introduced me to local citizens in different locations and the 
entire research process unfolded as a consequence of co-incidental and 
facilitated encounters/interactions. During field observations, I also used 
exploratory interviews to get an understanding of the institutional problems,
and the process of the implementation of planned development interventions 
and policies. I tried to remain neutral, but at times I had to confront certain 
situations in order to know more about social and political events. I constantly 
reflected upon the intricate details and representations of events in my daily 
15
write-ups of my notes. I would constantly engage with the raw data in order to 
attain a comprehensive grasp of uncontaminated events and the perceptions 
of people captured through structured and unstructured observations.
This thesis directly contributes to understanding how and under what 
circumstances the expected official behaviour of state officials is not in line 
with established rules and service-delivery processes. In addition, my 
extensive travelling and interactions enabled me to observe and document 
many discrepancies between official policy and the targets of development 
interventions. In this thesis, I argue that unofficial practices and informal social 
norms are embedded in society, that their social, administrative and cultural 
contexts are multiple, and that they are the primary determinants of 
understanding the problems of governance. Finally, all this is reproduced in 
different institutional settings and historical contexts. 
Structure of the thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters. In chapter one, I introduce models of 
public administration and good governance arguments propounded by 
Western scholars and the World Bank. The purpose of engaging with the 
central tenets of public administration is to show the previous and later trends 
in evaluating and analysing public sector performance and policy. The 
objective of introducing governance, despite the fact that it overlaps with 
public administration in its trappings and proclamations, is to underscore the 
dominant thinking behind the agenda of good governance considered as 
pragmatic and essential to addressing governance problems in the country. 
The overarching goal of this chapter is to situate these arguments in the 
context of Pakistan. As one reads through the literature on the issues of 
governance debated by scholars in Pakistan, it becomes evident that they 
have heavily relied upon the normative conceptions of good governance. This 
chapter tries to incorporate the Western-led literature, which Pakistan has 
bought into, and the literature on Pakistan about the prevailing problems of 
governance and how they are currently analysed.
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The second chapter contextualises the first chapter within the pre-colonial era 
and the post-colonial state of Pakistan. The goal of this chapter is to elaborate 
on three specific historical strands. The first of these concerns the pre-colonial 
history of the sub-continent. This traces the roots of imperial penetration into 
state and society, and the implantation of an imperial bureaucracy and 
colonial administration. The second engages with the post–colonial state. It 
studies the structure of the state, its character and the role of bureaucracy, 
and further provides a chronology of civilian- military regimes, and inter alia
their ambitions, policies and reforms. The third deals with a critical 
assessment of public administration under civilian and military regimes, and 
briefly introduces the current modus operandi and the dominant practices of 
implementing development projects to improve public sector performance in 
the country.
Chapter three outlines my analytical framework and explains the reasons for 
developing an alternative approach to good governance and public 
administration arguments. This chapter critiques concepts of formal 
governance such as rationality and impartiality. I have argued that these 
concepts provide inadequate explanatory frameworks for understanding 
blurred public–private boundaries, the operating culture of state bureaucracy, 
their interactions with service users, how public authority is undermined, and 
how informal social norms influence official behaviour. This chapter describes 
political clientelism as a useful explanatory concept, as it engages with sub-
disciplines that involve clientelistic networks—relationships, patronage and 
moral attachments. They systematically help in studying the actual functioning 
of administration and practices that deviate from established official norms 
and service delivery processes. This chapter relies heavily on the 
anthropological literature on South Asian and African states.
The fourth chapter describes my research methodology and my epistemology, 
and sets out the process of the research in terms of how it evolved and the 
experience underpinned by my interface approach. This enables the reader to 
grasp the perspectives and the experiences of the people with whom I 
interacted, and the processes of interpretation of their practices and language. 
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I also briefly introduce the history of the research sites. This chapter provides 
an insight into and prepares the reader to gain some understanding of the 
complex phenomena in question. However, it is far from exhaustive, as my 
explorations can only cover certain aspects which I considered were possible 
to study. This chapter examines different administrative structures made up of 
diverse actors. It further demonstrates that events and my transcription of 
them often took place in difficult and awkward situations.
Chapter five introduces the case studies. These are associated with the 
provision of public and collective services in both rural and urban 
communities. The provision of collective services is studied from different 
perspectives.6 Moreover, the particular nature of case studies goes beyond 
state-directed services, and includes non-state entities. This chapter illustrates 
how state and non-state entities implement policies and development 
interventions, and describes the processes which establish linkages between 
state officials and citizens in a decentralised, spatial and social context. In 
addition, I also discuss the rationale for selecting three distinct case studies.
Chapters six and seven are empirical chapters based on the examination of 
case studies. The three case studies provide distinct and interesting arenas to 
examine state bureaucracy and their interactions with citizens. In writing these 
chapters, I have made an earnest effort to maintain consistency with my 
theoretical chapter and the data collected in the field. I have ventured beyond 
the generalised observations, social practices, informal behaviour, local 
citizens’ limitations and their expectations, which presented multifaceted 
problems in the provision of collective services. I have concentrated on the 
interactions between officials and citizens; social and political relationships; 
the internal reasoning of state officials regarding their incapacity to deal with 
powerful personalities; and the explanations associated with bureaucratic 
practices in terms of how public and collective services are actually being 
provided through the state administrative structures. These observations are 
made in both chapters. Hence, the focus of chapter six is at the local level and 
                                                       
6 For example, the provision of water supply can be seen from a technical point of view as it 
depends on a water distribution system and the processes of formal access.
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involves the social and political dynamics of access, and how a local political 
figure mediates between state and society in managing access. The primary 
focus of chapter six is on the politics of access, which reflects political 
influence and its manifestation around associations. In chapter six, I 
investigate the significance of social relationships and kinship ties in an urban 
locality. In so doing, I pay attention to how they influence official 
norms/administrative practices of public officials on one hand, and, on the 
other, side-track the stated goals and objectives of an external intervention. In 
chapter seven, the level of observation and examination is raised beyond the 
local level. There are similarities between chapters seven and six, but the 
scope and context is different. Chapter seven engages with clientelism and its 
manifestation in different forms. What differentiates chapter seven from six is 
the implementation of policy in terms of the actual functioning of district 
education at different levels. Chapter seven highlights political networks, the 
emergence of different sets of social and political relationships, and the 
observations of how front-line officials deal with citizens’ interests and 
complaints.
The concluding chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of the general 
themes and elaborates how the research objectives were achieved. The 
conclusion summarises the main findings of the thesis and discusses different 
aspects of the research. It seeks to highlight ‘subtractivist’ approaches as 
deficient in their analyses of problems of governance in Pakistan. I further
engage with the problems of ‘subtractivist’ approaches. The research 
implications in this concluding chapter elaborate a way forward to improving 
the management practices in the country.
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Chapter One
Problems of Governance
1. Introduction
This chapter engages with classical and recent debates on public 
administration and good governance. It has two main goals. First, I briefly 
consider three models of public administration, which are: Public 
Administration, New Public Management and New Public Governance. These 
models are regarded and used as the dominant models in terms of their 
usefulness in evaluating and assessing public policy implementation and 
public service delivery. Moreover, these models can be viewed as overlapping 
paradigms and their features illustrate the conceptions of good governance. In 
recent times, the good governance framework has become the primary 
criterion when assessing public sector institutional performance, and offers a 
range of definitions and perspectives on state bureaucracy and society. 
Second, I discuss the perspectives and research conducted by different 
authors in Pakistan, highlighting the problems of governance7 and their root 
causes. The debates and approaches of certain authors are heavily tilted 
towards and inspired by the normative models of good governance employed 
to improve official behaviour and administrative practices. Some authors 
(Shafqat, 1999; Hijazi, 1999; Javaid, 2010; Mallick, 2001; Candland, 1997) 
have identified lack of incentives, political interference, bureaucratic 
indifference and problems of access for ordinary citizens to public and 
collective services, as key contributors to dysfunctional public sector 
performance. My aim is to highlight literature which covers several dimensions 
of bureaucratic dysfunction in Pakistan. Some of this literature (Shafqat, 1999;
Quershi, 1999; Khan, 2001; Husain, 2006; Khawaja and Khawaja 2007) 
highlights bureaucratic dysfunction—which includes practices of 
                                                       
7 The terms ‘governance’ and ‘good governance’ are used interchangeably—see clarification 
in chapter three.
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mismanagement, corruption, accountability, non-observance of official norms, 
etc., as key governance issues. 
2. Public administration
As argued by Lane (2001), there are different definitions of the public sector 
and it is hard to describe what the expression ‘public sector’ stands for. ‘Public 
sector’ suggests a public administration which comprises the institutions of the 
government, corresponding bureaucracy and the exercise of public authority. 
Public administration is about the public sector and the way it operates and 
performs the operations of the state through effective institutions.8 Studies in 
public administration have highlighted the performance of the public sector in 
relation to three different approaches and regimes: traditional Public 
Administration (PA), New Public Management (NPM) and New Public 
Governance (NPG).
2.1. Public Administration:
The traditional model of PA denotes a centralised system of hierarchical 
structures answerable to politicians, serving the public through effective 
bureaucracies assigned with formal functions, rules and regulations (Lane,
2002; Osborne, 2010). Both administrative and judicial authority is established 
in a formalised sense with a clear separation of powers between the executive 
and the legislature. The state also appoints civil servants who perform 
important functions such as advising ministers in crafting and implementing 
state policies (Christopher 2002). The state assumes control of its territories 
through regional authorities and other state agencies. The power of the state 
is distributed across all regions and there is a high degree of compliance with 
state directives, laws, constitution and other statutes. The structure of the 
state agencies is hierarchical, centralised and highly formalised. The state has 
an elected Government and elections are held on a universal suffrage basis 
(Ibid. 2002). Voters from all segments of society have freedom to participate 
freely in the election of politicians, and have equal rights and opportunities 
                                                       
8 North (1990, p.3) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally
… the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”.
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regardless of their class and status. The traditional PA was meant to improve 
the well-being of people by ensuring the social and economic needs of the 
citizens in a democratically elected government through the concepts of 
equality and fairness (Osborne, 2010; Clapham, 1982). 
2.2. New Public Management (NPM)
The emergence of NPM during the 1970s was a reorientation of public 
administration by introducing attributes of private sector management 
techniques and practices into the public sector. A need was felt to open ‘the 
black box’9 by disaggregating state organisations into decentralised units and 
restructuring public sector delivery processes on the basis of inputs, outputs 
and performance evaluation (Osborne 2010, p.3). NPM reforms were primarily 
concerned with removing the obstacles to efficiency and changing the ways in 
which public bureaucracies performed. Principles of private sector 
management were introduced in the developing countries by the IMF and the 
World Bank, laying stress on output-oriented results and performance during 
training within the governments and ministries in order to achieve tangible 
results (Kjaer 2004).
2.3. New Public Governance (NPG)
In the 21st Century, the emergence of NPG has been presented as a new 
“conceptual tool to meet the challenges of public policy implementation and 
delivery of public services” (Osborne 2010, p.6). NPG advocates two forms of 
plurality in the implementation of public service delivery. The first relates to a 
plural state associated with a diverse set of interdependent factors 
contributing to the delivery of public services. The second pertains to a 
pluralist state which is concerned with the institutional as well as with the 
external environment. Both forms of plurality, according to Osborne (2010, 
p.9), focus upon inter-organisational relationships, and governance processes 
                                                       
9 As noted by Schofield (2001), and Hill and Hope (2003), public administration in terms of 
policy implementation came under criticism to explore the complex processes and 
management of outputs of the policy process. Moreover, policy élites are depicted as 
‘villain(s)’ when they manoeuvre policy goals towards their own ends (cited in Osborne 2010, 
p.5).
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stressing service effectiveness and outcomes which depend upon the 
interactions of public sector organisations and inter-organisational networks in 
negotiating policy, accountability and resource allocation. NPG has not been 
introduced as a new paradigm to supersede its predecessors PA and NPM.  
Rather, all three models contribute to our understanding of public sector 
performance in terms of the implementation of policies and the delivery of 
public and collective services. The primary focus of public administration is on 
the functioning of public institutions from both managerial and administrative 
perspectives. Moreover, public administration and the constituent elements 
and characteristics of the three models are closely associated with the 
principles of good governance.   
3. Good Governance
According to Leftwich (1994), the phrase ‘good governance’ was first used in 
1989 by the World Bank and defined as “the exercise of political power to 
manage a nation’s affairs”. There has since been a shift in the World Bank’s 
definition as a result of conditions attached to foreign aid, which lay emphasis 
on reform of public sector institutions. The World Bank’s 1992 definition treats 
good governance with reference to public administration and public sector 
management, which means that for an effective public sector, “efficiency, 
accountability, transparency, predictability and impartiality in decision making 
are the pre-requisites” (Leftwich 1994, p.372). The word ‘governance’ does 
not convey one particular definition; rather, it covers a range of meanings. The 
concept of good governance has not been restricted to the managerial and 
administrative dimensions, but over the past few years political analysts have 
also included politics and interconnections with the structures and authority of 
political regimes (Doornbos 2002). Doornbos further argues that good 
governance falls into two broad streams. One is associated with state–society 
relationships, and the other is related to policy. The first stream is oriented 
towards the institutions of the state and how they interact with society. The 
second stream is the primary concern of donors and informs their 
interventions in state and political structures, the guiding principle of which is 
to integrate the developing world with global Western systems based on neo-
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institutionalism. I agree with authors (Doornbos 2002, p.93 and Leftwich 1994, 
p.368) who claim that good governance is used to justify Western aid which is 
aimed at inculcating the attributes of modern liberal democratic states—such 
as political freedom, equality, etc.—in a non-western political context.
The broader meanings and conceptualisation of governance among various 
authors (Kjaer, 2004; Johnson, 1997; Leftwich, 1994) and international 
organisations such as the World Bank share certain common ingredients and 
attributes which deal with concepts including politics, rights, power and 
interests. Kjaer (2004, p.6) describes some of these concepts in terms of the 
way authority is exercised, and defines governance as “the relationship 
between the rulers and the ruled” and “how interests are articulated and rights 
exercised”. Whereas Leftwich (1994) suggests that good governance has 
social, political and administrative dimensions. Writing from an administrative 
point of view, Smith (2007, p. 6) argues that good governance requires 
“accountable and transparent public administration; and effective public 
management, including a capacity to design good policies as well as to 
implement them”. Whilst Doornbos (2002, p.94) suggests that good 
governance is a contested concept and that the attachment of various 
meanings and debates points to a lack of agreement among authors and 
researchers on its core meaning and sphere of application. Governance is not 
restricted to the traditional public sphere of the state, but also includes Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs) and their role in the delivery of public 
services.
4. Problems of governance in Pakistan
In the early decades of state formation, the key issues for public 
administration in Pakistan were tackling the centralised decision-making 
process, the over-reliance on state bureaucracies, and the neglect of the 
needs and preferences of the citizens in administering development 
(Inayatullah 1964). During the 1960s, the bureaucracy was criticised in the 
media and by the people as being insufficiently responsive to the needs of the 
people. Bureaucratic behaviour was deplored by the citizens for being 
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removed from issues of social concern, and for its lack of accountability and 
responsibility (Shafqat 1999, p.996). The role of bureaucracy in steering the 
administration was reassessed in the 1990s by the World Bank as being 
corrupt, unaccountable and inefficient. Citizens generally had a very negative 
image of the bureaucracy, reinforced by reports of gross human rights 
violations involving the state. The changing role of government, how 
governance was performed and the behaviour of civil bureaucracy were 
certain key challenges which needed to be addressed in order to restore trust 
among communities and international organisations. Building on these 
arguments, Shafqat (1999, p.1002) argues that an efficient, non-corrupt and 
accountable bureaucracy is a sine qua non for achieving efficient public sector 
institutions and good governance in Pakistan. By tracing the genealogy, 
structure and the impact of civil service reforms of the military and civilian 
governments in the country, Shafqat asserts that the civil service reforms in 
Pakistan were conceived by civil and military regimes10 to advance their 
political interests by interfering with the formal functioning of bureaucracy. As 
a consequence, the reforms not only fell just short of changing the behaviour 
of civil bureaucracy, but also contributed to the erosion of trust and confidence 
among the civilian bureaucracy.
During the period of democratic governments (1988-1999), and particularly 
after 1988, politicians frequently promoted bureaucrats into policy and service 
delivery roles irrespective of the criteria of merit and competency. Shafqat’s 
(1999, p.1009) central argument is that governance will not improve if political 
leaders disregard the importance of “merit driven and non-partisan civil 
service”. Shafqat further argues that in promoting behaviour changes, merit 
should be the essential criterion in the recruitment of bureaucrats, and also 
stresses the importance of non-political relations between civil bureaucracy 
and political leadership. This means that bureaucrats establish political 
contacts with politicians to acquire personal favours such as preferential 
treatment, as opposed to adhering to the principles of neutrality and 
transparency. To restore the image and confidence of new entrants joining the 
                                                       
10 These reforms are discussed in the next chapter.
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civil service, reforms are needed to redefine the role of bureaucracy in terms 
of achieving honesty, integrity and dedication in serving the public. 
Needs for such reforms are often justified with reference to the crisis of 
governance in the state of Pakistan, a crisis which has multiple dimensions 
including lack of professionalism, politicisation of bureaucracy, non-
transparency in making decisions and lack of citizen access to information on 
state policies. Other factors include strict observance of official rules, strong 
democratic institutions, a professional and competent civil service and an
elimination of the politics of patronage. Shafqat suggests certain measures 
aimed at reinforcing the attributes of good governance and these are: 
performance evaluation, monitoring of official behaviour of junior officials by 
senior officials, access to information and accountability of civil servants, 
devolution of power from the upper tiers of the government to district level, 
and incentives to performance. In addition, the bureaucrat must promote the 
interests of the public, and his actions must be guided by fairness and justice.
Hijazi (1999) argues that one of the major reasons behind the weak 
performance of civil servants is the incompatibility of their job structure with 
organisational goals. The civil servants lack the motivation to work in the 
public sector. They do not find their work environment conducive to their 
professional growth for reasons such as lack of incentives, stagnation in 
promotions and conflicts of interest. Moreover, nepotism, promotion criteria 
and lengthy bureaucratic procedures in getting promotion create disincentives 
for civil servants to remain in service. As pointed out by Hijazi (1999, p.905), 
the performance of civil servants could be improved if the focus is placed on 
the “motivational aspect of good governance”. Hijazi’s main emphasis is to 
improve the motivation of state employees by suggesting a methodology of 
Government by Objective (GBO). The GBO approach resembles the log-
frame11 approach by developing specific targets and goals mutually agreed 
among officials in the organisation. To achieve this, Hijazi (1999) deploys 
                                                       
11 Log-frame approach is based on inputs, outputs and outcomes as a project is conceived 
and implemented. This approach enables the administrators in the organisation to track 
progress against project deliverables and timelines.
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motivational theories to achieve good governance. Meeting human needs 
through rewards and achieving organisational goals through task-centred 
approaches are stressed as the missing elements in improving the motivation 
of civil servants.
Analysing the impediments to human development and the problems of 
governance in particular, Candland (1997, pp.265-266) identifies three primary 
factors responsible for dysfunctional public sector performance in Pakistan. I 
discuss the first two factors only, since they are directly related to the problem 
of dysfunctionality.12 The first is related to the discriminatory policies of the 
state which neglect the needs of girls and women in the society. The second 
is the nature of political government, being non-democratic and 
unaccountable, with a weak civil society and corrupt administrators. In the 
context of administering and delivering social services, Candland (1997, 
p.270) argues that the over-centralisation of political authority in the hands of 
powerful élites has adversely affected education, health and provision of water 
and sanitation services to the local communities. In education and health 
sectors, the officials are appointed by the politicians and these appointments 
neglect merit as well as the fitness of the person to undertake a highly skilled 
job. High levels of absenteeism among teachers are observed in schools, and, 
despite lack of attendance, teachers continue to draw their salaries from the 
state. Moreover, parents’ concerns are ignored by state officials who use their 
personal networks to avoid pressure from the local citizens to improve service 
delivery. These issues are further explored by Candland in evaluating the 
impact of Social Action Program (SAP).
The Social Action Program (SAP), instigated by the Pakistan’s People’s Party 
(PPP) in 1992, was a major initiative of a democratic government to improve 
the quality of social services across four sectors, namely health, education, 
water supply and sanitation. The SAP was, however, deemed a complete 
failure, and the diagnosis of this failure suggested administrative and political 
causes. Candland noted that the programme was completely politicised, with 
                                                       
12 The third factor is irrelevant because it deals with fiscal constraints, debt burden and 
external financing of development projects in the state.
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local politicians directly involved in the provision of education, health and other 
services. Local politicians occupied positions on advisory committees known 
as “social action boards” at the national level, and “district development 
advisory committees” at the district level. These local politicians exploited their 
positions and diverted state resources to their political supporters, depleting 
what was reserved for education and other services. Moreover, Candland 
(1999, p.272) notes, state bureaucracy prevented the active participation of 
local community-based organisations in monitoring the use of public 
resources. Candland argues that this happened in two primary ways. First, 
state officials lacked direct interaction with citizens and used their official 
authority to discourage any efforts made by local citizens, media and oversight 
bodies during the implementation of the programme. Second, in framing the 
SAP the government had created “fictitious” and inactive oversight bodies, 
such as community organisations. 
The creation of community organisations was an essential and an innovative 
component of the programme to monitor government human development 
initiatives and expenditures. In the absence of truly representative and 
functional community organisations, the programme suffered from political and 
bureaucratic interference. Hence, the programme did not achieve its desired 
goals and perceived concepts of empowerment and participation in the 
delivery of social services to the communities who needed them most.
Mallick’s (2001) assessment of education and health sectors identifies poor 
personnel management systems and official practices as the most critical 
problems of governance in the public sector. The poor management system 
relates to the overall administrative structure and the organisation of the staff. 
The focus of Mallick’s assessment is rather on the identification of 
discrepancies between official rules and the actual practices of state officials 
deployed at the level of service delivery. During discussions held with state 
officials in both sectors, Mallick (2001, p.5) observes a dysfunctional system, 
the causes of which inter alia were: lack of motivation among the staff, 
absenteeism, frequency of posting of staff, “weak supervision, monitoring and 
feedback” and loop-holes in performance evaluation and accountability 
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processes. The frequent transfer of officials is viewed by public officials as an 
infringement of official policy, which is for them to serve in a particular post for 
a minimum period of three years before they can be transferred elsewhere. 
Such frequent transfers have an impact on service delivery when each time a 
new official resumes responsibility he/she has to start from scratch, causing 
major frustrations and loss of trust in decision making. Mallick (2001, p.8) 
further mentions a deficient system of performance evaluation known as a 
seniority-based system, which encourages the promotion of officials based on 
seniority rather than on good performance. Performance evaluation according 
to Mallick is a confidential process which means that a junior official cannot 
challenge or review their performance evaluation as conducted by a senior 
official. Moreover, assessment of official performance depends upon the 
length of service in a particular organisation and not upon competency and 
utilisation of professional expertise based on targets and outputs.
In a study conducted at the micro-level in the city of Multan, a district in the 
province of Punjab, good governance is acknowledged as a necessary 
condition to alleviate urban poverty (Imran et al. 2006). The study examines 
urban poverty with reference to World Bank and United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) normative definitions of good governance. The study 
presents two types of analysis: quantitative and descriptive. The study reveals 
that urban poverty is related to bad governance, which is linked to the 
problems of how public and collective services are being managed by the 
district officials in the city. The poor people in the city are living in deplorable 
conditions. Contaminated water, lack of sanitation and the non-disposal of 
solid waste are the major concerns among the poor. The study cites bad 
governance as one of the root causes of poverty in the city. In addition, the 
study highlights the differences in power relations between the poor and the 
officials. The poor are unable to officially complain about the degradation of 
water supply, sanitation and other facilities. The public officials talk about 
these issues with the local citizens, but power imbalances, and the 
unresponsive behaviour of the officials, leads to the complaints of the poor 
being treated as low priority. 
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In 1999, Sarfarz Qureshi, President of Pakistan Society of Development 
Economists, stated in his presidential address that economic growth and 
poverty reduction would  remain an elusive goal in Pakistan unless the 
problems of governance are dealt with through institutional reforms. Qureshi 
(1999, p.328) emphasises two particular features of good governance. The 
first considers the exercise of authority, alluding to the state and bureaucracy 
to effectively manage state resources to achieve development. The second 
feature focuses upon the capacity of state officials to conceive and implement 
policies, as well as to perform their official functions in line with official rules. 
Within this overall context, Qureshi presents three interrelated factors of poor 
governance in Pakistan. The first is related to the non-observance of formal 
institutional rules due to the lack of capacity among state officials and their 
misuse of power. The second factor is the weakening of public sector 
institutions resulting from political interference and patronage. The third factor 
is the lack of accountability of public officials in the provision of public 
services. These inter-linked factors directly contribute to informality in public 
dealings and deviations from formal institutional rules. 
A number of authors have pointed out the prevalence of different forms of 
corruption affecting the professional ethics of civil servants and the relations 
between bureaucracies and people. There are different perspectives and 
contexts in which the phenomenon of corruption or corrupt practices are 
described and defined in Pakistan. It must be noted that most of these authors 
use the notion of corruption in relation to the normative principles of good 
governance. Using statistical data, Javaid (2010, p.126) argues that corruption 
is caused by lack of accountability, low incentives to performance, use of 
discretionary power and lack of transparency. Javaid further argues that 
corruption is endemic in all the institutions of the state and that it has a deep 
impact on the lives of citizens seeking to get access to public services. In 
addition, corruption is inconsistent with the concept of a representative 
government: politicians bribe voters and sell party tickets openly, which 
provides opportunities for brokers to act as intermediaries. In this way the 
election process becomes non-transparent. Corruption is also correlated with 
poor governance, since the different state sectors, politicians and officials 
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either directly or indirectly are involved in acts of bribery, red-tapism, 
siphoning off state resources and extending preferential treatment in official 
appointments (Javaid 2010). An early study (Khattak et al. 1999, cited by 
Javaid 2010) conceives corruption as the social norm in Pakistan. In the 
study, nepotism, bribery and a system of patronage are identified as the key 
drivers of corruption. The study also argues that despite anti-corruption laws, 
formal state regulations and accountability procedures, these stringent 
measures could not have been strictly invoked because of political interests 
and the misuse of official authority.
Corruption is perceived by Qureshi (1999) as the major cause of inequality 
among citizens. Qureshi (1999, p.329) argues that corruption undermines the 
rights and entitlements of citizens and leads to a draining of state resources 
when state officials take bribes in rendering social services. Among other 
factors, corruption affects economic growth when official decision-making 
processes are circumvented through private interests and has negative effects 
on the political-administrative functions of the state. In Qureshi’s view, 
corruption is the biggest obstacle to promoting good governance in the 
country.
Khan (2001) examines the impact of World Bank policies to eradicate two 
types of corruption in Pakistan—bureaucratic and political corruption. The 
study discusses both types of corruption in terms of bureaucratic structures in 
the country, low incentives to performance and the political structure. The 
study indicates that bureaucratic corruption cannot be isolated from political 
corruption. The bureaucratic structure has been shown as problematic when 
there is a mismatch between formal functions and the capacities required to 
perform those functions. Khan (2001, p.3) further argues that the incidence of 
corruption in the structure of bureaucracy is likely to be high in two situations. 
Firstly, when the structure of state is dominated by a large number of officials, 
those working on lower grades are made redundant. The lower officials 
deliberately create barriers for the service users so that they can use their 
influence and local knowledge of how services are provided. Secondly, when 
formal state functions are not clearly defined, bureaucrats try to negotiate the 
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provision of social services by demanding a price to render a service, leading 
to high transaction costs for the service users. Moreover, when the state 
performs its functions in a discriminatory fashion, citizens acquire desired 
services through bribes.
Khan also investigates the nature of corruption in state structures through the 
concepts of monitoring, accountability and patron–client relationships. 
Corruption in these contexts leads, in different ways, to the undermining of the 
performance of public bureaucracies and the effective functioning of public 
sector institutions. When internal monitoring is weak, it gives rise to the use of 
discretion which in turn enables state officials to engage in corruption. Khan 
(2001) finds divergent views amongst officials and politicians on monitoring 
the official tasks of civil servants. From the perspective of state officials, 
bureaucratic performance is severely damaged by political interference in their 
official responsibilities. On the other hand, political leaders argue that 
bureaucrats use discretionary powers and are involved in corruption. 
Moreover, the state operates in a clientelistic manner when state officials are 
not held accountable by the political leaders. In certain cases, co-option of 
bureaucracy by political leaders leads to misappropriation of state resources 
and adopting monopolistic measures in restricting access to public goods in 
favour of clients of the politicians. Khan’s study demonstrates bureaucratic 
and political corruption as the primary factors of bad governance in the 
country. Based on interviews with political leaders and state officials, Khan’s 
main conclusions are: patron–client relationships, lack of accountability and a 
dysfunctional public structure in Pakistan are major impediments in achieving 
effective public sector performance.  
Husain (1999) argues that the functioning of public sector institutions in 
Pakistan is related to the effectiveness of institutions and how ‘institutions of 
restraint’ can be strengthened to address the problems of governance. Husain 
(1999, p.512) describes three main functions of public sector institutions—
“policy making, service delivery and oversight and accountability”. The author 
focuses upon the third element, ‘oversight and accountability’, by adopting 
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Kaufman’s six clusters13 of governance indicators grouped under three broad 
categories: a) “the process by which governments are selected, monitored 
and replaced”; b) “the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies”; and c) “the respect of citizens and the state for 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”. 
Husain’s main arguments in relation to ineffective public sector institutions are 
based on Kaufman’s governance indicators and suggest that the public sector 
institutions are dysfunctional and the state institutions are weak. In Pakistan, 
there are formal and informal “institutions of restraint” and these are state-
centred and civil society-centred. In the state-centred institutions, Husain’s 
main concern is the misuse of official authority. In the civil society-centred 
institutions, there is an implicit understanding in Husain’s argument that NGOs 
in Pakistan lack credibility and must undergo self-evaluation to become 
effective and credible oversight bodies. Husain (1999) identifies 
decentralisation and devolution at local tiers of the government as the solution 
to many problems such as non-involvement of local communities in decision 
making, lack of trust and misconceptions among citizens, and weakening of 
official norms.
The performance of civil bureaucracy in the past few years has declined, 
according to Husain (2006, p.5), because of corruption, lack of motivation and 
abuse of official authority. Bureaucrats also develop close ties with politicians 
to ensure that they get preferential treatment in return for their loyalty. This 
has resulted in a political patronage which has shifted accountability of 
bureaucracy from citizens towards these regimes. Husain (2006, p.7) aptly 
captures the fact that despite many accountability laws, committees and 
commissions, public sector institutions continue to suffer and “instances of 
rampant corruption, malpractices, nepotism and favouritism and waste and 
inefficiency have become a common folklore in the administrative culture of 
the country”. Middle and low-level officials are engaged in informal means to 
extract monetary benefits from citizens trying to establish private business. 
This is because of bureaucratic itineraries and delays in processing cases. 
                                                       
13 The six clusters are: voice and accountability, political instability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory burden, rules of law and corruption (Husain 2006, p.517).
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Public sector performance in Pakistan between 2001 and 2006 is analysed by 
Khawaja and Khawaja (2007) using four indicators of performance, namely 
accountability, participation, predictability and transparency. These indicators 
are applied to the reforms introduced by the military government in 2001. 
However, the authors argue less empirically and more theoretically that the 
reforms have made an insignificant improvement in public sector performance. 
The authors further argue that the state institutions are in a state of decay. 
There is widespread corruption at different levels of the state which affects 
people. Khawaja and Khawaja (2006, p.60) argue that civil servants are not 
trusted by the people and the image of the civil service is tarnished due to 
corruption, lack of accountability and incompetency. The authors allude to 
patron–client relationships by referring to political élites who alter the rules and 
appoint people/clients in the public sector. It has been further argued that the 
state is dominated by civil bureaucracy, military14 and powerful politicians who 
undermine democracy and the emergence of a vibrant civil society. In a 
decentralised context, Khawaja and Khawaja (2007) assert that the 
bureaucracy frustrates the efforts of the local people to participate in 
development as officials implement development interventions without 
consulting the citizens. Resource allocation, planning and budgeting is the 
sole prerogative of the élite and not of the ordinary citizen. This means that 
political institutions in Pakistan are represented by powerful personalities who 
are least accountable to the people, as they are under no obligation to explain 
what they are doing. 
                                                       
14 The role of military in the internal governance of the state is discussed in the next chapter.
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5. Conclusion
Public administration and good governance arguments are key points of 
reference in the evaluation of official behaviour and public sector performance. 
The normative definition of good governance encapsulates two intertwined 
dimensions—political and technical. The technical dimension assumes an 
effective Weberian bureaucracy to implement state policies, in the sense of a 
highly efficient public administration. The political dimension refers normatively 
to a political government in which the balance of power and the relationship 
between the state and its institutions are complementary and universal. The 
political dimension further implies a democratically elected government and a 
respect for rule of law, and a political system in which the citizens have equal 
rights and opportunities to pursue their livelihoods as enshrined in public law. 
International organisations implicitly or explicitly advocate these arguments as 
increasingly important for development and anti-poverty initiatives. The 
normative conceptions of governance and development administration make 
judgements about official performance in relation to structures, inputs and 
outcomes in Weberian terms.
The problems of governance in Pakistan are assessed by different authors 
such as Candland and Mallick, who conclude that the public sector in Pakistan 
is dysfunctional. Bureaucratic dysfunction and ineffective public sector 
performance is widely recognised as the basis of bad governance in the 
country. The reasons for dysfunctionality according to both Quershi and 
Javaid are corruption, non-accountability, transparency and politically-based 
appointments. While most of the authors agree on these issues, concepts 
such as participation, non-democratic government and weak civil society have 
been discussed to highlight the issues of access to public and collective 
services. The arguments of Khan and Husain are important as they examine 
institutions through the lenses of bureaucratic structures and informal 
institutions. Political patronage and the political affiliations of civil servants 
remain central to describing demotivation among state officials. Khawaja and 
Khawaja’s central argument relates to the intrusion of political personalities 
into official policy and into the formal rules of the state institutions. The issue 
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of official performance is associated with weak monitoring, evaluation criteria 
and the politicisation of state bureaucracy.
The observations, analysis and propositions must not be restricted to state 
bureaucracy, but must also highlight the British legacy, its impact on the post-
independent state, and the perverse affects of aid conditionalities and 
structural adjustment strategies adopted by the donors. Therefore, multiple 
explanations must be taken into account, including the designs and ambitions 
of the British regime, the implantation of an unknown and modern 
bureaucracy, the erosion of the traditional culture, the history of post-colonial 
state, its structure, the political institutions and the role of civil bureaucracy in 
the internal governance of the state. Chapter two addresses these issues.
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Chapter Two
Historical Account of State Formation
1. Introduction
The state of Pakistan and its political system have undergone many changes 
since independence in 1947. To understand these changes, it is vital to 
engage with historical accounts in order to examine the ruptures that British 
imperialism caused in the previously existing state structures, the 
bureaucracy, and society more widely. Concerning the period before the 
arrival of English and French traders in India, a brief account of the Mughal 
Empire rule will allow the reader to understand the decline of Mughal rule, the 
events leading to the advent of the East India Company, and the subsequent 
establishment of formal control of India by the British. These events are crucial 
in understanding the historical formation of the post-independence state, its 
political culture and the role played by the state bureaucracy. To examine 
these fundamental questions in the case of Pakistan, it is also vital to engage, 
albeit briefly, with accounts of pre-colonial history and how a colonial 
bureaucracy was implanted for the exercise of authority in pursuit of 
domination. Thus, the role of the state bureaucracy in the post-independence 
state, its alliance with the military, and its ambitions, can all be better 
understood by historical contextualisation.
The post-independence history of Pakistan shows how the state bureaucracy 
and military have been able to shift the political situation in the country 
towards authoritarian rule, and makes manifest their ambitions to destabilise 
civilian governments. Moreover, the weak political structure of the state and 
polity has not been able to counter the dominance of the bureaucracy in 
political and civil affairs. A detailed account of political events and conflicts of 
interest between political parties reveals the weakening of political institutions, 
and shows how the military was able to create the conditions for the civilian 
bureaucracy to continuously intrude in the internal governance of the state. In 
particular, this historical overview of the bureaucracy shows how it assumed 
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different roles through successive interventions in state politics and 
institutions. The successive civil and military regimes have advanced their 
own agendas through the political capture of public administration. The 
installation of local governments by military regimes was instituted in order to 
bypass the political parties and to create conditions for legitimising military rule 
in the country. Whereas the military regimes strengthened the political role of 
civil bureaucracy, under the civilian government of the Pakistan People’s Party 
(PPP) we witnessed the decline of the autonomy of the state bureaucracy. 
This chapter further focuses on the politicisation of bureaucracy and the 
implications of this for its accountability to society as a whole. In addition, it 
briefly describes the locus of the decentralisation reforms introduced by the 
military government in 2001, because of their distinctiveness from the 
previous decentralisation reforms in terms of substance and structure, and 
sets out how public administration is performed in the present-day state.
2. An account of the pre-colonial Indian Empire
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Indian empire was ruled 
by the Mughal dynasty. The Mughal Empire was established in 1526, and 
went through phases of expansion and consolidation, surviving, albeit in an 
attenuated form, until 1857 (Bose and Jalal 1998, p.35). The economy of the 
Mughal dynasty was dependent on revenue generated by the Indian 
merchants through exchanges of goods along its coastal regions (ibid.). The 
Mughal Empire had rich metropolitan cities with a continuous influx of revenue 
and a consequent accumulation of wealth. The community in this period 
consisted of heterogeneous classes, and among those classes two in 
particular were used by the Mughals to maintain control and authority over the 
rest of the communities. The first was the noble class, called Amirs, who were 
designated noble officials. They were paid from lands called Jagirs, and their 
powers of revenue-raising embodied both power and patronage (Misra 1977, 
p.310). The second class comprised the feudal chiefs and hereditary 
Zamendars who enjoyed a certain degree of independence and to whom the 
Mughals granted official status. Over a period of time the position of the 
Zamendars was strengthened in various ways, since they were contracted to 
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carry out de facto administration at local levels (Richard 1993). During this 
process, the Mughals succeeded in generating large revenues because of the 
docile nature of village society, which had been accentuated by colonial policy 
in order to subjugate the locals (Madison 1971). 
The central authority of the Mughal Empire was undermined by the widening 
gap between the central and regional powers. The local elites and the regions 
controlled by them were concerned about the preservation of their vast tracts 
of land and could not keep up with the demand for revenue required by the 
empire to finance its expensive regional wars (Bose and Jalal 1998). The 
regional imbalance of wealth, along with economic disparities within classes, 
weakened the central power base of the Mughal Empire. As well as the high 
demand for revenue by the centre, the weakening of Mughal power was 
rooted in the “manipulation of central authority by the regionally based power”, 
and the “intra-regional disparities between classes” (ibid., p.50). The nobles 
(Amirs) of the Mughals were stripped of their powers and their jagirs were 
confiscated by the British, reducing them to abject poverty. There were also 
factors external to the sub-continent which drove the Mughal decline, such as 
tribal incursions into the hinterland of the Mughal Empire from the regions of 
Afghanistan, Eurasia and Central Asia (ibid.). Most fundamentally, however, it 
was the crisis of state legitimacy and its contribution to the schisms in local 
society which led to the weakening of the Mughal Empire in the Indian sub-
continent. The advent of the East India Company and its penetration into the 
empire was a result of the decline of the Mughal dynasty and its loss of power 
over its vast territorial boundaries.
3. The colonial administration and authority
Control and authority over the East India Company was exercised by the 
British parliament through the board of directors in London (Misra 1977, p.46). 
The company was not accountable to its subjects and used centralised control 
to extend its domination across the entire Indian sub-continent. As Bose and 
Jalal argue (1998, p.67), the Company “operated within the indigenous 
structure” of the Indian Empire. The Company introduced a “centralised 
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civilian bureaucracy” which was essentially British and kept its distance from 
the lower-rank officers who performed the routine activities of government 
(Misra 1977, p.94). After the rebellion/mutiny in 1857, the British took direct 
control of the management of the Indian Empire. This period was the 
beginning of the British Raj, and instead of a governor-general, India was 
ruled by a viceroy (Bose and Jalal 1998, p.97).
After 1857, the most urgent task was reorganisation to maintain imperial 
dominance (ibid.). After taking formal control of the Company, the British 
imposed rule-bound bureaucratic institutions designed according to the 
conceptions of Western states (Misra, 1977; Jalal, 1995). The institutions were 
designed to penetrate into the economy and society of India. Between 1858 
and 1919, the bureaucracy in India was marked by multiple attempts at 
rationalisation. Rationalisation meant hierarchy, rigidity in procedures, and 
adherence to codes intended to achieve predictability in public administration 
(Misra 1977). Thus, the centralisation of bureaucracy was achieved through 
bureaucratic control and uniformity in decision making. According to Misra 
(1977, p.91) “this was in fact a period of ‘bureaucratic despotism’ which at 
every level of the hierarchy tightened the chain of subordination from local 
officers through Provincial Governments to the Government of India”. The 
Indian Civil Service (ICS), as it was called from 1886 to 1887, was formally 
constituted through the enactment of statutory rights by the British parliament 
in order to protect the civil servants from political influence (ibid.). The reason 
for the constitution of the ICS was to grant an opportunity to educated Indians 
to be employed in the Covenanted Civil Service.15
The late eighteenth and mid nineteenth century have been characterised as 
the extension of power “over the peasantry through the ‘Zamendars’, granting 
them unchecked powers to raise rents for the Company’s revenue” (Bose and 
Jalal 1998, p.70). The company used coercive means to extract wealth from 
the indigenous population. The peasants and the weavers were stripped of 
                                                       
15 The public service was classified into two main classes: covenanted and the un-
covenanted. “The former was a higher administrative service recruited in England. The latter 
was lower executive services recruited in India” (Misra 1977, p.93).
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their property rights (ibid.). Moreover, the district collector, a creation of the 
British administration system, exercised arbitrary powers during the colonial 
period and created a personalised form of patronage system (Jalal 1995). As 
a consequence, the patronage system encouraged loyalty and compromised 
impartiality in public dealings. During the colonial period, local bureaucrats 
were used to suppress uprisings and to counter the pressure from below. In 
the following years, the bureaucracy established a strong hold over different 
levels of government due to its superior knowledge and expertise (Misra 
1977). The bureaucracy was thus actively engaged at the political and 
administrative levels.
In 1917, Edwin Montague, Secretary of India, announced the prospect of self-
rule in India, which was a formal commitment to a move towards 
independence. By granting some representation to Hindus and Muslims in the 
provincial legislatures, the broader agenda of the British was to establish 
control over their colonial subjects. The India Act of 1935 divided the subjects 
into categories and at the same time granted Hindus and Muslims limited 
authority in the internal affairs of the state (Lawrence 1997). The Muslim 
League, represented by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, resisted the 
British policy of limited representation for Muslims in the constituent assembly. 
In the elections of 1937, Jinnah was able to unite the Muslims and secured 
some representation for them (ibid.).
The overwhelming victory of the Indian National Congress in the 1937 
elections resulted in the Muslims being ignored in the sharing of power, as 
Nehru was determined to preserve his monolithic presence within the party. 
Moreover, the Congress did not acquiesce to the constitutional safeguards 
demanded by Jinnah for the Muslims. In the wake of these developments, 
Jinnah was convinced that without constitutional safeguards, the Muslims 
would not be able to garner support for their demands on an equal footing with 
Hindus (Lawrence 1997). 
In the final decades of the British Raj, the All India Muslim League led by 
Jinnah used their platform to advocate for a separate Muslim state. Jinnah 
demanded that the Muslim majority states should form a Muslim state and the 
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Hindu majority areas should constitute a state for Hindus. Jinnah’s communal 
demand was based on his idea of the creation of Pakistan out of the “Muslim-
majority areas in the north-west and north-east of the subcontinent” (Jalal 
1995, p.14). Jinnah argued that Hindus and Muslims would not be able to live 
together after independence because of the mistrust of the majority Hindu 
leaders towards the Muslims, and as a result his two-nation theory became a 
decisive factor in the establishment of a separate Muslim state in 1947.
The British in the Indian sub-continent established a unitary state structure 
controlled by bureaucratic institutions in order to skilfully impose its colonial 
policy, which, according to Jalal (1995, p.13) “allowed the colonial state to 
manipulate and administer the affairs of a society differentiated by region, 
class, caste and community”. British bureaucratic authoritarianism was based 
on personal loyalties and the allegiance of the local landlords to the Crown. 
The British colonial policy was the result of using the landlords as 
intermediaries at the cost of dispossessing the tenants to broaden their 
colonial base and authority (ibid.). People of the Indian sub-continent were 
offered limited opportunities to rule and were denied rights to citizenship. The 
British Raj failed to recognise the Indian political structures, the communal 
problems of India, or its multi-ethnic roots and religious sentiments. The 
Government of India Act of 1935, adopted by both India and Pakistan after 
partition in 1947, served to establish the practice of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism. The hasty departure of the British in 1946 left deep imprints 
on the post-colonial state and left many issues unresolved.
4. The post-colonial state
Occidentals and the intelligentsia in Pakistan often cite lack of democracy, the 
crisis of governance, and low human development as the key impediments to 
development (Sayeed 1980). Such analysis does not take into account the 
historical legacy of British imperialism and the capitalistic mode of production 
in the Indian empire. Moreover, to understand the long period of military and 
bureaucratic alliances, it is vital to explain and examine the class structure and 
state within Pakistan. In order to analyse the roles and the character of 
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successive civil and military regimes in Pakistan, an understanding of the 
question of the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state requires explanation in terms of 
how the state and civil society are mutually integrated (Alavi 1983, p.42). This 
in turn calls for an assessment of civil–military alliances, the articulation of 
power, their class structure and the competing interests of other dominant 
classes in the post-colonial state. Different theories have been advanced 
(Miliband and Marx, cited by Alavi 1972) in the examination of the nature of 
post-colonial states. Here, I introduce the thesis proposed by Hamza Alavi, 
which is particularly related to the post-independent state of Pakistan. Alavi 
states: 
“The central proposition I wish to emphasise is that the state in the 
postcolonial society is not the instrument of a single class. It is 
relatively autonomous and it mediates between competing interests 
of the three propertied classes, namely the metropolitan 
bourgeoisies, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes, 
while at the same time acting on behalf of all of them in order to 
preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, 
namely the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as 
the dominant mode of production”. (Alavi 1972, p.2)
The above argument was developed in relation to the classical Marxist view of 
the state “simply as instruments of a single ruling class” (Alavi 1972, p.2). 
According to Alavi, the situation in Pakistan is more complex. Under British 
rule, the state apparatus was ‘over-developed’ in relation to society, and
among the social classes it was the metropolitan class which carried out the 
tasks of colonial rule. The metropolitan class has played two different roles in 
the Indian sub-continent: one was to support the indigenous revolution for self-
government, the other to establish “its domination over the indigenous class”. 
After independence, the metropolitan class was “separated but the indigenous 
class remained intact along with the pre-colonial state apparatus” (Alavi 1972, 
p.2).
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Alavi’s main thesis is that in post-colonial Pakistan, the state and its 
institutions have developed to look after the interests of not one but three 
competing classes. The emergence and constitution of these three different 
classes was unique and cannot be fully explained from a classical Marxist 
perspective, “simply in terms of a single ruling class” (Alavi 1972, p.2). In the 
post-colonial state, the processes of the development of the institutional 
framework are more complex. The structure of the post-independence state of 
Pakistan is based on this multiclass relationship (ibid., p.3). The apparatus of 
the state after independence did not only consist of the three propertied 
classes—namely: the indigenous class, the metropolitan class and the feudal 
class—but also included a civil-military oligarchy, which assumed effective 
command over the state in October 1958. The central issue in the articulation 
and sharing of power is that the three propertied classes did not directly 
influence the relatively autonomous role of the state. Rather, they mediated 
their demands through the state which was dominated by the civil-military 
oligarchy and exerted centralised control over society (ibid.).
A key point to understand is that the three dominant classes in the post-
colonial state of Pakistan did not challenge the state apparatus because of 
‘relative autonomy’. In relation to the question of ‘relative autonomy’, the 
metropolitan class negotiated its demands within the state structure due to its 
financial strength and the considerable power it attained prior to and after 
independence. The metropolitan class could not impose its demands 
unilaterally as it had to forge alliances with other classes. Moreover, the 
relative autonomy in the post-colonial state had a different character as the 
bureaucratic-military oligarchy operated within the “existing matrix of the 
society and not outside it” (Alavi 1972, p.8). From its inception the state had 
established an independent material base and enjoyed an autonomy which 
was vested in the interests of state bureaucracy and the military. Alavi 
maintains that such autonomy was a distinctive feature of the post-colonial 
state apparatus, as it was “over-developed” and exercised command over the 
rest of society. The position of ‘relative autonomy’ to which Alavi draws 
attention thus has a two-fold explanation: one explanation relates to the 
legacy of an “over-developed” bureaucracy in relation to political and civil 
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society institutions; the other relates to three competing propertied classes 
(i.e. not one dominant class controlling the state in its own interest). These two 
explanations became reinforced by the significance of the military, which was 
established to subordinate the indigenous classes rather than to serve them. 
The metropolitan class emerged as a strong player in mediating the role of the 
state by forging alliances with civil bureaucracy. It was able to intervene in 
state politics and policies because of the civil–military cooperation and its 
ability to bring other ruling elites, factions and landlords under its influence and 
control (Sayeed 1980).
There are alternative perspectives which throw light on the post-colonial state 
and deal specifically with the nature of the state, the crisis of state legitimacy 
and continuation of the post-colonial legacy in Pakistan’s various democratic 
and non-democratic regimes. Tracing the process of transition, Samina 
Ahmad argues that Pakistan inherited a fragile and a highly centralised 
authoritarian state. State legitimacy in the post-colonial environment was 
constantly challenged through the consolidation of power by the civil and 
military apparatuses (Ahmad 1988, cited by Shastri 2001). Similarly, Malik 
(1997) argues that after independence in 1947, Pakistan’s highly centralised 
state structure and its political institutions were dominated by a non-
representative elite. The government was primarily run by civil–military 
alliances, which thwarted the process of establishing “fully-fledged 
accountable, representative and mandated institutions” (Malik 1997, p.58). 
These perspectives are closely associated with the thesis of Alavi, who lays 
extra emphasis on tracing the class structure of and articulation of power by 
powerful elements, and the consequent impact on the political institutions in 
Pakistan.
Alavi’s account of the post-colonial state does not fully encompass the social 
and political culture and the regional configuration of the state after 
independence. The regions of Pakistan make up a diversified multi-ethnic 
class-based society with four provinces, namely Punjab, Khyber 
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Pakhtunkhwa,16 Sindh and Baluchistan. Baluchistan is the country’s largest 
and least-developed province. The province is inhabited by the Baloch tribes, 
and within these tribes there are land-based loyalties spurring local rivalries. 
The development of institutions in the province is mainly restricted to its 
capital Quetta. The British left the internal affairs of the province to the people 
of Baluchistan because it was too remote and inaccessible (Malik 1997). 
The province of Punjab is the most prosperous province, dominated primarily 
by the feudal classes with huge land holdings. The legislative councils in the 
province were established by the British as early as 1897 and granted 
representation to the loyalist landlords, who thereby acquired a strong hold 
over the country’s politics and its political institutions. The province had been 
ruled by the landed class through the Punjab Unionist Party up till 1947. After 
1947, the All India Muslim league, led by the founder of Pakistan, faced 
impediments in holding the league together as one united party because of its 
confinement to urban elites (Malik 1997). 
The second-largest province, Sindh, like south-western Punjab, has been 
dominated by tribal dynasties mostly of Baloch origin. Karachi, the provincial 
capital, has enjoyed metropolitan status since the transformation of the 
political, economic and demographic contours of the province by the Mahjir 
Quami Movement (MQM), a migrant community settled there (Malik 1997).
The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has historic significance stemming from 
the era of Britain’s incursions into Afghanistan, and the special interest of the 
British in deriving military advantage by enlisting the support of the local tribes. 
The province has a strong Pakhtoon tradition which dates back to ancient 
times (Malik 1997). 
There are different tribes, and among these the Pakhtoons form a majority 
within an otherwise very diverse region. The regions bordering present-day 
Afghanistan are the tribal regions of the province and the administration of the 
                                                       
16 The North Western Frontier Province (N.W.F.P) was renamed in April 2010 by the 
constitutional committee set up by the Federal Government to propose certain reforms and 
amendments. The renaming of the province was a demand put forward by the ruling National 
Awami Party (NAP) in the province.
46
province was left to the tribal chiefs by the British. These regions have 
retained their own customs, alliances and centuries-old cultural traditions. 
After partition, the tribal regions were administered by the federal government 
and they maintain a separate identity within the state structure. The people in 
the province rely heavily on kinship for social security and social capital, 
though the specific nature of these kin relationships is dependent on the social 
status and class structure of the different clans, tribes and families.17
Different languages are spoken in the different provinces, and there is wide 
variation in culture, dress codes and social-cultural norms. The post-
independence state thus comprises a multi-cultural society, wherein social 
relations are generally framed around ethnicity, strong family ties and kinship 
links.
5. Overview of the federal, provincial and local government systems
The India Act of 1935 established a federal form of government in the Indian 
state and introduced ‘fully responsible’ provincial governments in the 
provinces (Ali Cheema et al. 2004, p.3). Another feature of British rule in India 
was the introduction of local government in urban and rural areas. The urban–
rural divide in local government was exacerbated under the British due to their 
efforts to provide municipal services in the urban areas. This was done to 
establish centralised control by the district bureaucracies over the rural 
classes and to co-opt the local elites, and was in effect “an extension of the 
system of patronage” (Ali Cheema et al. 2004, p.4). East Pakistan and West 
Pakistan were divided into divisions18 which were sub-divided into districts19
(Sayeed 1958). 
                                                       
17 The information in this paragraph is drawn from the author’s own background and 
biographical experiences—the author being Pakhtoon, and thus familiar with the province of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
18 A division constituted a vast geographical spread and these divisions were large central 
urban cities such as Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Gujrat. A district consisted of urban and rural 
areas.
19 The level below the districts was the tehsil, a sub-division of the district consisting of several 
villages. See Inayatullah 1964.
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Administration in Pakistan remained at the district level. The district officials, 
known as the Indian Civil Service (ICS), became the face of the government
(Inayatullah 1964). After 1947, the local government system first introduced by 
the British was fully functional only in the province of Punjab, where it took the 
form of “village panchayats and municipal councils”20 (Ali Cheema et al. 2004, 
p.5). Despite official declarations, the local government system in the rest of 
the country was not fully implemented, and this was for two reasons: first, the 
state bureaucracy dominated the local governments; second, the local 
governments “were denied legitimacy by not holding elections because of 
limited franchise and malpractices” (Ali Cheema et al. 2004, p.5). Thus, the 
local governments existed, but there was no real commitment to 
decentralising powers at the district and lower levels. In the first decade of 
partition the ICS bureaucracy penetrated into all levels of the government and 
established its control over much of the policy-making in the country.
The role that the ICS had inherited further strengthened the state apparatus, 
since all the key posts in the state administrative structures were reserved for 
select cadres21 and, as a result, they controlled the entire administration. In 
keeping with the imperial tradition of the ICS, the strength of the Civil Service 
of Pakistan22 (CSP) lay in its concept of ‘guardianship’, which required 
showing solidarity with colleagues (Gardezi and Rashid 1983). Hence, the 
CSP’s longstanding image of superiority and ‘guardianship’ was perpetuated 
after partition. The recruitment and the training of CSP officers were controlled 
by the Public Service Commission (ibid.), and public service in Pakistan was 
thus dominated by its ‘cadres’. The cadre system can be traced back to the 
East India Company: the creation of the Provincial Civil Service had been 
referred to as the ‘Indianisation’ of the services, its object being to recruit 
natives into public service, and this policy was pursued from 1887 to 1947 
(Misra 1977).
                                                       
20 The term panchayat means the constitution of a forum known as a council, consisting of five 
members.
21 The cadre system defines career prospects and the civil servants are mostly recognised 
according to a particular cadre (Kennedy 1987).
22 ICS was renamed the Civil Service of Pakistan.
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6. Chronology of regimes and key policy changes/reforms
In the period from 1947 to 1958, the social structure of the state differed 
between East and West Pakistan. In East Pakistan, the Muslim league failed 
to mobilise grassroots support to become a mass political party. The All India 
Muslim League (AIML), which was credited with the establishment of 
Pakistan, could not live up to the expectations of its leader Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah. The disintegration of AIML in 1956 was due to “intrigues, neglect and 
rivalries along personal and provincial lines” (Jalal 1995, p.53). As argued by 
Malik (1997), the AIML formed coalitions with non-representative rural elites to 
gain power and aligned itself with them for personal interests. The ruling elites 
were retired and serving bureaucrats and military leaders used the party to 
legitimise their illegitimate rise to power.
The political structure in East Pakistan was represented by the United Front 
Coalition, a group of diverse parties of which the Awami League was the most 
important (Sayeed 1980). The league challenged the domination of the 
Muslim League over the issues of language and provincial autonomy (Lodhi 
2011). The major decisive turn in the political situation of Pakistan can be 
seen after the defeat of the Muslim League by the United Front Coalition in the 
1954 provincial elections (Sayeed 1980). The triumph of the party resulted in 
the formation of a central government. To the civil bureaucracy, the army, and 
in particular the landed elites and families in the western part of the country, 
democracy was anathema. In this non-democratic context, “the military and 
civil bureaucracy was able to achieve their own narrow institutional interests” 
(Jalal 1995, p.50). The formation of alliances between the bureaucracy and 
military undermined the role of the parliament in the state structures. National 
elections in the country were not held and constitution-making was delayed 
because of differences over the distribution of political and financial powers 
between the centre and the provinces (ibid.). Moreover, the executive enjoyed 
superiority over the legislative and judicial organs of the state. This was 
evident after 1951 when the country was ruled by civil bureaucrats, and in the 
future collaborations between the civil bureaucracy and military in the internal 
governance of the state.
49
In 1953, the third governor-general of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad (a 
bureaucrat), with the connivance of the military, overthrew the first elected 
prime minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin, despite the latter having a majority in 
parliament (Ziring 1997). The judiciary acted in favour of the governor-general 
by validating the dismissal on the basis of the law and order situation and 
upheld its ruling in favour of the dissolution of the constituent assembly. The 
ruling of the supreme judicial court thus legitimised military rule in the country. 
A major conflict existed between the bureaucrats and the politicians, and this 
conflict must be seen in the context of the arbitrary powers used by the British 
to suppress the politicians. The civil bureaucracy was able to justify the 
dismissal of an elected prime minister as an act of legitimising its authority 
without much political resistance. The centralisation of bureaucratic control 
undermined the independent functioning of the legislative and judicial organs 
of the state. This further worsened the precarious position of the political 
parties. The political events just before the first military takeover in 1958 thus 
make manifest certain factors which have marked the political situation in 
Pakistan since independence. These include the success of the military and 
the civil bureaucracy in undermining the political process, and their ability to 
establish writ within the state in collaboration with other dominant classes.
6.1 The military regime and ‘Basic Democracies’ (1958-70)
In 1958, General Ayub imposed martial law and introduced the concept of 
‘Basic Democracy’ (BD) in the country. Parliamentary democracy was seen as 
a hindrance to the interests of the civil-military oligarchy. According to the 
1956 constitution, holding general elections would have transferred power and 
authority from East Pakistan. The social and political situation after 1958 
ushered in authoritarian rule using the bureaucracy as instruments of 
governance (Jalal 1995). Jalal further asserts that the institutions of the state 
were permanently damaged when authoritarian rule was introduced in the 
country. General Ayub legitimised the military takeover by the army and 
initiated the process of intervening between the state and society. His attack 
on politicians was an assertion of their inability to improve the living conditions 
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of the people, and he described the character of the politicians as “venal and 
unscrupulous” (Ziring 1997, p.260).
The declaration of martial law in 1958 in the country was a clear message that 
all political activities must cease, and many political leaders were disqualified 
and barred from engaging in political mobilisation. General Ayub needed the 
sympathy and the support of those groups who could provide him with an 
opportunity to bypass his critics. This resulted in forging an alliance with and 
enlisting the support of the bureaucracy. The state apparatus became totally 
centralised, and the authority and decision-making of higher officials were 
considered as final (Ziring 1980, p.87). The civil-military oligarchic alliance 
appealed to the landed class of the country who feared the introduction of land 
reforms and the loss of their wealth under democratic regimes. They lent 
support to the military regime, which further strengthened the authority of the 
General (Ziring 1980).
Prior to the introduction of the Basic Democracies, the politician in the local 
villages hardly visited the people. The politician would seek an understanding 
with a particular faction of the village and votes would be delivered in his 
favour (Ziring 1997). The parties before the Ayub era had followed this 
process, and no efforts had been made to alter the prevailing system. The 
introduction of Basic Democracies was meant to bring political change. The 
object of General Ayub’s Basic Democracy was two-fold: to establish a 
political constituency for maintaining a stable relationship between citizens 
and government, and to grant excessive powers to the president under the 
constitution of 1963. From the time of Ayub’s takeover, the ‘bureaucratic-
military oligarchy’ remained at the helm for the entirety of the 1960s (Cheema 
and Sayeed 2006, p.9). Moreover, Ayub’s military regime gave the 
bureaucracy the space to play a vital role in policy-making within the country 
(ibid.). 
6.2 The civilian government and bureaucratic reforms (1972-1977)
The first true elections of 1970 significantly altered the political system, and 
Pakistan shifted from an autocratic to a parliamentary form of government. A 
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true believer in parliamentary democracy, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto founded the 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in 1967 (Sayeed 1980). In a short span of time, 
Bhutto was able to gather huge support among the rural masses. In 1970, 
elections were held in West as well as in East Pakistan. In West Pakistan, the 
Pakistan People’s Party was the main winner of the elections in the provinces 
of Punjab and Sindh. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto capitalised on the fact that Ayub’s 
policies had failed to improve the social and economic conditions of the rural 
masses or to alter the existing political structure dominated by the landlords in 
West Pakistan (Sayeed 1980, p.153). The populist appeal of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto with the rural masses, and his democratic ambitions following his 
victory in West Pakistan, made him an extremely popular leader. The Awami 
League Party headed by Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman secured an overall 
majority in East Pakistan (Ziring 1980). The political situation between East 
and West Pakistan became tense after the elections due to a number of 
political and military events, such as the military operation in East Pakistan to 
crush the separatist Bengali movement, Mujeeb’s insistence on lifting martial 
law in the country, the delay in the transfer of power by General Yayah and 
the invasion of East Pakistan by India (Ziring, 1997; Sayeed, 1980; Waseem,
2007, Talbot, 1998). These events led to the formal assumption of power by 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the Western part of the country and the creation of 
Bangladesh in 1971.
In 1972, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the president of Pakistan and sought to 
reduce the influence of the military and bureaucracy. The major challenge 
faced by Bhutto in the consolidation of power was to deal with civil–military 
nexus. Bhutto knew that in order to achieve his political ambitions, he had to 
deal with a civil service which was closely aligned with the military and also 
played a dominant role in the country’s development policies. After becoming 
president, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto initiated reforms in the state bureaucracy. In the 
initial phase, under martial ordinance, 1,300 civil servants were dismissed who 
were too close to the previous military regime and were also known for their 
dominance and influence (Noman 1998, p.61). This was followed by the 
abolition of the CSP in 1973. Instead of the CSP, a linear system was 
introduced which combined all the hierarchical structures into twenty-two pay 
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scales (known as the All Pakistan Unified Grade Structure). The entire 
structure of bureaucracy was crafted around this hierarchical framework 
(Noman 1998). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s reforms to the Civil Service of Pakistan 
were never fully implemented because the country was facing threats from its 
neighbours as well as from the separatist movements in the province of 
Baluchistan. The military once again frustrated the efforts of parliamentary 
democracy by arresting Bhutto and replacing his government by the military 
dictator General Zia-ul-Haq. Martial law was again declared in the country in 
1977. This allowed the bureaucracy to extend its reach and exercise its 
authority in perpetuity.
6.3 The second military regime (1977-1988)
The second military regime was more autocratic than the previous one. 
General Zia dissolved the national and political governments in the name of 
restoring peace in the country, justifying martial law by citing the inability of the 
political leadership and political parties to manage national affairs (Ziring 
1997, p.424). General Zia became the president. Under the rule of General 
Zia, political parties were banned, the press and freedom of speech were 
curtailed and, above all, Zia introduced his own constitution without any 
consultation and had it ratified by the legislature. The constitution gave the 
president all the powers needed to reign over the state, and unparalleled 
discretionary powers to interfere in the political institutions. In addition to the 
above, the president’s authority was final (Ziring 1997). His actions could not 
be deemed unconstitutional because he had removed the authority of the 
assembly to make such judgements. The president enjoyed the powers to 
appoint the prime minister, provincial governors, officials, and also the 
judiciary (Noman 1988).
Another important scheme of the General was to enlist the support of a 
network of civilians similar to the objective of the Basic Democracies of 
General Ayub. Noman (1988, p.130) argues that there were two basic 
objectives behind this strategy. The first was that the civilians would form a 
core of loyalist beneficiaries; the second was to restrict the demands for 
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democratic rule and so help shore up Zia’s power. Zia achieved his 
objectives—firstly in terms of political fragmentation, as a result of his 
interventions “in political parties to neutralise the presence of organised 
political parties within the political structure” (Cheema and Sayyed 2006, 
p.13), and secondly through his promulgation of the Local Government 
Ordinance of 1979, which was based on restrictive representation at the local 
level.23
6.4 The civilian governments (1988-1999) 
After the death of Zia in 1998, Ghulam Ishaq Khan became the president of 
the country. He was a seasoned bureaucrat who had served during the pre-
independence period and had been chairman of the Senate. He followed the 
path of the military regimes and remained powerful under the 8th amendment 
of the 1973 constitution, which gave the president the power to dissolve 
political governments. After the writ petition in the Supreme Court which 
declared the dissolution of the National Assembly by Zia illegal, President 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan decided to hold general elections (Ziring 1997). 
Two major parties became strong contenders in the elections: the Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP) under the leadership of Shaheed (Martyred) Benazir 
Bhutto, and the Islamic Democratic24 Alliance (IJI) headed by Nawaz Sharif. In 
the election of 1988, Benazir Bhutto was the first “woman in modern history” to 
become the head of an Islamic state (Ziring 1997, p.510). The first clash of the 
Benazir government with the IJI was over the provincial ministry of Punjab, 
and the role played by Nawaz Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab, to influence 
the provincial elections in favour of his party (Ziring 1997, p.511). Instead of 
working together to build democratic institutions in the state, the politics 
between the PPP and the IJI (members of the Muslim League formed the core 
of the IJI) became increasingly confrontational. The head-on confrontation 
was not tolerated by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In the following years, 
                                                       
23 I explain this particular strategy of Ayub’s regime in section 6 of this chapter.
24 The term ‘Democratic’ in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan, is ‘Jamhoriat’.
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coalition parties—namely the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the 
Awami National Party (ANP)—broke away from the PPP in the provinces of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhaw and in Sindh. What emerged on the political scene was 
the formation of alliances of political parties25 with the IJI to bring the PPP 
down (Ziring 1997). Key factors in the dissolution of Benazir’s government 
were the close contacts between the president and the army, and the role of 
the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) in ‘horse-trading’, the latter being 
an internal conspiracy by the army to derail the democratic government of the 
PPP (Talbot 1998, p.309).
In 1990, under article 58 (clause b) of the 1973 constitution, the president 
dissolved the national and provincial governments and dismissed the 
government of Benazir Bhutto (Ziring 1997, p.524). After Benazir was ousted 
from the government, Nawaz Sharif indicated that he would form a broad-
based coalition with the urban and other classes. The urban constituencies 
which were represented by the industrial and commercial classes lent support 
to the policies of Nawaz Sharif during the elections (Ziring 1997, p.529). 
Following the 1990 elections, Nawaz Sharif formed the government at national 
and provincial levels and became prime minister. The tenure of Nawaz Sharif 
(1990-93) was marked by confrontational politics with the Pakistan Democratic 
Alliance (PDA) instigated by the PPP, as well as corruption, and crises of law 
and order in Sindh. The incident that sparked a confrontation between 
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif was the appointment of the 
new chief of staff of the army. The president appointed the new chief without 
consulting Nawaz Sharif: this, combined with the aforementioned factors, 
coincided with Nawaz Sharif’s decision to review the Eighth Amendment 
(Talbot 1998, p.325).
Following the dissolution of elected governments by the president using the 
constitutional amendment26 instituted by the Zia regime, Nawaz Sharif was 
                                                       
25 Lodhi (2011, p.53) argues that provinces are organised around traditional kinship groups 
and influential political personalities, illustrating the significance of the dynastic character of 
political parties.
26 The amendments made “in the articles 58 and 48 of the constitution of 1973 established a 
quasi-Presidential form of government in 1985” (Ali Cheema et al. 2004, p.15).
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adamant about repealing the Eighth Amendment and empowering parliament 
instead. These measures were seen by the bureaucracy and military as an 
assault on their power (Ziring 1997). Nawaz Sharif was in a weak position to 
confront both the army and the president, who was also a civil servant. 
Moreover, what greatly undermined the power of Nawaz Sharif were the civil-
military institutions, a legacy of the overdeveloped bureaucracy discussed by 
Alavi, which formed a powerful bloc with the military in the post-colonial state. 
In a televised broadcast, Nawaz Sharif cited the president “as the root cause 
of the country’s woes” (Ziring 1997, p.541). The split within the Pakistan 
Muslim League (PML) weakened the position of Nawaz Sharif, and after 1993 
he lost the overwhelming support enjoyed earlier. Major charges were brought 
against the government of Nawaz Sharif relating to issues of “corruption, 
nepotism and maladministration” (Talbot 1998, p.326). The Nawaz Sharif 
government faced the same fate as its predecessor.
Benazir Bhutto’s second administration (1993-1996) was different from her 
first. The elections of 1993 gave her an overall majority in the parliament. 
Moreover, President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari belonged to the PPP and 
remained a staunch and sincere believer in building democratic institutions in 
the country. However, the relationship between the president and Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto became tense over “extra-judicial killings, issues of 
corruption and economic mismanagement” (Talbot 1998, p.334). The country 
was witnessing the collapse of legitimate government institutions and the 
manoeuvring by the PPP and other political parties was seen by the president 
as compromising the credibility of the state institutions (Ziring 1997). The 
president became increasingly aware of the Benazir government’s designs 
and interests. Following a law and order situation in which the law enforcing 
agencies were not able to prevent the killing of twenty-one innocent people 
praying in a mosque, the president decided to turn against his own party and 
government (Ziring 1997). On 5th November 1996, President Farooq Leghari 
declared the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies, and the 
tenure of the second term of Benazir came to an end.
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After the dissolution of the assemblies in 1996, elections were again held in 
1997. In these elections, Nawaz Sharif secured an overwhelming majority. 
The victory of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) was due to the massive 
support from the urban-based classes in the province of Punjab (Lodhi 2011). 
The loss by the PPP was attributed to the low turnout of voters (Ziring 1997). 
Nawaz Sharif formed alliances with other political parties, such as the Awami 
National Party (ANP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Mahajir Quami 
Moverment (MQM) in Sindh. Nawaz Sharif declared that he would not tolerate 
corruption and would begin the process of increasing political accountability; 
but at the same time, he made every effort to undermine the highest institution 
of the country, the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The prime minister faced 
charges of corruption in the award of contracts to international organisations 
and the rapid accumulation of wealth by his family (Ziring 1997). While cases 
against Nawaz Sharif were being probed by the Supreme Court, the elected 
Prime Minister and his party workers, including serving Members of the 
National Assembly (MNAs) and Members of the Provincial Assembly (MPAs), 
ransacked the building of the Supreme Court and made a mockery of the 
independence of the judiciary (Talbot 1998, p.362). Jones (2002) argues that 
Nawaz Sharif was never interested in politics. According to Jones, Sharif was 
more interested in protecting his own private business by seeking political 
influence. The country during the period 1993-1998 faced a crisis of 
democracy as a result of a continued civil war in the province of Sindh, weak 
political institutions, corruption and the politics of confrontation between the 
political parties (Talbot 1998).
6.5 The political structure under the Musharraf regime (1999-2008)
In order to understand the decentralisation reforms known as the ‘devolution 
of power’ introduced by the Musharraf regime, it is instructive to briefly 
describe the system of administration which existed prior to decentralisation. 
Up until 2001, administration was divided into four tiers; the centre, province, 
division and district (Khan 2006, p.1; Keefer et al. 2005, p.6). The centre held 
both administrative and financial powers. The districts and the divisions were 
distinct entities governed by the provinces through the bureaucracy (Khan 
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2006). The district tier had always maintained its traditional status of 
exercising substantial control vested in the office of the Deputy 
Commissioner27 (DC). Although the local governments did exist during the 
previous regimes of Ayub and Zia, they did not significantly alter the 
centralisation of power at the provincial level. The powers of the local 
governments at the sub-provincial levels were restricted because 
administrative functions were performed by provincial line departments, a 
“deconcentrated bureaucratic tier that did not report directly to provincial 
elected representatives” (Ali Cheema et al. 2004, p.16). During the periods of 
Ayub and Zia, the importance of local governments as a means of 
decentralisation of political, fiscal and administrative authority fell short of
establishing the legitimacy of local governments. The new devolution plan 
introduced by General Pervez Musharraf in 2001 significantly restructured the 
government at the sub-provincial levels, i.e. district and below (Ali Cheema et 
al. 2004). 
Under the devolution plan, an elected government was created at the district 
level and political linkages were established at the sub-district levels (tehsil 
and union council).28 The district government is headed by an elected Nazim
(Mayor), and the administration in the district is headed by the District 
Coordinator Officer (DCO).
After the military takeover in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, now the Chief 
Executive of the country, revealed in his speech to the nation his seven-point 
agenda. Among the seven points, devolution of power was identified as a 
mechanism to empower the people at the grassroots level (Khan 2006). The 
National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) was formally assigned the task of 
crafting a Local Government Plan (LGP) in 2000. The LGP led to the 
establishment of local governments (LGs) throughout the country at district, 
                                                       
27 The DC performed several functions such as: magisterial functions which included law and 
order, revenue collection, general administration, and the coordination of service delivery.
28 Political linkages have been established between the three tiers of local government—i.e. 
district, tehsil and union. The union Nazims (mayors) and the Naib Nazims (deputy mayors) 
“are the members of the district and tehsil councils respectively”. The formal administrative 
linkages between these tiers have been laid out in the Local Government Ordinance (2001).
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tehsil and union (sub-district) levels. After the establishment of the LGs, fiscal, 
administrative and political responsibilities were transferred from the centre 
(Federal Government) to the LGs (ICG 2004). The primary motive behind the 
local government reforms in 200129 was to replace the previously centralised 
system of governance in the country. It was envisaged by the NRB that 
restructuring of bureaucracy, in addition to decentralisation of administrative 
authority and decision making at the district level and below, would improve 
public administration in the country. An overarching objective of the devolution 
process was to reform the political structure so that it would serve the interests 
of the disadvantaged citizens and increase access to local politics. The 
technical aims of the devolution plan were to improve the delivery of public 
and collective services. The underlying assumption behind the creation of 
local governments was that it would effectively and efficiently deliver primary 
education, health, and municipal services like water and sanitation. 
6.6 The civilian government (2008 to present)
After the tragic incident of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 
2007, national and provincial elections were held in February 2008. Asif Ali 
Zardari, the widower of Benazir Bhutto, became the leader of the PPP and the 
president of the country. In the national assembly, the PPP secured the 
largest number of votes and formed a government in coalition with various 
other political forces, namely the National Awami Party in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, MQM in Sindh and PML (Nawaz faction) in Punjab (Nelson 
2008). The coalition government of the PPP continued to implement 
development programmes and policies under the LG system of 2001. 
However, the local government system had a limited constitutional protection 
for a period of six years, and after that period the provincial governments 
could make amendments in the LG system. Through a presidential ordinance, 
the PPP government made certain policy changes. First, LGs became 
provincial subjects. Second was the suspension of the LG in the country in 
                                                       
29 The system is not been implemented in federal areas, cantonments and federally 
administered tribal areas in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
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March 2010. The provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa appointed 
administrators30 instead of Nazims throughout the province in the districts and 
at the sub-district (tehsil) level.
7. Political capture of public administration
In this section, I examine the changes and reforms introduced in the state 
bureaucracy under the military regimes and the civilian government of Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto, in order to underscore the extent of the political capture of public 
administration by the state bureaucracy. In particular, I pay attention to the 
role that bureaucracy assumed after independence, and how the state 
bureaucracy lost its autonomy and became politicised under the military 
government of General Zia and, most recently, under the local government 
system introduced by General Musharraf. The objective of this section is not 
to provide an in-depth analysis of the bureaucracy but rather to focus on the 
institutionalisation of bureaucracy in the present state of Pakistan.
The bureaucratic structure of public service has been inherited from the 
colonial civil service—that is, it comprises a loyalist class, highly educated, 
trained and groomed in colonial traditions of rule. After independence in 1947, 
the civil servants were no longer subjects of the Crown. Instead of 
reorganising the centralised administrative system and undertaking the tasks 
of strengthening political institutions, it was more convenient for the members 
of the civil bureaucracy to run the country on a pre-colonial framework. The 
civil bureaucracy enjoyed considerable strength in a period when the weak 
elected assemblies were unable to make policy decisions. In Pakistan, 
bureaucratic elites were not much concerned about institution-building or 
acquiring political support to justify their policies. The decision-making process 
was totally dominated by the civil bureaucracy and there was little interaction 
with local citizens. Here, I refer back to Alavi’s assessment of the relatively 
autonomous role of bureaucratic-military oligarchy in the state. As Alavi 
                                                       
30 The provincial government, through legislation, appointed public officials to perform the 
functions of Nazim until such time that local government elections are held in the province 
after their suspension in March 2010.
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argues (1972, p.4), from the inception of the state, parliamentary democracy 
and the consolidation of power by the political parties have always been 
weakened because the bureaucratic-military oligarchy was able to bypass the 
political leaders by using British techniques and dealings. The British 
techniques were institutionalised when state bureaucracy did not allow the 
mediation of political parties (Alavi 1972). Furthermore, the oligarchy has 
accrued benefits by developing close contacts with big businessmen and 
landlords, and, more importantly, the civilian bureaucracy and the military 
were drawn from the landed class (Alavi, cited in Gardezi and Rashid 1983, 
p.46). It is in virtue of these particular modes of operation that the 
bureaucratic-military oligarchy was not just able to retain its autonomous role, 
but also constituted and secured its mediatory role between the propertied 
classes—metropolitan, indigenous and landed. The three propertied classes 
have not been able to influence and exercise exclusive command over the 
state apparatus because the “influence and power of each is offset by that of 
the other two” (Alavi 1972, p.8).
During the era of General Ayub, the civilian bureaucracy enjoyed considerable 
power within the state and was not accountable to the citizens. One of the 
objectives of the introduction of the Basic Democracies system was to 
enhance the powers of the bureaucracy and to make the politicians 
subservient to Ayub. The civil service was able to manipulate the political 
process at the district level because the BD system was designed to place the 
bureaucracy in between the local community and the Electoral College. 
Furthermore, “BD was structured to enhance bureaucrat powers at the local 
level over and above the politician” (Cheema and Sayeed 2006, p.9). 
According to Jalal (1995) the entire façade of the political process has been 
one of exclusion, political patronage and personalised transactions between 
the civil bureaucracy and the dominant social groups. Furthermore, the 
institutional character of the state has not diminished and the objectives of the 
colonial establishment have been reinforced. The colonial administrative 
designs were used as instruments of personal gain by the military and civilian 
bureaucracy. A personalised network of “15,000 civil servants, 500 or more 
military officials and less than two dozens of urban families controlled the bulk 
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of industrial, banking and insurance assets in the country” (Jalal 1995, p.58). 
According to Alavi, the bureaucratic network was able to invest in businesses 
of all kinds which were established in the “name of their wives and close 
relatives” (cited in Gardezi and Rashid 1983, p.49). Due to a weak political 
base and the absence of representative democracy, the military-bureaucracy 
oligarchy continued to intrude in the internal governance of the country.
The government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was more successful in its attempts to 
break the autonomous role of the civilian bureaucracy which had dominated 
politics in Pakistan since 1947. The reforms of 1973 significantly altered the 
role of bureaucracy in the formulation of policies. The politicians outlined the 
policies, and in this process, the role, functions and duties of the civil servants 
were decreased in the public sector. The role of the civil servants was 
confined to the implementation of policies, and their previous role in the 
formation of policy therefore abolished. The restructuring of the civil service 
elite was not the only reform designed to make the public sector more 
efficient, but was also supplemented by the introduction of “lateral entries” into 
the civil service. These were measures to replace the “generalists” with more 
professional and technical people in the expanding public sector (Noman 
1988). However, according to Noman (1988, p.62) “the lateral entry system 
was used not to attract talent from the private sector, but as an instrument for 
the distribution of political patronage”. With the increase of lateral entries, the 
public sector expanded and there was widespread nepotism, graft and 
corruption. As Jones pointed out (1997, p.340) “between 1973 and 1977 over 
1,300 persons were recruited under these relaxed provisions, primarily 
benefitting relatives and associates of cabinet ministers, and those 
recommended by provincial governors and Pakistan People’s Party leaders”. 
Instead of transforming the role of bureaucracy, the reforms further 
encouraged political patronage.
The bureaucracy during Zia’s period was re-politicised, and this undermined 
the rule-bound hierarchical structures and processes of decision-making. 
These practices once again revived the previous role of bureaucracy which 
had been used by successive civilian governments for patronage or to gain 
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loyalty. Zia’s promulgation of the Local Government Ordinance of 1979 was 
aimed at weakening the base of political parties. Quoting Cheema and 
Mohammad, Cheema and Sayeed (2003, p.14) state that:
“This was done through the disqualification of a large number of 
candidates with a PPP affiliation in the 1979 local bodies’ elections 
and by holding local elections on a non-party basis. Although non-
party elections had been the norm at the local level since 
independence, nonetheless during this period they represented an 
important reversal because mass-based political parties had 
emerged as important players in the electoral arena since the 1970 
federal and provincial elections ….”
Zia’s purpose in holding elections in 1985 on a non-party basis was to extend 
central control over the parties’ political base, which could have otherwise 
turned the political situation in favour of a particular political government. The
effect was to elevate localised clientelist factions to the federal and provincial 
levels (Cheema and Sayyed 2006, p.14). The politicisation of bureaucracy led 
to the manipulation of the rules, resulting in the establishment of a 
decentralised patronage-based system (Cheema and Sayyed 2006). As a 
result, the merit-based criteria of appointments in the civil service was 
compromised, so was accountability. Moreover, the bureaucracy was able to 
stay in its position due to its political connections, and promotions and 
appointments were based on forming close relationships with the politicians. A 
World Bank report commented that the “excessively frequent contact of 
politicians with the local staff” eroded the hierarchal structures of decision-
making and inculcated practices of loyalty and patron–client relationships in 
the public service (Cited in Cheema and Sayyed 2006, p.16). In addition, 
General Zia used the quota system to accommodate regional disparities in the 
civil service, the CSP (Civil Services of Pakistan), and granted preferential 
treatment to favoured persons in the federal government. As a result, the 
tendencies towards impunity, favouritism and political patronage were 
exacerbated, which not only undermined the efficacy of the public sector but 
also contributed to a dysfunctional bureaucracy.
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Musharraf’s local government reform is a continuation of the practice of 
holding local government elections on a non-party basis,31 in that 
accountability of public officials and the empowerment of the local 
communities are the two basic ingredients of the reforms. 
A critical analysis of the bureaucracy up to 1999 suggests that two different 
roles have been performed by the state bureaucracy in Pakistan. The first was 
its political role, following the imperial tradition and being further expanded 
due to the fragmentation of the state political structures and institutions. The 
assumption of the political role was strengthened by the successive military 
interventions, which induced a particular reliance on bureaucracy because of 
its professional background and the weak civil society in the country. The 
bureaucracy remained powerful and autonomous in making policy decisions, 
and although later reforms altered its direct role in policy-making, its role in the 
implementation of policies remained centralised. The second role played by 
the bureaucracy was the introduction of the ‘lateral’ entry system, which set a 
precedent for introducing patronage into the bureaucratic institutions. These 
‘lateral’ entries institutionalised patronage and relaxed the strict criterion of 
entry into the CSP through examination and competition. 
In the next section, I briefly describe public administration in Pakistan and how 
development interventions are being implemented, with emphasis on the good 
government techniques most recently used to improve public sector 
performance.
8. Public administration and good government techniques
The framework of public administration in Pakistan is mainly organised into 
specialised ministries in which officers of different rankings are posted. 
Administration is viewed as a technical field wherein the civil servants need 
technical expertise and are accordingly trained in various specialised Training 
Academies. In the early phases of development planning in Pakistan, i.e. not 
                                                       
31 The principle of holding elections on a non-party basis has been used by different military 
regimes to neutralise the influence of mass political parties that had emerged in the country 
since 1970 (Cheema and Sayeed 2003).
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long after independence, the Planning Commission emphasised that 
coordination and adjustments between the various ministries and sectors was 
needed for the implementation of policies (Inayatullah 1964). Development 
and planning from the 1950s onwards were embedded in certain techniques 
and approaches. Development programs and policies in Pakistan are 
implemented through projects, and these development projects are generally 
based on preconceived and ambitious targets without carrying out an
empirical examination of ground-level realities. Candland argues that policies 
aimed at social development in Pakistan have been implemented without 
interacting with citizens or articulating the necessity for strengthening social 
institutions such as community-based organisations (Candland, cited in 
Wilson and Shastri 2001, p.277). Social development was seen as a set of 
rational planning activities, cascaded from the federal to provincial 
governments. Administrative and management tools were overemphasised. 
Moreover, the projectised approach to achieving development objectives was 
top-down, and constrained by limited knowledge and insufficient managerial 
and technical capacity for the performance of highly diversified tasks.32
During the 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF imposed conditionalities and 
introduced structural adjustment reforms to improve governance and 
economic indicators in the country (Zehra 2002). Since these international 
financial institutions are primarily concerned with macro-economic 
performance, market liberalisation and growth, key good government 
techniques were introduced to achieve quick-fix results. Moreover, the 
structural adjustment reforms were based on the premise of re-organising the 
public sector institutions, and the adoption of management techniques based 
on log-frames and input/output indicators. Such measures were adopted by 
the government to justify projects which had little impact on the service users. 
Inherent in these techniques was an oversimplification of the problems
                                                       
32 These and points made in the following paragraphs are based on my own observations and 
assessments, gathered through experience of working with the National Commission for 
Human Development, and my heavy involvement in capacity development of state officials
throughout Pakistan. The examination of projects designed to improve the capacity of state 
officials does not reveal the difficulties faced by poor segments and disadvantaged citizens in 
terms of poor quality of primary education, health and getting access to state officials.
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confronting communities, which engendered a misunderstanding of the nature 
of these problems and a consequent inability to develop adequate solutions. 
The key source of obscurity thus lay in the actual conceptualisation of the 
problems of the target beneficiaries and their concerns. Moreover, in the 
implementation of the Social Action Program (SAP) during the PPP’s second 
tenure (1992-1996), the lack of reliable data and the problems of allocation of 
resources created opportunities for corruption and diverting funds for other 
development programmes.33
From the 1990s onwards, many donors and international agencies have 
justified development interventions in the country as means to improve the 
indigenous capacity of the public sector institutions. The criteria were that, 
through training of state officials held abroad and domestically, the 
organisations would acquire the necessary skills to be able to perform 
optimally. However, capacity-building measures have compromised the 
existing capacity of the state actors by introducing innovative organisational 
techniques which rarely took into account the social norms and cultural 
aspects of the organisation. As a result, most projects have failed to achieve 
their stated objectives. A more recent aspect of development intervention in 
Pakistan is technical assistance for enhancing local government’s capability to 
improve the delivery of public and collective services.
                                                       
33 This is based on my personal conversation with a senior bureaucrat who was involved in 
the implementation of the SAP. The program was financed by a consortium of international 
organisations and involved the provision of social and public services implemented directly by 
the provincial governments in the districts.
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9. Conclusion
The chapter has contextualised the historical formation of the state, its political 
institutions and the role of bureaucracy within the broad framework of the 
colonial legacy. In the formative years of the post-independent state, civil 
bureaucracy was involved in the politics of the state and it became more 
powerful and centralised as a result of constitutional provisions and the 
changes brought by the military and civilian governments in the structure and 
role of bureaucracy after independence. The fragmentation of the main 
political party, the Muslim League, created dissenting groups formed around 
landed elites with vested interests. It was unable to acquire political support or 
become a party which represented the social aspirations of the people. The 
thesis advanced by Alavi was discussed in order to show the complex 
structure of the state after independence. Between 1947 and 1958, the 
country was ruled by civil bureaucrats and due to their colonial legacy, 
resisted the civilian and representative governments. The introduction of the 
Basic Democracies system by General Ayub aimed to perpetuate the rule of 
the army in the country and acquire a stronghold in policy and decision-
making. Bureaucratic capture was crucial in this process.
The bureaucratic reforms undertaken by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1973 can be 
analysed with reference to the abolition of the CSP and restructuring the civil 
service to eliminate the influence of the military. The reforms had little 
success. Rather, the reforms created new opportunities for patronage and 
loyalty acquired through ‘lateral entries’. The reforms ignored the previous 
criteria of induction into the civil service and set a precedent which was used 
by General Zia when he politicised the bureaucracy. The institutional 
framework of bureaucracy was distorted when the appointment rules and 
merit-based criteria were neglected and the prestige associated with the civil 
service was thereby undermined. The return to democracy could not survive, 
due to confrontational politics, intrigues and manoeuvring to destabilise civilian 
governments. Corruption and the weakening of state institutions during the 
civilian governments paved the way for the presidents and the military regimes 
to use their powers to dissolve elected governments.
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The central control over policy-making and the implementation of development 
interventions remained the prerogative of the central and provincial 
bureaucrats. The elected governments were dependent on the traditional role 
of the bureaucracy, which followed a top-down approach in the 
implementation of state policies. Given the political situation in Pakistan, the 
bureaucracy assumed both an administrative as well as a political role. 
Bureaucrats were least accountable to the citizens, and due to the weak civil 
society in the country, the bureaucracy was able to intervene in state political 
institutions. Public administration in Pakistan did not penetrate below the 
district level and did not recognise the importance of broad-based consultation 
and interaction with citizens. To achieve results, the provincial governments 
implemented development programmes directly in the districts using the 
provincial officers posted there. The decentralisation reforms of 2001 
attempted to achieve accountability of civil servants and to improve decision 
making through elected representatives at different tiers of the government. 
Chapters one and two have set out the problems of governance faced in 
Pakistan, providing both a historical perspective and outlining a number of 
theoretical explanations for its current dysfunctional state. However, these 
theoretical accounts have a number of deficiencies with which the bulk of this 
thesis aims to engage. Firstly, the academic research into governance is 
rooted in normative governance and cites patron–client relationships, poor 
accountability, politicisation, corruption etc. as the fundamental causes of bad 
governance and dysfunctional public sector performance in the country. These 
accounts do not provide us with a clear understanding of the actual practices 
of the state actors. Secondly, the actual functioning of public sector institutions 
in Pakistan has not been subjected to rigorous, systematic and empirical 
analysis. The literature on good governance eulogises neutral technical 
solutions to improve bureaucratic behaviour and ignores social relationships, 
networks, bonds of affinity and the relationships between officials and service 
users. Therefore, a deeper understanding of public administration in Pakistan 
requires an alternative approach. In the next chapter, I will outline my 
approach to engage with these lacunas.
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Chapter Three
Political Clientelism: An Alternative Perspective on 
Governance
1. Introduction
This chapter sets up my analytical framework based on the literature review, 
and thereby addresses my research aims and objectives. In the first section of 
this chapter, I critically assess those elements of governance which are 
associated with questions of how public sector institutions ought to perform. 
The second section looks at the idea of political clientelism as an alternative 
framework to understand actual governance practices and behaviour. Under 
the broad category of political clientelism, I discuss four major analytical 
subcategories namely patronage, networks, moral attachments and access. In 
so doing, I draw on the works of recent anthropological explorations of 
governance (Oliver de Sardan, 2008; Blundo, 2006; Le-Meur and Blundo,
2009; Scott, 1972; Clapham, 1982; Legg and Lemarched, 1972; Sandbrook,
1972; Medrad, 1982; Smith, 2001; 2003, Lazar, 2005; Ruud, 2001; Osella and 
Osella, 2001). Much of this literature has been developed in the context of 
Africa. While some work along these lines has been carried out in India, there 
are no similar scholarly accounts rooted in the experience of Pakistan. 
2. Critical analysis of good governance
The objective of this section is to critically analyse certain concepts of good 
governance. First, I clarify the terms ‘governance’ and ‘good governance’. 
Governance is associated with administrative and managerial dimensions 
(Doornbos, 2001; Leftwich, 1993). The concept of governance also has a 
political dimension which, in addition to effective administration, places an 
emphasis on democratic politics. The political dimension of governance is 
closely aligned with the definition proposed by Hyden (1999) who argues that 
“governance is the stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the 
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game. Governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for 
the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules” (cited in Kjaer 
2004, p.3). The political and administrative dimensions of governance are 
often used interchangeably. Tracing the genealogy of the concept of 
governance since the 1930s, and looking at its different elements or layers, 
Le-Meur and Blundo (2009) note that governance has been divided into 
corporate and urban governance. Later, governance became the driving 
agenda of the Western institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The 
historical shift, according to Le-Meur and Blundo (2009), shows the transfer of 
the application of the concept from the private to the public sector. The origin 
of the term ‘good governance’ can be traced to the period when West-driven 
structural adjustment and economic liberalisation programmes were 
acknowledged to be unable to address poor governance, accountability, weak 
government structures, incompetency and lack of openness in policy-making 
(Smith 2007, p.3).
The experience of structural adjustment policies, from the perspective of the 
international institutions and donor agencies, has identified incompetent and 
corrupt government as the cause of their failure, especially in the context of 
sub-Saharan Africa (Leftwich 1993). The phrase ‘good governance’ appears in 
a 1989 World Bank report on Africa, which argues that poor governance is a 
major cause of “Africa’s development problems” (Leftwich 1993, p.370). In the 
1990s, the theme of good governance became the driving agenda in the 
context of aid-dependent countries’ efforts to improve the social and economic 
conditions of the poor (Smith 2007). The aid agencies/donors convey different 
meanings when they use the term ‘good governance’. According to Leftwich 
(1993, p.371) the meaning of ‘good governance’ can be understood from three 
primary levels, namely systemic, political and administrative. The systemic 
view of governance goes beyond the conventional view of government which 
is based on the premise of centralised decision making in the formal 
institutional structure of a modern state. The broader view denotes social, 
political and economic relationships and rules, encapsulated in a system 
which sees good governance as essentially based on a minimalist state and a 
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free market economy, a viewpoint promoted in particular by Western political 
leaders (ibid.). 
The political view of good governance is based on the principles of liberal 
democratic states in which there is clear separation of powers between the 
state organs (legislature, executive and judicial). Moreover, the state assumes 
control of its territories through regional authorities and other state agencies. 
The power of the state is distributed across all regions, and there is a high 
degree of compliance with state directives, laws, constitution and other 
statutes (Clapham 1982). State legitimacy is derived from democratic norms 
and adherence to the principles of democracy (ibid.). Pluralism is part and 
parcel of representative democracy in many important ways, requiring, for 
example, the free association of people in order to influence state polices and 
hold the executive accountable on different levels (Leftwich 1993). From an 
administrative point of view, Leftwich argues that in Western states, the 
doctrine of good governance means “an efficient, independent, accountable 
and open public service” (Leftwich 1993, p.371). 
In administrative terms, the concept of good governance fully endorses an 
impartial, incorrupt, competent bureaucracy, and an effective public 
administration. The normative framework of good governance has been 
criticized by Leftwich for its technical and managerial fixes, “detached from the 
turbulent world of social forces, politics and the structure and the purpose of 
the state” (Leftwich 2000, p.108). As previously argued in (chapter two) with 
reference to the operation of public services, there is general consensus on 
the nature of real governance and its features based on the normative 
principles of ideal governance. In a sense, attention has been focused on the 
frameworks and standard literature of good governance to evaluate the daily 
functioning of administration and reforms aimed at transforming dysfunctional 
bureaucracies in order to provide quality social services (Smith, 2007;
Shafqat, 1999; Hijazi, 1999; Qureshi, 1999; Javaid, 2001). In the following 
sections, I critically assess those elements of good governance which are 
associated with Weberian bureaucratic administration. According to the 
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Weberian ideal type, modern bureaucracies should have the following 
characteristics: (2.1) Impartiality; (2.2.) Rationality.
2.1Impartiality
State officials or bureaucrats are supposed to be impartial in their dealings 
and there are no exceptions by which impartiality is made the exclusive 
preserve of certain members of society. The ideal bureaucrat is impartial in his 
(or her) dealings because he attains a high level of proficiency through training 
and values himself as part of an elite culture. The organisation acquires an 
ambitious, competent and loyal body of staff whose allegiance is to the 
purpose of the organisation as bounded by common goals and shared 
expectations (Nicholas 1991). Impartiality inculcates a culture of ethics and 
morality based on the ideals of the public. The public know that they have 
expectations from state authorities when they seek their rights and make 
demand on the state. Public officials discharge their official responsibilities in a 
professional manner. Professionalism demands that bureaucrats fulfil a 
specific role without the intrusion of the social and cultural norms of wider 
society (Nicholas 1991).
In the formal state structures, people have equal opportunities to access state 
services as a result of impartiality (Smith 2007, p.6). According to Nicholas, 
the state creates public trust through a balance of distribution of power within 
the state and society. The diffusion of power across institutions creates a 
symbiotic relationship between the state, government and its agencies. A 
modern bureaucracy in a Western democratic state implements state policies 
and achieve its objectives since impartiality discourages discretion and 
favouritism. Impersonal dealings and impartially are intertwined. They 
reinforce the inherent qualities of officials in state organisations and the 
manner in which they perform their official duties. Within the framework of 
policy making and implementation, bureaucrats as ‘agents’ must act in the 
interest of citizens as ‘principals’ (Lane 2003). Crucial to impartiality is the 
promotion of the public interest as opposed to the private interest (Lane 2003, 
p.6). From the forgoing analysis of impartiality, both the state and community 
72
can be seen to draw benefits, which could be state services or people waiting 
to be served by an official. Both these institutions develop relations which 
mutually harness these benefits.
The modern state and the formal functions of bureaucracy assume a clear-cut 
distinction between public and private. The gap between the formulation of 
development schemes and what happens in practice exemplifies the inherent 
problem of the public–private distinction. The formal model of good 
governance treats state and society as two sets of distinct entities. In the 
formal state, despite the existence of formal laws and government institutions, 
there are powerful actors such as groups and individuals who pursue their 
own private interests by circumventing the public decision-making process 
(Lund, 2006; Oliver de Sardan, 1998; Clapham, 1982). These actors 
participate in local politics and also influence public authority in day-to-day 
encounters. Moreover, they also impose their own decisions, which inevitably 
means challenging state legitimacy (Clapham 1982). 
In the implementation of policy, public authority is exercised by the state 
officials. In the public sphere, Lund (2006) highlights a paradox in the exercise 
of public authority in the classic Weberian sense. The paradox according to 
Lund is related to two interrelated elements. On one hand, public authority is 
underpinned by impersonality in administrative practices. On the other hand, 
public authority is subject to negotiation and contestation. Public servants 
constantly engage with the state as well with society, and there are conflicts, 
dealings, negotiations and interactions between them. For state officials, their 
concern is to function within the public sphere in order to legitimise their 
decisions and actions. For the service users, “they may stretch or restrict the 
public domain through flows of interactions” (Le-Meur and Blundo 2009, p.26). 
This means that the boundaries between the public and the private are 
permeable and not upheld in practice. The political nature of public services 
therefore lies in defining the permeability of these intricate and complex 
boundaries (ibid). Permeability, in governance terms, refers to a process 
whereby formal state authority is subverted by competing logics and private 
interests and, as a result, the formal rules of governance and public decision-
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making processes are circumvented. Oliver de Sardan (2008) uses Erving 
Goffman’s metaphor of a ‘semi permeable membrane’ in African states to 
describe the permeability which allows the penetration of socio-cultural norms 
of a society into the public sphere.
Wood (2000; 2004; 2006) advances discussions on permeability through the 
ideas of positive and negative permeabilities. Positive permeability refers to 
situations when state institutions perform according to the ideals of the public 
and the outcomes of state interventions meet the expectations of the society. 
Positive permeability, according to Wood, means following official norms and 
morality in public dealings without falling into illicit practices such as 
corruption, nepotism and the misuse of official resources. The penetration of 
private interests, informal practices, personal relationships and social norms of 
society into the public domain is termed negative permeability. Negative 
permeability refers to situations where poor and the disadvantaged people rely 
on social relationships and informal/personal networks for personal security 
and to get access to resources where these are not formally granted by the 
state (Wood 2004). Formal rights and entitlements or access to state services 
in these structures are acquired through patron–client relationships. A poor 
person may have to seek security informally by relying upon his patron. In 
certain circumstances, people rely on their immediate family members and kin 
groups to get employment in the public sector (ibid). As a result, external 
considerations such as personal and social relationships in official dealings 
become privileged over intended and stated priorities. The real significance of 
achieving state ambitions and ideas can be appreciated by locating 
bureaucratic rationality in a modern state.
2.2Rationality
The state implements policies and plans which are intrinsically linked to the 
wellbeing of the people (Clapham 1982). In the allocation of resources 
intended to improve the welfare of people, decisions are made by state 
officials in order to maximise gains and optimise resource allocation
(Ibid.).This entails the ‘bureaucratic rationality’ of Max Weber (Nicholas 1991). 
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The state institutions operate under rules which embody a close alliance with 
the rationality of state actors and state institutions. Bureaucratic rationality 
emanates from organisational procedures, organisational structures and 
processes. The state institutions and the notion of bureaucratic rationality 
become the key points of reference through which power is exercised and the 
demands of the citizens are met (ibid.). Bureaucratic rationality accepts state 
authority and legitimacy, and makes rational judgements through the 
structures of the state. The system of bureaucracy is rigidly hierarchical and 
“everything depends on formal regulations and the specific orders of 
superiors” (Willott 2009, p.8). The bureaucratic system and the role of 
bureaucracy are publicly accepted as the most efficient means of achieving 
public goals and state ambitions (ibid.).
The decisions are evaluated against the formal rules of institutions and 
rationality. Despite political struggles and pressures from interest groups and 
society, official behaviour remains rule-bound (Kjaer 2004, p.20). The 
functions of the state officials are driven by the organisation’s broader 
interests. The rationality is never compromised since bureaucratic behaviour 
demands observance and enforcement of official rules and formal procedures. 
The other guiding principle of rationality is to achieve efficiency and fairness in 
achieving the ambitions of the state with least cost and maximal equity in 
access to state benefits (Clapham 1982). On the other hand, people also 
know that when they are not treated with fairness, they can rely on state rules 
and laws to counter the discriminatory practices of state authorities (Plumper 
et al. 2003). Bureaucratic rationality not only ensures that the demands of 
citizens are met by accepting state power structures, but also that personal 
and impersonal relationships do not impose constraints on policy decisions 
(Nicholas, 1991; Willott, 2009). 
The element of rationality lays emphasis on the observance of official norms34
or the professional norms of an organisation. However, besides the existence 
                                                       
34 Professional norms are the official rules, regulations, codes, procedures, official decision-
making processes, organisation charts and bureaucratic rationality in Weberian terms. These 
rules/regulations and institutional procedures are formalized by the state and used to 
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of official norms, there are also social norms and practical norms, which are 
expectations or obligations that arise from family, friends and followers (Oliver 
de Sardan, 2008; Blundo and Le-Meur, 2009). In diverse social, economic and 
political contexts, state bureaucracy does not perform its official tasks and 
does not take decisions according to official norms. In bureaucratic dealings 
and encounters with citizens, bureaucrats often use non-official norms which 
are at odds with their expected official behaviour. There are instances when 
officials sideline or ignore official rules. The official norms are at times 
replaced with practical norms which are open to negotiation and manipulation 
(Blundo 2006, p.807). Two crucial points have been mentioned by Blundo 
(2006). First, the administrative laws are seldom disclosed to the public. 
Second, the superior bureaucratic knowledge of state officials coupled with 
their weak accountability to the public give rise to illicit practices. As 
articulated by Blundo, these may happen in different circumstances which 
involve administration and its users. In the case of public officials, they may be 
unable to perform their official duties due to pressures from “social, identity
and political networks” (2006, p.808). Anders’ research in Malawi (cited in Le-
Meur and Blundo, 2009) highlights that in state bureaucracy, social 
relationships are extremely important as they infringe on the official norms.
Under different circumstances social relationships are used to grant favours 
such as avoiding taking actions or granting preferential treatment to an officer 
who has contacts with senior officials. 
The social norms exemplify social expectations, multi-dimensional 
relationships and informality in official dealings. The official norms of the state 
officials are confronted by social norms or the prevailing norms of individuals 
and communities, and the officials become unable to perform their 
responsibilities in strict compliance with official rules and regulations. In the 
context of Africa, Oliver de Sardan (2008) argues that the actual behaviour of 
state employees is inconsistent with their official expected behaviour because 
                                                                                                                                                              
determine state officials’ performance, job descriptions and how organizational structures are 
developed. Performance, monitoring, training and evaluation of officials are guided by these 
norms. These norms set “rights- duties and responsibilities” of state employees (Oliver de 
Sardan 2008).
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of informal practices. Moreover, informal practices are regulated as a 
consequence of the interpenetration of the social norms into the public sphere 
or the official norms (Oliver de Sardan 2008, p.9). 
In bureaucratic organisation, a pattern of hierarchy is observed. Hierarchy is 
closely linked with power.35 The priorities of a higher-ranked officer are at 
times related to certain institutional constraints. The exercise of power may be 
to use discretion by overriding the authority of certain officials to comply with 
the demands of a patron and to engage in acts of intermediation.36 In post-
colonial countries, a higher officer may be under obligation to act on a 
decision which may not be in conformity with existing bureaucratic norms. 
Schaffer (1969) argues that in a political system, whether centralised or
decentralised, the relationships in bureaucratic structures are asymmetrical 
and there are principal and agent relationships. Schaffer further argues that 
the greater the asymmetry the more compromises are made, and thus the 
relationships become more complicated. The asymmetrical relationships are 
within bureaucratic structures and between leaders and citizens. Asymmetric 
power relations inevitably lead to either conformity of decisions or give rise to 
a conflict. 
Lipsky (1980) discusses conflict between higher officials and junior officials 
associated with their positions in the organisation. One aspect of the 
difference is that managers have different priorities than those working below 
them. Lower-level officers resort to different coping strategies as means of 
survival in the organisation. According to Lipsky (1980, p.17), in these type of 
organisations the “policy may be carried out consistent with the interests of 
                                                       
35 The terms ‘power’ and ‘authority’ are sometimes used interchangeably and may have 
similar meanings. The word ’power’ is preferred over ‘authority’ to show the interrelationship of 
hierarchy and power.
32 The term ‘intermediation’ is used by Wood (2007) to refer to official norms being sidelined in 
order to accommodate private interests, that is, that an official takes into consideration social 
relationships with friends and patrons when acting in an official capacity. Intermediation arises 
in different institutional contexts. A political leader is under obligation from family to mediate 
between the state authorities by neglecting the official rules and laws. A junior officer, when 
he lands in trouble, approaches close friends to escape from accountability.
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higher levels, but this should be understood as resulting from the mutual 
adjustment of antagonistic perspectives as well as the result of shared 
interests”. In the empirical chapters which follow, I argue that the senior 
officers often resort to discretionary powers to bypass the junior officers in 
order to maintain their superiority and status in the organisation. This entails 
negating or bending official rules and regulations.
The critiques of Weberian bureaucracies and their functioning show that good 
governance is normative and prescriptive. The normative dimension of 
governance assumes an ideal bureaucracy, and this does not account for 
personal and social relationships emerging out of repeated interactions 
between actors and institutions and thus penetrating boundaries which are not 
predefined. The model of good governance is formal and is strictly confined to 
official norms, laws and policies. The formal model ignores the significance of 
social interface, i.e. social interactions and face-to-face encounters with 
diverse social actors which give rise to different patterns of negotiations, 
multiple relationships, meanings and experiences. The literature on good 
governance also falls into the subtractivist trap. It analyses, evaluates and 
judges un-official practices with reference to ideal-type Weberian 
organisations. Moving away from the formal governance to examine the 
everyday practices which involve citizen’s interactions with bureaucracy, I am 
offering an alternative approach which is organised around the notion of 
political clientelism. 
3. Political Clientelism 
Anthropologists have not been unanimous over the concept of clientelism, 
with some equating the term with “machine politics” and others describing it as 
a specific type of relationship which falls outside the formal system of 
government authority (Legg and Lemarchand 1972). From the available
literature, I have used the definition of James Scott (1972, p.92) who 
describes clientelism as being
“a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely 
instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher 
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socioeconomic status (patron) uses his influence and resources to 
provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status 
(client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support 
and assistance, including personal services, to the patron”.
Scott’s definition suggests three important features of political clientelism. 
Firstly, it is an un-equal personalized social relationship between a person of 
higher status who enjoys superiority over a person of lower status. The 
superiority is established due to un-equal power relations and differences in 
social and economic status. Secondly, the relationship is based on reciprocal 
exchanges between actors, consisting of “mutually beneficial transactions that 
have political ramifications beyond the simple dyadic relationship” (Legg and 
Lemarchand 1972, p.152). The reciprocity and the benefits accrued through 
transactions, which are often persistent and durable, are tilted towards the 
patron because the patron holds a higher social status or a position of 
authority which cannot be challenged by the client who occupies a 
subordinate position (Scott 1972, p.93). Thirdly, clients are able secure access 
to certain benefits by attaching themselves to patrons who are in a position to 
offer the desired benefits. 
In contrast to an ideal-type bureaucratic relationship which involves 
anonymity, rationality and impersonality, clientelism is rooted in a broad social 
structure. It involves multiple relationships between patrons and clients 
beyond the exclusive dyadic-type relationship. Clientelism entails an 
asymmetric relationship between patrons and clients which is expressed in the 
differences and control of resources, and reciprocal rights such as privileges, 
preferential treatment and moral obligations (Clapham, 1982; Legg and 
Lemarchand, 1972). For example, a political leader extends material and other 
benefits to citizens or a family in return for their votes and loyalty. Thus, 
patrons and clients enter into stable and predictable sets of relationships to 
secure mutual objectives. In this way, the patron–client relationship develops 
into a clientelistic system which expands outwards and gets replicated across 
the society, as well as into formal institutions. At this stage, it is pertinent to 
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engage with selected conceptual categories to deepen our understanding of 
political clientelism. 
3.1 Patronage
Sandbrook (1972, p.108) identifies disagreement between anthropologists and 
political scientists over the use of the term ‘patronage’. According to 
Sandbrook, for anthropologists, patronage is based on interpersonal 
relationships between two persons of unequal status. For political scientists, 
the patronage system concerns the ways in which the party in power 
distributes jobs and extends special favours in return for votes. Medrad (1982, 
p.166) argues that patronage from a political perspective is diffused across the 
society and tied to achieving particular benefits such as jobs and access to 
public resources. It is less personal than a patron–client relationship, which is 
based on affectivity and friendship unrelated to a formal organisation such as 
a political party. At this point it is essential to look at the mechanisms and 
principles which underpin the actual system of patronage.
Nelson (1996, p.45) describes the basic principles and the system of 
patronage in an educational institution. The basic definition of patronage 
according to Nelson is that a patron uses his power to provide opportunities to 
get access to resources, and appoint people in posts without merit. A system 
of patronage is created in the institution forming a patron–client structure in 
which the power of a patron is directly related to the number of clients. The 
relationship between a patron and a client is based on reciprocity and loyalty, 
two crucial elements of patronage accompanied by informal rules for 
extending rewards and threats of sanction. Nelson describes this as an 
inclusive system of patronage which benefits a large number of clients in 
different ways in the institution. Devine’s (1998, p.90) research identifies 
patronage and factionalism in the context of Bangladesh, and affirms that 
class and patronage are interrelated concepts. It is through the process of 
patronage that the differences between these two conceptual categories are 
observed. In a country where access to resources and inequality persists, 
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class and faction37—which are group categories—are headed by a leader who 
has followers. These categories establish patron–client relationships and 
factional leaders such as village elites manipulate their social relationships 
and patronage to establish their claims to leadership. The patronage 
dispensed through economic and non-economic transactions enables the 
leader to develop wider obligations and commitments. Devine (1998, p.91) 
further argues that patronage is not limited to exchange of goods and 
services, instead “it operates as a mechanism which reflects and reinforces 
the allocation of social power and status”. 
In the context of new democracies in Southeast Asia and parts of Africa, 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) mention patronage-based party-voter linkages 
between political authorities and citizens. The politicians identify resources 
which are offered to clients in return for support in their electoral campaigns 
(ibid., p.8). Differentiating between programmatic exchange relationships38
and clientelistic linkage relationships, clientelistic exchanges are contingent 
upon a direct exchange relationship between the politician and specific 
members in a community. The distinctiveness of clientelistic exchanges is that 
the politicians identify target beneficiaries to secure mutually agreed services 
and ensure the provision of these services in return for their votes. In a direct 
exchange clientelistic system, the politicians (principals) provide benefits 
based on their perception and crafting of a policy from which their own voters 
(citizens) would benefit (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, p.10). The policies are 
devised in a sense which benefits a particular group rather than others. These 
services may be economic, jobs, preferential treatments or “discretionary 
access to highly subsidised good …” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, p.11). 
                                                       
37 The central feature of a faction is that a leader recruits followers who are either known to a 
leader from previous acquaintances or belong to the same kin group (Boissevain 1974, 
p.192). The leader of the faction knows how to manoeuvre a situation towards his own 
advantage and attempts to build a large clientele (1974, p.196). Sandbrook (1972, p.111) 
conceives of faction as a “segment of clientage network organised to compete with a unit or 
similar types within one or more political arenas”.
38 Programmatic exchange relationships do not involve a direct, predictable and binding 
relationship between patrons and clients. These relationships operate on collective preference 
based on an ideological framework in countries that have established democratic-party-based 
politics under democratic conditions (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).
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The authors further argue that democratic accountability in these countries is 
not contingent upon the politicians’ success in providing material benefits, 
since clientelistic accountability diffuses formal accountability and impartiality 
when voters are incorporated into the state structures. 
The relationship, being informal, is rather at variance with formal rules or 
moral expectation of government and the way it operates within hierarchical 
structures. In states where there is a high degree of discretion enjoyed by 
officials and politicians in the enforcement of rules, citizens regard it as 
essential to have access to powerful patrons who assure that state officials 
deal with their clients either honestly, or dishonestly, in cases such as ignoring 
official rules and receiving favours through extra-legal means (ibid.). 
With the departure of colonial legacy, the state of Pakistan became strongly 
dominated by powerful social identities who are engaged in patronage-based 
politics.39 They compete for power in different parts of the country to gain 
political influence over state institutions. These social identities represent 
different tribes headed by a powerful political personality. The political 
personalities are local politicians who are in possession of assets and 
disposable income. The local politicians appoint clients from their own 
constituency into the state institutions. A typical example of the process 
through which officials seek preferential treatment would be as follows: An 
official writes an application to a local politician, and the politician endorses 
the application which then becomes a political requirement to acquire a 
particular benefit which may not be granted under official rules. The same 
process is followed by others and the process becomes an informal channel 
which is not publicly announced and remains hidden from the general public. 
In my field work, state officials in different situations narrated that unless one 
has political connections, it is too difficult to perform formal functions 
according to rules, as one would come under pressure from different sources.
                                                       
39 Patronage-based politics is organised along a system of kinship and social ties of political 
leaders who come from the landed class. They acquire political support in the form of votes 
from their patrimonial and kinship based relationships, and from the people who are working
as tenets on their lands. 
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The system of patronage, and citizens’ experiences of it, differs in different 
societies and is contingent upon the political and social structure of the society 
in question. Moreover, the transactions in a patronage system involving 
clientelistic relationships vary. According to Legg and Lemarchand (1972, 
p.155) these transactions in terms of access to resources and the flow of 
patronage can be at the local level and beyond. In the following section, I 
discuss the characteristics, structural dynamics and the formation of networks 
in social, political and bureaucratic institutions.
3.2 Networks
James Scott’s (1972, p.92) seminal work on patron–client relationships 
informs us that bureaucratic institutions in Asia are penetrated by “informal 
patron–client networks that undermine the formal structure of authority.” 
Clapham (1982, p.6) argues that patron–client networks consist of more than 
a simple relationship between two persons, as the nature of transactions are 
extended to other relationships which manifest an interconnected series of 
patron–client ties. The system that so develops is multifunctional and has 
certain specific characteristics. The multiplex relationships exemplify wider 
interactions which cut across different strata of the society exhibiting the 
attributes of personal, interlocked and multiple relationships in societies where 
poverty persists, and where security, social status and wealth are weak. The 
social structure and exchange relationship among networks is based on 
different typologies and types of composition. One form of network is analysed 
by Clapham (1982, p.2) through the concept of “representative clientelism”. 
Despite universal suffrage, electoral clientelism works in those areas where 
the patrons have established their political base for mobilising support. 
According to Clapham (1982), “representative clientelism” penetrates into 
state institutions and not only becomes the controlling authorities within 
structures, but rather represents the state structures. This type of clientelism 
can be seen in those countries which have been under imperial domination 
and lack representative governments and stable democracies. These 
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societies are dominated by the extension of politically motivated exchange 
relationships such as securing allegiance to a party in power.
The clientelism of representation is manifested in the form of a vote. The 
citizens use their vote as a crucial resource of the state and through this 
resource provide support to the politicians to take control of the state. 
Clapham (1982, p.3) focuses on understanding this type of clientelism as a 
form of rational behaviour rooted in the logic of personal relations rather than 
an attribute of a particular culture. Clapham further asserts that this type of 
clientelism must be seen in the context of the nature of relationships between 
patrons and clients. Scott (1972, p.98) mentions an interesting case of public 
officials who use discretionary power to deviate from official norms by 
rewarding their clients. Scott’s observation can be seen to characterise 
different situations depending upon the nature of transaction and the type of 
resource which causes deviation. One reason for the deviation could be 
rewarding a patron based on a potential resource. Clients use their own 
resources in reciprocating their patrons’ support, and the nature of the reward 
will depend on what resource is required by the patron. In case of my own 
research, the political resource is critical for patrons to win elections. James 
Scott refers to this resource but does not examine the modalities and contexts 
under which this resource is considered critical for patrons and clients and 
vice versa. In the same vein, we may ask how this resource is exploited by 
patrons and clients for political and personal ambitions.
Social networks also permeate into bureaucratic organisations, a
phenomenon which Clapham (1982, p.26) terms “bureaucratic clientelism”. 
Bureaucratic clientelism is associated with the internal politics of an 
organisation. Clientelist politics occur in bureaucratic organisations and, 
according to Clapham, in these organisations clientelism appears behind the 
facade of a legal-rational universe. Clapham identifies two limitations on 
“bureaucratic clientelism”. One is associated with formal rules of bureaucracy, 
and the other with factional interests depending on circumstances. In 
bureaucratic organisations, Clapham further argues that there is a conflict of 
interest between the power enjoyed by the mid-level officials by virtue of their 
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official status and the limitations imposed on them to use their powers in 
relation to the formal rules of bureaucracy. The patrons occupy a central 
position in bureaucratic structures and have political ambitions. Moreover, 
according to Clapham there is a clash of interest among patrons in the 
organisation, and to counter this conflict the patron relies on subordinates to 
get information and to promote the patron’s policy agendas or block the ones 
which are threatening to their survival. The reason for this is that the structure 
of the state is occupied by networks of state actors within the formal state 
hierarchy and provides a perfect habitat for clients to have direct contact with 
their boss by circumventing the authority of others in superior positions 
(Clapham 1982, p.27).
According to Lemarchand and Legg (1972, p.153); in a bureaucratic 
framework clientage networks function as interpersonal relationships between 
patrons, and exercise command and authority outside the framework of formal 
rules and regulations. The patron–client relations are replicated in a clientage 
network which is not just restricted to the level of organisation but may be 
extended across the entire society (ibid.). In general, the more persistent the 
asymmetrical relationship between clientage networks, the more durable and 
extensive the chain of reciprocities becomes from the bottom to the top in a 
political system (1972, p.154). The underlying interrelated arguments 
discussed so far relate to patron–client structures, linkages and relationships 
between patron and clients, their penetration at the local level, and in other 
instances their integration into hierarchical structures. In the next section, I 
turn to the concept of moral attachment.
3.3 Moral attachments
The conception of moral attachment is central to understanding bureaucratic 
practices in different contexts and situations. Moral attachments refer to the 
quality and the nature of relationships between patron and clients seen in the 
light of four interrelated factors. These factors, and the relationships between 
them, are: (a) the dynamics of exchanges between patron and clients which 
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show loyalty embedded in primordial loyalties, kinship ties40 and social 
relationships. These relationships are manipulated to acquire access to 
particular benefits and services from the state, and thus (b) the exchange 
becomes familiar and what it entails is taking actions and decisions which are 
considered to be morally correct. However, (c) familiarity breaches public and 
private boundaries, and thus (d) unofficial practices become legitimate, 
connect patron to clients, and involve obligations, personalised and informal 
relationships in contrast to legal-rational ones. 
Ekeh (1975) argues that the elements of citizenship are deeply rooted in 
primordial ties associated with moral obligations. Ekeh (1975, p.92) talks 
about two realms in post-colonial Africa. One, which is termed the ‘primordial 
public’ and operates according to moral sentiments linked to ethnicity and 
community of origin, is ‘moral’. Alongside this is the ‘public realm’, also termed 
the ‘civic public’, which is “amoral because it does not suffer from the moral 
imperatives in the private realm and in the primordial public”. Ekeh’s argument 
about morality is imbued in primordial loyalties and sentiments which influence 
official behaviour. Elements of citizenship are embedded in primordial 
relationships associated with moral obligations. In the civil republic, the state 
is privatised,41 in that corrupt practices are viewed as legitimate in order to 
benefit the “primordial public”. Through the logics of two realms, Ekeh 
emphasises that individuals in the “primordial public” have certain obligations 
which must be fulfilled by extracting benefits from the civic public to strengthen 
the primordial public. In the civic republic, duties are de-emphasised and 
rights are informally acquired which have an element of amorality. What Ekeh 
does not mention is the interpenetration of public sphere into the private 
sphere. Primordial loyalties run parallel to the public sphere and their co-
existence creates confusion in any attempt to differentiate between public 
                                                       
40 In my research, kinship ties operate at the local level and they show moral obligations, 
social expectations and solidarities.
41 The term ‘privatisation’ is used in the context of appropriating state resources for personal 
gains and not as in (neo) liberal economic strategy, where the term privatisation has a 
different meaning.
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interest42 and private interest. Primordial and traditional loyalties continue to 
function, however it is important to recognise that these loyalties co-exist 
along with the modern impersonal norms of a rational bureaucracy.
Lazar (2005, p.213) explores the concept of corruption in a non-normative 
sense by asking how people in Bolivia perceive corruption when their elected 
leaders are unable to deliver public goods. According to Lazar, people in 
Bolivia perceive corruption in two different ways. The first is that those who 
are elected would deliver promised goods according to the expectations of the 
people. Second, people construct a moral element through which people 
attempt to hold their leaders accountable when involved in the appropriation of 
state resources. When people talk about corruption, they condemn the 
political power of political leaders who divert state resources for personal and 
private gains. These people feel powerless to hold their leaders accountable 
when they talk about the unlawful distribution of state resources because they 
are not part of a system which operates on patron–client ties. Those who are 
inside the system would judge a political leader as a good patron. For them, 
extra-legal practices are considered legitimate and justified. 
Political power further implies the abuse of state laws by offering people jobs, 
and providing a framework for the accumulation of wealth and its downward 
distribution.  In this manner, a clientelistic network is formed which according 
to Bayrant involves the “politics of the belly”. In Bayrant’s view, politics is 
about accumulation of wealth and its distribution among clients to increase the 
politician’s clientele (cited in Lazar 2005, p.223). In the case of Bolivia, the 
patrons redistribute state resources as well as the wealth of the state through 
public works among their family in the form of jobs.
In Nigeria, Smith (2001, p.345) argues that the issues of corruption, identity 
and patronage are inextricably linked. They are closely related to the 
discourse of morality and the state. People have a moral obligation to invest in 
                                                       
42 Public interest is the responsibility of the state. The state performs certain functions in 
accordance with the ideals of a society without any discrimination or inclination towards a 
group or a political party. The private interest is a human endeavour to act in accordance with 
personal motivations towards a particular.
87
their immediate kinship relations by placing immediate family members in 
strategic positions to acquire access to resources. Smith’s (2001, p.344) 
ethnographic research in the Igbo community in Nigeria explores how 
corruption is rooted in the political economy of clientelism consisting of kinship 
ties, moral obligations, reciprocity and bonds of affinity. Corruption is a key 
feature in the Igbo community and its social reproduction is taking place 
between members of the same kin and via informal relationships (2001, 
p.345). Corruption43 is propagated through the system of clientelism and 
sustained through the personal interests of those people who do not have 
political connections. Thus Nigerians extract benefits from the state by relying 
upon their social connections. Political economy and politics in Nigeria exhibit 
patron–client relations, reciprocity and mutual obligations to immediate family 
members. 
According to Smith (2003, p.707), patron–clientelism among Igbo people has 
two important characteristics. The first is hierarchical reciprocities and the 
second is obligations along the lines of kinship relations. The dependency of 
people on their kin is due to the unreliability of formal state structures in 
providing access to economic opportunities and resources. The ordinary 
people excluded from securing access to social services exploit kinship ties 
and social relationships as alternative options. Smith further argues that 
political economy and politics in Nigeria shows patron–clientelism through the 
idea of “having people”. Instead of navigating one’s way through the 
bureaucratic structures to acquire a particular service, it is easier for people to 
look for personal connections. What Smith (2001) succinctly captures in his 
                                                       
43 While dwelling on corrupt practices and exchanges, bureaucratic dysfunction and ineffective 
administration are commonly associated with some form of corruption. Corruption is most 
common in those countries where the relationship between the principals and agents are 
imperfect (Vannuci and Porta 1999). The agents are endowed with powers which they use to 
engage in illicit transactions and violating formal state laws. In everyday affairs of the state, 
effective provision of public services is undermined by corruption, a phenomenon which 
pervades into the state institutions (Oliver de Sardan and Blundo 2006). Oliver de Sardan and
Blundo (2006) argue that the dimensions of exchange and the process of unlawful distribution 
of resources not only give rise to misuse of authority, power relations but also “generate 
mechanisms of inequality and exclusion” in terms of access to resources. Corruption sheds 
light on how citizens’ expectations fall short because those in power have patron–client 
relationships.
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research is that morality and behaviour is structured by people using ideas 
such as ancestral ties and kinship to maintain relationships. The idiom of 
ancestral connections is used to nurture a sense of duty and obligation. The 
instances of corruption become prominent when people assist kin. They do so 
because they feel morally obliged to do so even when this is illegal or 
informal. Oliver de Sardan’s research (2009, p.49) in post-colonial Africa 
suggests the widespread existence of this phenomenon:
“To survive in the administrative domain it is necessary to know 
somebody or know somebody who knows somebody. When faced 
with an administrative problem that needs to resolved, people do 
not try to find out about the procedure that needs to be followed, 
but who they need to see, someone who can pull strings for them”.
Smith (2001; 2003), Lazar (2005) and Ekeh (1975) argue about the notion of 
morality from different perspectives and in different contexts. A careful 
analysis of morality suggests a political economy of politics and corruption in 
the state and society which needs to be understood through the examination 
of informal practices in the “familial idioms of patronage and 
connectednesses” (Osella and Osella 2001, p.156).   
Ruud’s arguments (2001), concerning the public and private spheres in the 
case of India, deal with politics, relationships and moral obligations. Ruud’s 
(2001) ethnographic study of everyday politics indicates that politics is about 
conflict, clash of interests and disputes. This kind of politics involves the 
mediation of powerful personalities such as political leaders who are in 
possession of social capital and who belong to the same community. Ruud 
(2001, p.128) further argues that a politician in a village engages with public 
and private boundaries. In a village setting, the politician represents voices of 
the people. He adjudicates in local disputes and establishes himself as a man 
who enjoys power by virtue of his position. In other words, to become a 
leader, there is a strong desire to establish control over material incentives 
and the distribution of state resources which enhances one’s own economic 
status and of the leaders’ family. People also have expectations from the 
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leader to work for their own community. A significant feature which Ruud’s 
anthropological study identifies in the village is that if the leader is able to 
deliver, then his unsavoury characteristics are sometimes overlooked because 
he meets the interests of the citizens in the manner that suits the community.
In the community where I was conducting research, people are integrated in a 
system of ‘Biradari’.44 The system of Biradari has developed on the basis of 
strong bonding between members of the community and an elected political 
figure. The moral proximity of the political figure beyond his nuclear family is to 
his immediate kin group members, since they voted for the political figure to 
acquire a high social status in their community. The local politician is under 
moral obligation from his own community to meet their demands and interests.  
In the state of Kerala, morality and politics is expressed by the people in a 
narrative of the lost golden age which highlights the identity of the Malayali, 
taking state and society as entry points for developing relationships with each 
other ingrained in familial relationships, moral obligations, reciprocity and 
patronage (Osella and Osella 2001). According to these authors, on the one 
hand familial relationships enforce demands on the state and bureaucracy, 
and interventions are justified because of social intimacy. On the other hand, it 
is expected that people as clients have to make claims based on morality 
within the ambit of rights and entitlements, which is often denied to the citizen 
in a democratic state. 
The authors further argue that “discourses on deception and sincerity are 
embedded in wider notions of mediation and compromise in which 
personalised relationships allow for a great degree of bargaining and flexibility 
…” (2001, p.151). The authors also comment that adjustments are made 
when the villagers and the sarkar (government) share personalised ties. 
However, there are cases when social connections are lacking and 
bureaucratic distance is observed, and therefore the adjustment becomes 
difficult. The underlying argument of these authors is that when relationships 
                                                       
44 The system of ‘Biradari’ means that people in the community are known to each other 
because of their common ancestral past, kinship ties, allegiance to family members and social 
relationships.
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between the state and the people are embedded in the myriad familial and 
other relationships which characterise the patronage system, “they become 
the site for political struggle and the assertion of collective rights” (2001, 
p.157). Moreover, political relationships characterised by increased social 
distance and bureaucratic indifference are re-constituted through patronage 
and personalised relationships and, in this, clients are able to advance their 
demands. 
3.4 Access
During the 1970s, Bernard Schaffer, along with other authors developed the 
theory of ‘access’, in which he studied how beneficiaries gain access to 
services in administrative systems. ‘Access’ refers to the ways in which the 
state policy and programmes define who gets what and in what ways. In 
developing countries, the problem of access and distribution of state 
resources are problematic given the nature of difficulties faced by people 
when interacting with bureaucratic institutions (Schaffer and Wen-hsien 1975). 
Schaffer and Wen-hsien pay special attention to how applicants use active 
strategies to establish relationships with bureaucratic entities. A strategy may 
be confirmative, such one which follows bureaucratic rules and procedures. 
This strategy is less likely to redress an applicant’s dissatisfaction with a 
service if he/she is unaware of these rules or lacks the necessary resources to 
come to know them. There are applicants who use strategies which include 
the use of personal, social and political resources. In bureaucratic institutions, 
access produces different outcomes depending on the design of a distribution 
system. In the case of frustrated applicants hoping to acquire a particular 
service, they team up with other applicants and attempt to change an existing 
distribution system (ibid.). The strategies vary depending upon different 
choices and options people attempt to adopt.
The deployment of strategies depends on the relationships of applicants with 
a bureaucratic entity (1975, p.18). Political connections, social ties and 
relationships are exploited by applicants excluded from a service. On the other 
hand, people deploy a combination of resources to counter the negative 
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effects of a distribution system. As pointed out by Schaffer and Wen-hsien 
(1975, p.18) people/applicants search for personal connections such as 
patrons, use social capital, or formally complain to the officials. Access 
depends upon social situations faced by people, cultural settings and their 
relationships with officials (ibid.). The important argument of these authors is 
that different access situations lead to politics. The politics of access becomes 
obvious in the case of exclusion and inclusion. The politics is not restricted to 
the level of the organization. There are other levels at which politics operates 
such as at the conceptual level where policies and programs are conceived, 
and at the implementation level when the plans are implemented with 
unexpected results. The politics of access reveals several dimensions and 
these are: the actual intentions behind the delivery of services, what the 
applicant insists and complains about, and the nature of institutional 
processes involved in the provision of a service (Schaffer and Wen-hsien 
1975, p. 22). I have argued in chapter six that access also involves what sort 
of responses, social and institutional, are adopted to convey complaints and 
dissatisfaction by those who are excluded from a particular service.
Schaffer and Lamb (1974, p.73) define the problem of access as “the relation 
between the administrative allocation of goods and services and the people 
who need them or for whom they are intended”. Schaffer together with Lamb 
lays emphasis on “service definition” as requiring “the move from policy 
activity to the institutionalisation of programmes, so that resources can be 
allocated to the service and an organisation built to carry it through” (1974, 
p.73). Factors affecting access depend on different situations in which the 
behaviour and responses of the people involved may vary. Making reference 
to the work of these authors, Peter (1992) argues that access is localised as 
well as institutionalised when the state is trying to address a particular 
problem in a community. It is precisely in this context that an access problem 
arises (ibid.). 
Schaffer and Lamb analyse different access situations and the ways people 
respond to or attempt to influence these situations through voice and exit. The 
use of voice by people conveys their dissatisfaction at an institutional level 
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and in their encounters with front-line managers, given the fact that in access 
situations there exists much “discretion, much room for interpretation and 
therefore for the exercise of voice by an applicant” (ibid., p.75). On the other 
hand, eligibility and service provision rules can also be circumscribed or 
undermined by people using political support. Schaffer and Lamb (1974, p.75) 
describe this by arguing that “the eligibility conditions, the gateways, will look 
different on either side of the gate”. This means that they will be viewed 
differently by the front-line managers and by the beneficiaries who are 
included and excluded. This would produce unanticipated effects when a 
policy is implemented. During the process of service provision or prior to it, 
employing voice therefore indicates politicisation. 
Access to public goods and services involves both voice and exit, and these 
are closely related. Voice plays a central role in access situations but, at the 
same time, exit can also occur. Schaffer and Lamb (1974, p.77) argue that the 
option of exit is less feasible for those who are totally dependent on state 
services when there is a state monopoly, and when there is one institution
involved in its provision. On the other hand, under different conditions, people 
do have a choice to acquire a required service from elsewhere, such as the 
market or other decentralised state agencies. As pointed out by Schaffer and 
Lamb, in actual access situations, it is not by design that people are left with 
no choices. In fact, people are excluded even when they do meet certain 
conditions, for example in a formal queue-like situation.45 Similarly, when 
people move out from an access situation in which voice remains central, they 
are forced into their own peculiar realities—poverty, reliance on existing 
services or forced to acquire a degraded service. People exit because their 
                                                       
45 In a bureaucratically dominated system access becomes possible for those applicants who 
meet three conditions, namely eligibility, ordering (sequential admissibility of applicants based 
on arrival and waiting time), and encounter with the rank and file. This according to Schaffer 
and Wen-hsien (1975, p.23) is a system of queue. When the three conditions are met without 
any discretion or discrimination, the system becomes an ideal type queue. This type of queue 
means that planners and service providers can perform their functions in a fair manner with 
predictable outcomes because the rules of application for entry and exit are known, stable and 
straightforward. This process also enables potential applicants to decide whether to avail 
themselves of a service or refrain from it altogether.
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prior experience of access is too cumbersome; relying on voice needs time 
and resources, and at times leads to uncertain outcomes (ibid.). 
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4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I dealt with the limitations of the formal governance model, 
which has been shown to be inadequate as a tool with which to study actual 
practices and the significance of social norms. The critiques of the functioning 
of the ideal bureaucracy and administration by authors such as Lund (2006), 
Oliver de Sardan (2008), Blundo (2006) and Wood (2000, 2006) highlight the 
problem of permeability. Giorgio Blundo and Pierre-Yves Le Meur (2009) and 
Oliver de Sardan (2008) have shown how informal practices are justified and 
make reference to practical and social norms, and have discussed their 
interpenetration into official norms. Lipsky (1980) discusses conflicts of 
interest between hierarchies, and relationships that are at odds with 
organisational goals. These assessments helped me to reach the conclusion 
that the notion of political clientelism should be introduced as an alternative 
approach, and thus I engaged with the anthropological literature in order to 
study actual practices and informality in official and public dealings. The 
anthropological literature on political clientelism highlights the importance of 
networks and their penetration into state and society (Clapham, 1980; Scott,
1972; Legg and Lemarchand, 1972).
The concept of patronage offers insights into the actual functioning of 
patronage systems in different societies and social and political structures 
(Devine, 1998; Sandbrook, 1972; Neslon, 1996; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007). The analysis of morality by authors such as Smith (2001; 2003) and 
Ekeh (1975) focuses on primordial loyalties highlighting the relationship 
between the state and society. Based on a combination of factors, officials 
and users alike pursue their particular interests which involve abusing state 
laws, strengthening pre-existing forms of clientelist relationships and capturing 
state resources. The literature on access highlights problems of access and 
agent–recipient relationships. Factors affecting access depend on different 
situations in which the notions of voice and exit are important, particularly 
when the state is trying to address a particular problem in a community.
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The literature on South Asia does not explicitly deal with informal practices of 
state officials in the delivery of public and social services. However, the 
literature is extremely useful when dealing with the issues of moral obligations, 
politics and strategic relationships at the micro-level. The vast literature on 
patron–client relationships, and in particular the studies on these relationships 
by Scott, Devine and Clapham, suggest different approaches and variations in 
these relationships.  Although, they do share certain common attributes. Due 
to the diversity in the methodologies and the contexts of their research, we 
can assert that these relationships are multi-dimensional, asymmetric, 
personalised and structured under different social and political conditions. All 
these arguments, concepts, issues and debates are complex, and it is not a 
straightforward matter to arrive at a single conclusion. However, I consider 
them complementary as they provide sophisticated and multi-dimensional 
explanations with which we can study administrative practices and the actual 
behaviour of state officials in different institutional and political milieu. In the 
following chapter, I discuss the epistemological and methodological 
dimensions of my research.
96
Chapter Four
Epistemology and Methodology
1. Introduction
Before embarking on field work, I undertook an extensive review of the 
literature and produced a research strategy paper. The paper sets out an 
interactionist epistemological framework which aims to analyse official 
behaviour and administrative practices through an interface approach. 
Bernard (1998) proposes that gaining epistemological understanding is a 
discovery process which enables the researcher to understand events and the 
behaviour of actors. My research methodology is an ethnography of three 
case studies which are treated in relation to my interface themes: clientelism, 
access, capture and clash of rationalities.
The adoption of three case studies brought both advantages and limitations. 
Having three case studies provided me with the opportunity to gather a lot of 
data by interacting with a diverse set of actors in the research sites. In 
addition, the case studies enhanced the acquisition of detailed knowledge 
pertaining to how officials go about their daily routine tasks in three different 
contexts. And, further, they provided an opportunity to concentrate on the 
influence of social and political factors on official behaviour. The limitations 
were linked to the availability of time, the need for physical presence and the 
extensive travelling that was required to visit rural schools and meet citizens 
situated in villages in mountainous/hilly terrain. When I began my field work, I 
came to learn that the education policy, as well as the accompanying 
strategies and other development interventions, were already underway. 
Instead of trying to analyse the normative discourse associated with how 
government policies do not meet their targets, I focused upon how state 
bureaucracy actually performs—i.e. I aimed to understand its language, 
meanings, actions and motivations, and to immerse myself in situations 
whereby conflicting arguments and multiple forms of explanations of 
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institutional and development problems could be studied in a non-normative 
sense.
At the outset, conducting research with the state bureaucracy and citizens 
presented difficulties, and this was for two reasons. One was the initial 
questionnaire that I had developed before leaving for field work, and the 
second was the need to find an interface with respect to the case studies. My 
colleagues, as well as my key contacts in the bureaucracy, advised me to 
change my initial research questionnaire. Their advice was proved right when 
I attempted to test the questionnaire during a formal interview with an official 
of the tehsil municipal administration who was involved in the allocation of 
funds reserved for development projects. The officer was less than passionate 
about answering my questions and at times was evasive in his responses. 
The semi-structured questionnaire attempted to solicit answers to broad 
questions which were, inter alia: how rules and authority influence officials’ 
decisions; how state bureaucracy defines access in relation to beneficiaries; 
and methods of evaluation, consultation, participation and inclusion, or more 
generally the way citizens are involved in the implementation of interventions. 
The officer found these questions complex and intrusive. I realised that the 
objective of the questionnaire was being interpreted in terms of probing 
bureaucratic practices and that therefore the officer did not want to share 
information with me. This encounter provided me with an opportunity to rethink 
my research strategy on how to approach state officials, deal with sensitive 
issues and extract information, and this is discussed in the different sections 
of this chapter. Data collection, documentation, and developing relationships 
and techniques were therefore ongoing processes. In the following sections of 
the chapter, I discuss research sites and access, research methodology, 
selection of case studies, techniques, data collection/analysis, relationships 
and issues of ethical significance. 
2. Description of research sites and access
My research site was the district of Abbottabad, located in Northern Pakistan. 
The district was named after Sir James Abbott, the last non-native Deputy 
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Commissioner of the district. The district, which is surrounded by low-peaked 
mountains, was once occupied by the British and dates back to late 
eighteenth century. The population of the district is over one million (IUCN 
2009). Roughly 80% of the population lives in rural areas and the remaining 
20% in urban areas. The district is divided into urban and rural union councils. 
There are thirty-five union councils in the district, and, out of these, four are 
urban union councils. The rural union councils consist of villages comprising a 
scattered population situated mostly on the tracts of mountains. The urban 
union councils encompass planned towns and cantonment areas.46
Abbottabad district contains different tribes47 with varied social and economic 
backgrounds. These tribes are Jadoon, Syed, Karral and Dhoond. The tribe of 
Jadoons occupies a special place in the early settlement and habitation of the 
district. Jadoons are quite influential because of their economic status and 
political connections—politically, Abbottabad district is a stronghold of the 
Jadoons. Their economic status is due to the acquisition of vast lands and 
urban property. Within the Jadoons there are sub-clans, called Khhails in the 
local language, whose genealogy is the same. In terms of politics, Jadoons 
have been winning elections in the district due to their political affiliation with 
the Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (Q) league. In the elections of 2008, the 
Muslim League (Q)-backed candidate lost the elections to the Muslim League 
(N) group headed by ex-prime minister Nawaz Sharif. The candidate of the 
Jadoons lost the election to Sardar Mehtab Abbasi, who was politically aligned 
with the Muslim League (N) group. The political situation in the district also 
                                                       
46 These are those areas which are administered by the Military Lands and Cantonments 
Department (MLCD). Cantonment areas do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Tehsil 
Municipal Administration (TMA). Since my research on case studies involving water supply 
and waste management fall under the preview of the TMA, I have explained this tier of 
administration in the case studies chapter. 
47 The tribes are basically organised according to kinship ties and family lineage. Sometimes 
biradari and tribe do appear to have the same connotation in Pakistani perspective of 
genealogy. It is because of the tribes who have gradually grown weak and adopted alien 
cultural traits due to various sociological compulsions—when inter-marriages become 
common and mixing of blood and cultures results. In a nut shell, biradaris are more socially 
grouped together and tribes are more blood-based. Tribe and biradari share common 
characteristics due to multiple reasons such as social standing, common culture and common 
language. (Local residents/senior officials in district administration)
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reveals the active participation of Abbasi’48 in politics and the formation of 
political alliances. In the present regime, two Members of the National 
Assembly (MNAs) belong to the tribe of Abbasi, and in the same elections a 
candidate of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) also won a national assembly 
seat. Thus, the political landscape in Abbottabad district is shared by these 
three major political parties. 
I chose Abbottabad district because it offered a good test case to try and 
study official performance in view of my previous experience of working with 
district officials. The research site for the case studies on water supply and 
solid waste management was the urban union council Nawansher. 
Geographically and historically, Nawansher is a village with a heterogeneous 
population. The social-cultural dynamics and politics of domination in 
Nawansher are based on kinship ties particularly among the Jadoons. Due to 
migration and a rapid increase in population, Nawansher has expanded with 
the development of new hamlets on land which was once used for agriculture. 
The expansion of the population falls in ‘new’ Nawansher. This distinction is 
important because the majority of population in ‘new’ Nawansher comprises 
non-Jadoon tribes, namely Rajpoots, Syed and Kashmiris. Communities 
belonging to these tribes are mostly employed in public and private sectors. 
There is no authentic statistical record available which can indicate the exact 
distribution of Jadoons and other tribes in the urban locality. Through informal 
interviews with local residents, it seems that between 65% to 70% settlers in 
‘old’ Nawansher are Jadoons. There are also differences over the exact 
population of Nawansher. Local residents think that the population of 
Nawansher is over 90,000; but according to the survey conducted by local 
NGO LokParya in 2009, the population of Nawansher is 40,000, and 
according to government records, the population of Nawansher was 23,000 in 
2007.
                                                       
48 With respect to Abbasi, it is a common name by which the tribe Dhoond is addressed. 
People living in most parts of Abbottabad district prefer the name Abbasi to Dhoond. (Local 
residents/senior officials in district administration.) 
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3. Negotiating access
Familiarity with local customs, language and norms was not too much of a
hindrance in getting access to public bureaucracies. I was able to develop 
contacts at an early stage through interactions with senior officials in the 
bureaucracy and other colleagues working in the district who had contacts 
with senior officials as well as community members in the research sites. 
When I arrived in the district, I met the District Coordinating Officer (DCO) of 
Abbottabad district, the counterpart of the Deputy Commissioner (prior to the 
implementation of the local government system in 2001). I had known the 
DCO from the time when I was working with the National Commission for 
Human Development (NCHD). In granting formal access to state officials in 
education and the tehsil municipal administration, the DCO was kind enough 
to officially send a letter to the senior officials of these institutions and ask for 
their cooperation and support during my research. Under the local government 
system, the DCO heads the district administration, and accordingly the letter 
allowed official access. An obvious advantage of official access was that it 
allowed me to bypass the normal bureaucratic processes of meeting and 
getting access to civil servants in Pakistan. In an unofficial capacity, one 
would require an informal official contact with a higher official in the state 
bureaucracy to get formal access. In other words, I have informally 
approached previous contacts to negotiate access.
After meeting these officials a number of times, I soon developed trust and a 
good rapport. I knew that formal consent or access would also require 
frequent meetings and permission to freely move and meet other officials. I 
initially concentrated on meeting frontline managers. In these meetings, the 
context and background of my research, and the nature of support required 
both officially and at times unofficially, were discussed. The frequency of these 
meetings enabled me to identify the frontline managers as my key informants. 
To clarify and justify my epistemological standpoint, it is essential at this stage 
to describe the interface approach.
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4. Interface Approach
Norman Long’s (1992) actor-oriented approach draws on symbolic 
interactionism and phenomenological perspectives developed and practiced 
by anthropologists. Central to the development of the interface approach is the
significance of ‘human agency’.49 This further implies focusing on the 
“lifeworlds and interlocking projects of actors” and employing social research 
methods to describe “social meanings, purposes and powers” (Long 2004, 
p.15). The epistemological stance acknowledges “multiple social realties” and 
questions the positivist ontological explanations of the world in which we live. 
In addition, an actor-oriented approach conceptualises knowledge as an 
emerging complex phenomena constitutive of a “complex interplay of social, 
cognitive, cultural, institutional and situational elements” (ibid., p.15). In 
pursuing an actor-oriented approach, the researcher reflects upon events and 
shows sensitivity to the lifeworlds of social actors.50 The vantage point of an 
actor-oriented approach as discussed by Long is to inquire about types of 
knowledge, which also includes our knowledge, formed by domains of power, 
and the “social relations in which they are generated and embedded” (ibid., 
p.16). Interface analysis builds on social interactions and focuses on how 
linkages and networks are developed between social actors. Over a period of 
time, prolonged interaction establishes the interface as an entity that defines 
the “interlocking relationships and intentionalities” (ibid., p.29).
The interface highlights dissimilarities and conflicts of interests between 
individuals, groups or organisations. Moreover, its canvas is that of the 
negotiations, conflicts and expectations which take place within different social 
entities. The interface reveals the clash of rationalities or cultural paradigms in 
different situations, which provides an opportunity for individuals or groups to 
                                                       
49 Agency is observed through social interactions in which social actors use their capacity and 
the ability to alter a pre-existing situation towards a desired end (Booth 1995, Long 1992). In 
the context of actor-oriented analysis, all social actors are endowed with agency which is used 
in ways such as influencing decisions or enrolling people in a project for particular purposes 
using different social strategies and practices (Arce and Long 1992, cited in Long 1992).
50 The examples of social actors are individuals, households, state officials and non-state 
officials such as political leaders and members/personnel of other institutions such as NGOs 
(Hindes 1986, cited by de Vries 2001, p.115).
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define their own “cultural or ideological positions” (ibid., p.29). To understand 
the social interface, the importance of knowledge cannot be ignored. People 
acquire knowledge of themselves and others, and such knowledge is 
constantly shaped by “experiences, encounters and discontinuities that 
emerge at the points of intersection between different actors’ lifeworlds” (ibid., 
p.30). The interface approach focuses on how different actors interpret social 
realities and events which are embedded in society. It treats development 
interventions as consisting of complex negotiated processes which are 
influenced by many factors, such as an actor’s strategies, negotiations, 
interpersonal relationships and how they can be analysed from the actor’s 
point of view. 
5. The selection of case studies
Yin (2006) argues that case studies are often selected by researchers to 
investigate certain topics in a particular context that involves a pre-established 
criterion for exploring and studying different phenomenon. Yin further argues 
that case studies are beneficial when an attempt is made to study descriptive 
and exploratory questions in detail in order to understand people and events. 
In addition, case study methods allow the researcher to observe events in 
their natural settings. The selection of three case studies in this thesis aims to 
contextualise my interface themes in order to observe and to understand the 
actual practices of state bureaucracy in three different institutional settings. 
The case study on water supply allows me to focus upon the dynamics of 
access. In an urban locality, it enables me to understand the problematic
nature of access by focusing upon the role, interactions and dealings of a local 
political leader. The case study on primary education offers an opportunity to 
examine at an abstract level the complex inter and intra-relationships of 
bureaucracy in the implementation of policy. The case study on waste 
management looks at an external intervention. The most significant aspect of 
the waste management study is to examine the role of a non-governmental 
organisation in improving the practices of state officials in refuse 
management. 
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6. Ethnography
During my initial round of interviews with public officials, I realised they had 
not understood my interface themes. This in turn made me realise that the 
bulk of research in Pakistan adopts a more positivist approach, associated 
with getting quantitative data through structured interviews. What I discovered 
from the official documents did not in reality make much sense. Therefore, it 
was more appropriate to approach my target audience in order to get close to 
knowing the informal practices of state bureaucracy through observations 
carried out in a non-judgemental and descriptive way. Moreover, in traditional 
societies, cultural practices and norms are associated with meanings which 
are often expressed through practices and actions (Herbert 2000). Wacquant 
(2003b, p.5) emphasises the importance of “social research based on the 
close-up, on-the-ground observation of people and institutions in real time and 
space, in which the investigator embeds herself near (or within) the 
phenomenon so as to detect how and why agents on the scene act, think and 
feel the way they do”. 
In observing events in the field, I positioned myself as someone trying to look 
through a microscope to see different things. I encountered two different 
worlds which required different lenses, and I focused on those things which 
revealed and constituted basic ethnographic inquiry. In conducting research, 
heuristically, people and bureaucrats in Pakistan see them as two different 
worlds and it is through the lens of interface that these two worlds can be 
connected. One is associated with formal rules and the other with informal 
practices. It is more appropriate to draw out analysis which enables an 
understanding of the reality. In actuality, it is difficult to stand apart and not 
mention that official rules are ignored. State officials in different circumstances 
evaluate their own situations in ways which are context- and case-specific. An 
official might follow official rules to convey the message that he has to observe 
the rules, while in reality adopting a particular behaviour which favours his 
patrons and their clients. The official behaviour cannot be straightforwardly 
interpreted as to whether a decision was taken according to official rules or 
whether was it taken to create a situation which could enable the official to 
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circumvent official rules. The two worlds are not separate or clearly divisible. 
The civil servants frequently move between official norms and informal social 
norms. Ethnography enabled me to observe instances when official norms 
and official practices were challenged by informal social norms.
An ethnographic endeavour entails both dangers and opportunities to 
document in detail the narratives, stories, perceptions and actual work 
practices of state institutions which involve state bureaucracy and citizens. By 
adopting an ethnographic approach, I was able to make a detailed account of 
what was conveyed to me privately and through un-official and official 
interactions. The nature of the case studies presented both opportunities and 
drawbacks in doing ethnography. In the case study of primary education, a 
pure ethnographic approach was not possible. It transpired during my initial 
observations and informal meetings with senior officials that they spent most 
of their time in their offices examining official documents and had little 
interaction with the community. This became even more evident when I was 
offered a rare opportunity to observe an official meeting of female field officers 
of the district education department who were sharing field visit reports with 
their immediate reporting female officer. After observing the meetings and 
reflecting on what was discussed therein, I reached the conclusion that these 
discussions and decisions required visiting schools. Had I conducted 
ethnography in the district education headquarters, this would have restricted 
my unconditional access to schools, since the senior officials could have 
interpreted my ethnography as too intrusive. 
Quite apart from this, my interactionist-interface approach required observing 
interactions between citizens and officials in person, in order to attain a 
deeper understanding of the research community, which clearly is something 
which can only be undertaken in the field. These interactions can be classified 
into two different types: social interactions and official interactions. Official 
interactions with public officials complemented my data as gathered through 
social interactions in the field. As a native of the country, but not entirely from 
the local community, these interactions enabled me to record the details of the 
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actual practices of the state bureaucracy. These practices were observed in 
the field.
6.1 Participant observation
Participant observation is recognised as central to ethnography. Participant 
observation allows the examination of social practices and observing people 
and communities in the field. It elicits information by paying attention to the 
events which take place in the process of interaction, and recording them for 
detailed analysis (Bernard 1998, p.264). Participant observation involves 
immersion in events and in the realities experienced by people in different 
social and political contexts. Ethnographic field research involves observations 
and other techniques. My experience of observation was that of trying to adopt 
an interpretive, reflexive posture so that my interactions with different state 
and non-state actors could be transcribed in order to examine meanings, 
perceptions and institutional practices. With an eye towards retrospective 
processing, the data was gathered and kept in its original form for in-depth 
analysis later on. To get deeper insights into different social events, 
observations were made in order to uncover the reasons behind the social 
practices of state officials and citizens in different social contexts. In the case 
of water supply and solid waste management, observations were made during 
my frequent visits to the town committee in Nawansher and in observing 
people’s habits of disposing waste. I used to leave around 9 a.m. and would 
reach Nawansher at 9.20 a.m.
During my conversations and observations, I always presented myself as 
someone who was trying to understand the routine functioning and processes 
of service provision and the dealings of officials with the community. In the 
beginning, it was difficult to make officials understand the nature of my 
research, but after some time they became accustomed to my attendance and 
observations. Since I was a frequent visitor to the town committee and had 
close contacts with its members, I was able to observe instances when the 
community members turned up and argued with the water supply staff. It was 
a difficult task to grasp the intricate and complex backgrounds to these 
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complaints in this particular geographical milieu. As Herbert (2000, p.550) 
points out: “because ethnography provides singular insight into these 
processes and meanings, it can most brightly illuminate the relationships 
between structure, agency and geographic context”. In the main town 
committee, observations and interactions helped me understand community 
complaints and the internal logics and justifications of the water supply staff. 
These complaints were of a quite sensitive nature.
In the beginning, it was a struggle to attain a deeper understanding of the 
water supply distribution, its rationing and how it was being managed by the 
town committee. It was only after developing trust and closeness with water 
supply staff that I was able to understand the frequently used political terms 
and the social practices of the town committee. During my observations I 
encountered situations which did not conform to objective truth and reasoning. 
The water supply distribution system excluded certain hamlets in ‘old’ 
Nawansher. Prior to these observations, I met a community member. The 
member knew about the water distribution system and resided in one of those 
hamlets. He disclosed information on the design of the water distribution 
system put in place by the previous Nazim of Nawansher. This meeting was 
coincidental and came after many weeks of sitting in the office of a member of 
the town committee, observing angry protests. One protestor narrated the 
story behind the water distribution system and showed me how the system 
worked. The accumulation of data and the discussions that took place 
between the community and members of the town committee became an 
important source of data, as well as key to developing my research position.
The political nature of water demanded I pay special attention to local 
practices, and especially to the role played by the incumbent Nazim of 
Nawansher in managing access. This political nature of access to water, being 
a highly technical field, has been ignored in other research which is based on 
the standard secondary sources of qualitative data. Focusing on the water 
supply case study made me aware that close observations of social events 
requires attention to social and political dynamics. As Auyero (2006, p.258) 
puts it, “Unfortunately, … in concentrating almost exclusively on the models, 
107
charts, regression, and correlations of standard political research, social 
science has missed a significant aspect of the ongoing reality that is politics: 
namely it has missed the nitty-gritty details of politics.” When I asked the 
members of the town committee about problems of access, they were 
apprehensive about disclosing the actual facts, as they thought I might 
disclose them in turn to senior officials. I adopted a technique which was to 
move away from the officials of the town committee for a period of time, and to 
engage instead with the affected community through holding informal 
discussions. The socio-political dynamics could not have been explored 
without establishing the basic facts in the region from which they originated. 
On one occasion the affected community members had not received any 
water, and during my observation of the unfolding social events in the office of 
the town committee, I came to understand that this community had been 
facing water crises for the past two years.
Focusing on their stories and then drawing on the information gathered from 
the technical staff and the community, I came to understand that the social 
practices were embedded in kinship ties and social solidarity between the 
serving Nazim and his own community. Emerson et al. (1995, p.3) assert that 
“rather than detracting from what the fieldworker can learn, first-hand relations 
with those studied may provide clues to understanding the more subtle, 
implicit underlying assumptions that are not readily accessible through 
observation or interview methods alone”. When faced with complex 
phenomena and unexplained events, unstructured interviews were conducted 
with the water supply staff and members of the local community. I also 
developed a checklist for conducting informal and formal interviews with my 
key informants and state officials. These questionnaires were prepared in 
order to examine personal motivation, institutional practices and the 
knowledge of the members of the town committee. In conducting these 
interviews, I relied primarily on my key informants, and also on people 
introduced to me by those informants, who in turn facilitated my meeting other 
important persons who possessed rich information about social and political 
events in the research site.
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6.2 Interviews
Interviews supplement observations in the gathering of additional information, 
creating the conditions for recording responses and so attaining greater clarity 
through the process of face-to-face interaction. As a technique for collecting 
data, interviews are the most widely used tool in qualitative research. The tool 
serves to gain access to people’s perceptions and constructions of reality, and 
to uncover the meanings with which they define situations (Punch 1998). I 
conducted thirty-one interviews across the three case studies, with school 
teachers, the Nazim of Nawansher, community members, staff members of 
the local NGO LokParya51 and officials of the district education department 
(see appendix 4, 5, 6 and 7). These interviews were generally semi-
structured. The semi-structured interviews were located within my 
ethnographic work, as they helped me acquire a certain type of information. I 
carried out some intimate observations, which were then reinforced by open-
ended questions. Semi-structured questions offer the versatility and the 
freedom to sequence questions in a preferred priority, and to vary the amount 
of time and attention devoted to different topics (Robson 1993, p.237). 
Interviews also provide a response appropriate to the researcher’s interests, 
which is investigated “rather than treated as ‘a problem’ standing in the way of 
accurate reporting of ‘facts’ or ‘experiences’” (Silverman 2006, p.127). Starting 
with generalised, semi-structured interview questions contributes to the 
formation of concepts and ideas that can direct the researcher to record the 
respondent’s responses, followed by analysis and reformulation. Interview 
studies follow a deductive logic, while observation methods can complement 
that deductive logic inductively. Interviews with staff of education departments 
took place in the schools; the interviews conducted with teachers focused on 
their teaching experiences and the meanings they attached to multiple social 
and administrative problems.
During the interviews with teachers, which in most cases were formal, I 
frequently asked them about issues of access to quality education. Their 
                                                       
51 Most of my interviews with the staff of LokParya were based on their official documents and 
field activities.
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responses indicated excessive contact between certain teachers and local 
politicians in posting and transfers, and preferential treatment to teachers who 
had political contacts. During field visits, informal teaching practices were 
observed in which a teacher remained absent from duty and employed a local 
teacher by paying her a certain amount from her salary. The stories of these 
teachers revealed the reasons for the declining quality of education between 
urban and rural areas, which is discussed in chapter seven. The interview with 
the Nazim of Nawansher was informal and enabled me to grasp the delicate 
matters and situations which bring the Nazim, state officials and local citizens 
into negotiations within the different structures relating to issues of access to 
water supply.
The interviews in the case of education mostly took place in rural areas. I used 
to travel extensively, in some cases having to walk for several miles, since 
most of these rural schools were located in the hills and were not easily 
accessible. My key informants in conducting these interviews were teachers: 
in particular, the senior teachers who had a lot of teaching experience became 
my key respondents. During these interviews, the teachers would ask me if I 
had a questionnaire (i.e. a structured questionnaire) on which to document 
their responses. They used to get quite surprised that, in all these interviews I 
talked to them informally, trying to get their views on issues and problems in 
access to quality education and relating them to my interface themes. Making 
sense of what these teachers revealed required me to pay attention to their 
responses, concerns and administrative practices. In other words, 
organisational practices and utterances were socially constructed according to 
particular contexts. In most cases, there were issues of mistrust and frequent 
reference to the powerful ‘clout’ of the main education office. In conducting 
these interviews, I paid attention to their stories by keeping quiet and 
preferring to listen. The primary focus of these interviews was to come to 
know their subjective realities, and to explore in more depth the actual work 
practices of the state officials. Gaining knowledge in the field about actors’ 
perspectives, social practices and perceptions of others, leads to the 
construction of different types of knowledge which emanates from 
organisational practices and process, interactions, relationships and decisions 
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in both institutional and social settings. Mason (1996, p.12) argues that “social 
processes, interpretations, social relations, social practices, experiences and 
understanding” need to be tightly matched with the research methodology.
My interviews with female teachers in both rural and urban schools took place 
in the presence of senior female officials of the education department. In these 
interviews, I was accompanied by female mentor teachers, since females in 
the local community were reluctant to talk to the opposite sex. During these 
interviews, I made an attempt to observe the community in which these 
schools were located, since my unstructured interviews with parents and 
teachers enabled me to understand the reasons behind the lack of trust in 
public schools. I paid specific attention to the accounts of the respondents, 
rather than getting them to react to particular questions. I also observed that, 
in the presence of their immediate Assistant District Officer (ADO), female 
teachers were reluctant to disclose information and they constantly looked at 
the officer before uttering a response. After conducting a number of 
interviews, I became aware that these teachers wanted to talk about their 
experiences: problems of children’s access to schools, their own limitations of 
teaching in difficult conditions and, above all accessibility for these teachers, 
which was a problem in itself. 
Informal interviews were conducted with my key informants to gain clarity on 
issues of accountability and actual practices, and to deal with ambiguity and 
contradictory statements. These interviews were held with officials of the tehsil
municipal administration in the beginning of 2010, before returning to Bath in 
March 2010. The diversity of respondents across the three case studies and 
the nature of the information meant constantly adjusting the questions I had 
developed in the field. In the case of water supply, informal interviews with the 
technical staff were extremely useful. These interviews were held in private 
and during field visits when the technical staff went out to investigate the 
complaints of citizens. In the case study on solid waste management, I held 
detailed and frequent conversations with the team leader of LokParya, as well 
as going out and meeting the communities during the implementation of the 
project in ‘new’ Nawansher. The team leader of LokParya was extremely 
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helpful throughout the research. When the project was initially implemented, 
my interactions with him and the chief officer of the town committee took place 
in their offices. Soon we developed good relations based on trust, but at the 
same time they did not talk openly about the practices of the water and 
sanitation staff. However, since official documents and other information were 
easily accessible, and after my frequent interactions with the team leader of 
LokParya, I became aware that the sanitation staff were serving the residents 
of ‘old’ Nawansher and the residents of the new Nawansher were neglected. 
As I had gathered data from my other informants on the actual practices of the 
town committee, I also required the official documents and inside information 
to validate my findings.
I used different techniques to ensure that formal and informal interviews were 
properly documented. I seldom took notes while conducting formal interviews, 
as there was a danger that note-taking could put the official in an awkward 
situation and that the actual story might be distorted. It can also be argued, 
however, that officials seldom reveal the real intent and motivations behind 
their un-official practices. Since I had established trust, and because I had the 
distinct advantage of having worked with officials previously, the interviews 
were extremely useful—although, in certain cases, these interviews did not 
reveal the factors influencing official practices. Most of these interviews lasted 
for almost an hour and were written up on the same day. Writing about what 
the officials uttered and recording their words, I sometimes wrote up these 
interviews in the car immediately afterwards, especially where I thought they 
had to be written up sooner rather than later.
6.3 Informal encounters
I also gathered a lot of data through informal encounters. These encounters 
generally took place in very relaxed environments, or in passing moments with 
bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats. During my initial visits to the tehsil
municipal administration, personal conversation with two officials helped me 
get to know how officials talked about their own limitations when performing 
their official responsibilities. During these conversations I had requested that I 
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could take notes, to which the officials did not object. I must emphasise, 
though, that one official was more careful in his conversation while the other 
was more open. At a later stage the careful officer opened up, but refrained 
from giving too much information. The official who spoke freely was an 
extremely bold officer who did not hesitate to reveal how a local politician was 
able to extend preferential treatment to his clients, and how taking action 
against this person was considered to be creating problems for themselves. 
Our personal conversation benefited me a great deal, since I was able to take 
notes and interpret them afterwards.
During informal encounters, I did inform the officers that I needed to meet 
them regarding my research, which required an interface with officials and the 
community in the sector of urban services such as water supply and 
education. The bold officer said: “these two sectors have not been explored 
from the perspectives of the officials, examining their difficulties which they 
have to face on a daily basis in the provision of municipal services”. Informal 
encounters with the water supply staff in Nawansher yielded extremely useful 
information about local politics. In these interactions, staff requested that I not 
disclose their identity. I assured them that their identity would not be 
disclosed, and emphasised that my research was about knowing what goes 
on behind closed doors and in private conversations between the local 
politician and the officials—in other words, that I was trying to understand 
what officials say explicitly or implicitly about certain acts, decisions and the 
institutional logics behind informal practices.
Informal interaction with the Nazim of Nawansher was very useful in terms of 
his views on his political role and his understanding of the importance of 
kinship ties and the expectations of the local community. The Nazim narrated 
that when the community sees that their problems are being resolved, their 
social expectations are raised even higher. The most important element of my 
casual conversation with the Nazim was to acquire his views on his role in 
managing access and resolving local community problems. The Nazim said: 
“the people in the community elected me their Nazim so that I can solve their
problems”. According to the Nazim, he was elected to meet the social 
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expectations of the people. When I was doing field work, these casual 
opportunistic moments yielded important data. These moments helped me to 
overcome the challenges that I faced in the collection of data. Through these 
casual moments, I got closer to the interface because people were more 
relaxed, and this enabled me to come to a better understanding of the 
dynamics of the interface.
6.4 Focus groups
I conducted eleven focus group discussions. Six were held with community 
members and the remaining five with state officials (see appendix 1, 2 and 3). 
The purpose of holding these discussions was to seek responses and 
opinions from the officials and community members on different aspects and 
specifics of the research across the three cases. As pointed out by Krueger 
and Casey (2000), the focus group enables the researcher to acquire 
information in a particular group in which each participant either reinforces 
what others say, or influences others’ responses so as to convey a different 
line of argument. Focus groups were also essential to discuss certain 
concepts which required more clarity and further perspectives subsequent to 
conducting the interviews. Morgan (1997, p.20) asserts that focus groups 
“reveal aspects of experiences and perspectives that would be not as 
accessible without group interactions”.
Prior to conducting focus groups with officials, I framed a questionnaire to 
guide the discussion, keeping in mind logical sequence, consistency and 
clarity. In the beginning I asked general questions, followed by more specific 
ones. The questions were descriptive and designed to encourage the 
participants to elaborate on terms such as power imbalances, informal 
practices, the nature of pressures and the penetration of informal norms into 
official norms and decision-making processes. In the focus groups these 
terms were heavily discussed between and with the participants. In the case 
of primary education, I conducted two focus group discussions with ADOs: 
one with males and another with females. In the focus group discussions, I 
was able to compare and contrast the meanings assigned to the 
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aforementioned terms. Focus groups enabled me to grasp the intricate details 
of how official practices and the performance of junior officials are affected by 
political and administrative pressures. 
One focus group discussion was held with the water supply staff in 
Nawansher. I used the same questionnaire. The concepts of intermediation 
and using political connections arose in both the case of primary education 
and that of water supply. The context was different, however, as the water 
supply staff adopted different institutional practices in providing access to 
water. In the focus group discussion held with the water supply staff, it came 
to my knowledge that the pressure, in terms of political influence on the water 
supply staff in Nawansher, was from the Nazim and his clients. The focus 
group participants elaborated on how they had to accede to the Nazim’s 
interests, and at the same time how it became increasingly difficult for them to 
follow official rules. Focus group discussions confirmed and validated previous 
findings and analysis of data.
Similarly, one focus group discussion was held with sanitation staff to discuss 
the impact of an external intervention in the management and disposal of solid 
waste. Focus group discussion with sanitation staff was quite difficult, as the 
staff working under the authority of the chief sanitation officer were 
apprehensive about disclosing information. The questionnaire was not very 
useful and I decided to talk to the group in a casual manner.  
Focus group discussions with community members were held in local villages. 
The objectives of these discussions were to document the views of citizens on 
primary education and the utilisation of state resources by a select group of 
community members known as the Parent Teacher Council (PTC). These 
discussions were of a different nature, as the people in the local villages were 
mostly illiterate. The community members had diverse backgrounds and were 
from various social classes. They presented their community’s concerns on 
the quality of public education and the problems their children faced when 
attending and commuting to schools. These discussions were held in the 
presence of officials. In view of the overall manner in which officials were 
interacting with citizens, the focus groups became venues for the confession 
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of illicit practices and the expression of concerns regarding the declining 
quality of education.
Focus group discussions with parents were rather informal, again because of 
high illiteracy. To acquire information, I used to narrate the experiences of 
parents living in my own village. I observed that these parents were listening 
carefully. I felt strange telling local people about local problems, and wondered 
whether these meetings would enable me to extract information of vital 
importance. My feelings were mixed: I was pessimistic, but at the same time 
retained some optimism. In some cases, I attempted to incite people of the 
community to break the silence. This was primarily because I knew from my 
previous experience that local parents/citizens are ignored in decision making 
and face problems of inaccessibility of information about policies. During these 
meetings, their own reasoning and logic were challenged by probing delicate 
matters. Their own logic and arguments swayed whenever someone revealed 
the truth, such that the entire spectrum of discussion oscillated between 
confessions, ignorance and heated verbal discourses. 
Focus group discussions with state officials across the three case studies 
were held at different venues. In most cases, they were held in their 
respective offices. These discussions complemented my observations and 
provided depth and clarity on terms such as “politics” and “political 
connections”. These discussions were tape recorded and transcribed 
afterwards. Focus group discussions with PTCs were facilitated by the head 
teacher and written up on the same day.
6.5 Reflexivity
An important aspect of pursuing this kind of research is that every researcher 
faces problems when investigating and probing issues of a sensitive nature. 
During my research, many state officials talked to me candidly about their 
problems and the issues which confronted them daily; but there were also 
officials who only spoke about the official versions in narrating the same 
issues. The reason why I was able to succeed in identifying who was telling 
me the official version and who was more open was my previous experience 
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of working with state officials. The uniqueness of my being previously 
acquainted with state bureaucracy put me in a privileged position. In 
Abbottabad district there was wide recognition among the bureaucrats that 
they were dealing with someone who had exposure to administration in 
Pakistan. During the course of field work, I encountered informal practices, the 
disclosure of which could have negative repercussions for the actors involved. 
I overcame this by building trust with my key informants and developing a 
good rapport, especially among the bureaucrats in the district. Developing 
trust, the frequent exchange of ideas, interactions and having good 
relationships were the most important aspects of the process of conducting 
observations. Moreover, I enjoyed particularly close contacts with the senior 
officials in the district. I had the advantage of having these contacts, but I was 
also aware that my advantages could also be construed simply as being 
personally well-connected. Since I was residing in the district, during the initial 
days of my research most of my time was dedicated to getting to know people 
and talking to them informally about my research. I noticed a certain 
atmosphere among certain segments of bureaucracy who confidentially 
shared their problems with me perhaps in the hope that I would be able to 
resolve them using my connections with bureaucracy. I thus had a unique 
advantage over other people and researchers in carrying out this kind of 
research which involved observing complex institutional problems, conflictual 
situations and un-official practices. I can also affirm that there have been no 
negative consequences for my informants as a consequence of my 
discussions and observations.
6.6 Triangulation
Reporting and writing involves investigating diverse perspectives, and 
operating within a less structured social representation of events, which 
inevitably leads a researcher to confront ambiguities (Stake 2005). As a 
researcher, it was my foremost responsibility to get the facts right without 
misrepresenting events, interpretations or judgements. To reduce the margin 
of misrepresentation, I used triangulation to seek clarification of concepts, 
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interpretation and meanings, dealing with multiple realities and verifying 
observations. As argued by Jick (1979, p.602), “triangulation is used for the 
validation of data … this would involve the use of multiple methods to examine 
the same dimension of a research problem”. Triangulation was useful in two 
ways. The first was after coming back in March 2010 from my first research 
visit, which had lasted for six months, when I was able to write the initial drafts 
of my empirical chapters. Although I had already gathered a lot of data in the 
initial six months, I was encouraged to confirm the contents and the analyses 
of data across the three case studies with my informants and the people with 
whom I interacted. Initially, when I carried out my research, a senior official in 
the education department told me something which was contradicted by 
another officer in the same department. When I met another officer in the 
same department, she disclosed some information which was totally different 
from the versions of the previous officers that I had interviewed. The accurate 
construction of reality perhaps lay in between these versions and 
conversations. During the research, I noticed that different people would tell 
me a different story, and initially it was a struggle to discern the facts and 
reality. Ingrained in the interface approach is the need to work around and 
analyse such stories. As a matter of fact, I was dealing with a plurality of 
truths. Upon gathering official versions and learning what was happening in 
the field, it became more evident who was telling me the truth and who was 
narrating the official context. As a countermeasure, I also examined official 
documents, and was greatly indebted to certain officials who shared 
confidential documents with me.
With this background, and in view of the sensitive nature of this research, I 
presented my findings to officials, keeping the original data intact to allow the 
informants and others to agree, disagree, or make novel suggestions 
concerning any aspect of my findings and analysis. The data contained 
accounts of informal practices, appropriation of state resources, intrusion of 
social norms into official norms, politicisation, the Nazim’s political interests 
and issues in managing access. While sharing research through the process 
of triangulation, I was prepared for comments and disagreements. During 
presentation, however, I was quite surprised that my findings and analysis 
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were confirmed by the officials. There were some officers who gave me 
additional inputs and enhanced my own understanding on certain aspects of 
the findings. During the presentation of data, one officer responded that: “we 
follow official rules”. The officer further said that: “as we do observe official 
rules, we cannot ignore the influence on us from different sources”. Another 
officer responded in the same context by saying “we have to observe rules 
and there is an official process which we have to follow. In case if we are 
caught when we do something against official norms, we could face inquiry 
and may be sacked”. These responses clearly presented their dilemma in 
responding to normative rules and informal social norms. The officials were 
responding to my analysis with reference to how and under what 
circumstances they deviate from official norms. While presenting and 
validating the research, the officials knew that I had been going around, had 
access to official documents, and had been talking to citizens and observing 
their practices. Still, the validation of data with the sanitation staff was difficult 
as they had different versions and stories. In the entire process of validating 
the analysis of data, I encouraged everyone to openly critique my findings, 
respecting those who had shared inside information with me and had trusted 
me during the research process.
7. Writing field notes and the analysis of data 
Data relating to detailed accounts was gathered by observing people in local 
government institutions and selected villages. Simultaneously carrying out 
observations and interviewing was useful to capture those aspects of events 
which can only be transcribed and interpreted by asking questions. Moreover, 
combining interviewing with observations was helpful in exploring the 
components of the interface. Negotiations between officials and citizens in 
different settings led to better understanding of the emerging themes, 
concepts, language, practices and contestations. Throughout the field 
research, I spent a lot of time writing field notes and constantly interacting with 
state officials and key informants regarding what I had observed and was 
writing up on a daily basis. Ethnographic writing, in the form of maintaining 
diaries, enabled me to view and gain vital information on the case studies. 
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While writing, I would constantly engage with my raw data to get a 
comprehensive grasp of social realities, events and what transpired from the 
interactions with diverse social actors. I observed events and, while writing 
them down, I later conducted interviews with key informants to establish the 
validity and reliability of data.
The process of data analysis began during the field work by producing a 
detailed interim report which I sent to my supervisor for his comments and 
further advice. The analysis consisted of identifying emerging key analytical 
concepts and preliminary reflections. Since this process started in the month 
of January 2010, after already conducting three months of field work, I had 
ample time to collect more data. I followed up the case study on water supply 
by meeting the members of the town committee and the Nazim of Nawansher. 
While I was in the field, I was working through my data. During this process, I 
identified key arguments and concepts which became saturated before 
returning to Bath in March 2010. By conducting preliminary analysis of the 
data around key themes between April and June 2010, and after returning to 
Bath from my second field visit in October 2010, I was able to reflect on my 
data in more depth, as I was maintaining my daily diary. When I read the 
literature, my process of analysing data was an iteration between my initial 
detailed notes and diaries. Through constant iteration between data collection, 
analysis and external conversation, I focused upon key concepts which helped 
me in the development of an analytical framework. 
8. Ethical issues
In this kind of research it is important to be cognizant of ethical issues, as 
many of the people with whom the researcher comes in contact must be 
informed about the nature and purpose of the research. The sensitivity of my 
research was quite high, and entailed, first of all, informed consent. The 
consent was acquired before the research began from all the institutions and 
the people interviewed. There were a lot of ethical issues to deal with in the 
field. These issues were handled by disclosing to the researched community 
what I was doing, what information was required, and how their information 
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and identities would be protected throughout the research. What I was trying 
to achieve was to make the entire research process explicit to the researched 
community. Because of the sensitive nature of the research, a difficulty arose 
when presenting my research to the respondents. In the early stages I asked 
direct questions, which were answered but with little clarity. At a later stage, I 
changed my style and language whenever I approached different social actors 
within the researched community. In ethical terms, the research audience 
began to understand that my research was based on understanding informal 
practices through the examination of social norms.
In interactions with citizens, the greatest ethical issue was assessing the risk 
in exploring how state officials develop interpersonal relationships with citizens 
and use these relationships for personal benefits. I dealt with this ethical issue 
by asking the citizens to reflect upon what they thought were the most 
important issues which affect the quality of social services. With state officials 
my strategy was different, since confronting an official about appropriation of 
state resources would immediately be dismissed on many pretexts. In these 
situations, it was more appropriate to know how state resources were utilised. 
This question was posed to stimulate a discussion, and in most cases the 
answers were vague and general; still, however, I found them useful.
To remain focused and to add precision to the data, questions were asked 
indirectly about specific events and actions. However, at times I adopted an 
aggressive approach in order to probe a matter which was unavoidable, since 
information is not disclosed to outsiders when the state officials and citizens 
are engaged in extra-legal practises such as appropriating state resources or 
giving bribes. The respondents became used to the ways I asked questions, 
which were meant to explore an important event by narrating their own 
experiences. Moreover, issues of corruption, accountability and actual 
behaviour are quite openly discussed in the state institutions but in a more 
abstract way.
A major ethical issue was anonymity of key informants and the sharing of 
official documents. Matters of a sensitive nature—such as people revealing 
facts, inquiry reports and certain stories—have been documented with a 
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proviso of not naming the real persons involved. Some informants told me that 
they would not object if I mentioned their names. This reply was perhaps 
related to the fact that the most conspicuous events are widely known in the 
community and some get reported in the local newspapers. A senior officer 
informed me that the local press had levelled false allegations against him 
because he did not succumb to bureaucratic and political pressures: therefore 
it did not matter to him if his name was mentioned in my research. 
Another ethical issue was dealing with the local community where tribal and 
political interests are mostly localised and the people of the community do not 
want to talk openly about them. This meant that I could not talk to people 
about what was happening in reality as compared to what was being 
conveyed through official language and bureaucratic responses. Observing 
social events and what was happening between members of the town 
committee, the Nazim and the community, I tried to remain neutral and to 
avoid siding with any particular community or official. In the case studies 
concerning primary education and waste management, I tried to talk about 
political connections and local practices in a positive manner so that the 
people with whom I had been working did not feel uneasy about what I had 
gathered from observations and through other research methods.
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9. Conclusion
The most important aspect of my research was the development of an 
interface approach and deploying various research methods across the case 
studies. Most of the research evolved from the field, and I did not enforce a 
particular theme during my observations and interviews. The research was 
undertaken across different institutions involving state officials, citizens and 
non-state actors. I began my research with pre-decided questions, but 
amended them in eliciting responses in order to create a close fit between my 
research interests and the questions I was asking. The diversity, context and 
the nature of research enabled me to understand actual behaviour and 
administrative practices. An important aspect of the research was paying 
close attention to informal social norms and their significance from the 
perspectives of the officials were of paramount importance to delineate the 
delicate boundaries between official norms and actual practices. Interactions 
with local citizens highlighted how officials deal with local communities and 
how citizens cope with their own peculiarities of circumstance in trying to get 
access to public and collective services. 
The sensitivity of the research demanded trust and developing close 
relationships with officials and others. I must emphasise that developing trust 
was a rather frustrating process: officials are always wary about their own 
practices and relationships. Dealing with different versions, official practices 
and differentiating between officials’ informal norms was an extremely arduous 
and difficult task. Ethnographic research is by all means quite useful, but each 
individual has to reconcile it with his or her own personality and choose 
different options when dealing with complex realities and situations. Focus 
groups and triangulation were extremely useful, as they had the potential to 
contribute to my previous observations and analysis.
This research draws on the experiences and practices of state officials, and 
the social life of citizens who are marginalised in terms of their inability to 
exercise voice and face difficulties in getting access to social services. 
Moreover, the examination of politics and power are central attributes of 
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everyday practices, and negotiation and resistance is often not visible to the 
researcher. Partly, this is because of what has already been discussed among 
public officials and citizens in order to maintain the existing system and devise 
different social strategies for presenting their own experiences to the 
researcher. It is also the product of social relationships, norms, culture, affinity 
between the citizens, and the kinship ties which get revealed as one becomes 
immersed in and part of the community—which in my case was less 
problematic than for someone who is a total outsider.
Reflecting on my research experiences and the personal relationships that I 
developed with public and non-state actors, the data conveys the language of 
the people with whom I have shared personal experiences and developed 
relations of trust. I also encountered problems during data collection, 
especially in the case of primary education where I was seen as an intruder. 
However, I still enjoy good relations with my key informants and met most of 
them before returning to Bath in March 2010. 
In this chapter, research questions were explored with a two-fold objectives. 
The first objective concerned understanding how administration was 
performed. The second objective was associated with knowing the modes of 
actual practices of state officials, points of view, relationships and experiences 
which characterise bureaucratic encounters with citizens and non-state actors 
across the three case studies. In the following chapter, I introduce the three 
case studies.
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Chapter Five
Introduction to the Case Studies
1. Introduction
This chapter has two goals. The first is to discuss the three case studies, their 
objectives, and some key background issues on decentralised local 
governance narrated to me by state and non-state officials. The three case 
studies are: primary education, water supply and waste management. Primary 
education is a state-led intervention and deals with the provision of elementary 
education. Under the local government system, primary education is devolved 
to the district government, and water and sanitation is devolved to a sub-
district tier known as the tehsil municipal administration. The case study of
waste management concerns an external intervention designed by an 
international organisation and implemented by a local NGO. The three case 
studies present their objectives and processes in terms of what they intend to 
achieve, the involvement of different key actors, and how they are 
implemented in different geographical areas. In this chapter, I look essentially 
at the formal construction of education policy and development interventions, 
and do not infer anything about what happens in practice. The second goal of 
the chapter is to explain the rationale underpinning the choice of the three 
case studies, and their overall relevance to my research aims and objectives.
2. The case study of primary education 
After the promulgation of the local government system in 2001, primary 
education is devolved to the district government. District government 
comprises district councils and district administration. The district council is 
headed by the district Nazim (Mayor), elected by union councillors52 in the 
tehsil. The district council is partially constituted by the union council Nazims, 
                                                       
52 The total number of seats in a union council is 21 (Khan, 2006). Abbottabad district is 
divided into two tehsils, namely Abbottabad and Havellian. According to government records, 
in Abbottabad tehsil there are 35 union councils, which means a total of 735 union councillors. 
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and the rest of the council is composed of women councillors, peasants and 
minorities. The role of the Nazim in the devolved district education department 
is limited.53 The district administration comprises, among others, the district 
education department and officials of different ranks responsible for the 
provision of primary education.
Primary education is a national program. Under Pakistan’s 1973 constitution, 
primary education is established as a provincial concern. However, education 
policy is still formulated at the federal level under the umbrella of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The preparation of the PRSP is based on 
a consultative process which involves, among others, state and non-state 
institutions, and the active participation of respective provincial governments 
in the policy-making process. The PRSP is considered to be of special 
importance, as the wider objectives of the document identifies a number of 
challenges in primary education, namely: a shortage of trained and qualified 
teachers, lack of a well-defined criterion for allocating funds to schools, 
teacher absenteeism, lack of accountability, and an absence of mechanisms 
which bridge the gap between policy conception and implementation (PRSP 
2003, p.67). While these challenges are widely recognised, the objective of 
Education for All (EFA) lays emphasis on improving access and quality with 
respect to primary education in the country (ibid., p.68). In the Pakistan PRSP, 
EFA54 is a ten-year plan (2001-2011) conceived as a “sustainable and well-
                                                       
53 In the local government elections held in 2001, district Nazims were able to assert their 
authority over the officials of district administration since there were no provincial
assemblies/cabinets. Therefore, the role of provincial government in district administration 
was minimal. In the 2005 elections, the Nazims were unable to exercise their official authority, 
as provincial governments headed by political leaders had taken effective control of the 
provinces. Provincial ministers were constantly making changes in the rules of local 
government so that they could sideline the Nazims using their legislative authority, sometimes 
lawfully but also unlawfully. For example, in the garb of different notifications of various 
departments such as Establishment, Education, Health, etc., political leaders carved their role 
and overshadowed the authority of the Nazim. The induction of Members of Provincial 
Assemblies (MPAs) in District Public Safety Commissions and District Reconstruction 
Advisory Committees shows how provincial political leaders intervened in district 
administration (EDO finance and planning).
54 Pakistan is a signatory to achieving the EFA goals and targets by the year 2015. The main 
policy sectors of EFA are: primary education, adult literacy, teachers’ education, early 
childhood education, etc.
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integrated framework linked to poverty reduction and development strategies” 
(PRSP 2003, chapter 4, p.69). EFA has been considered as critical to 
achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development (PRSP 2003, 
chapter 5, p.78). In addition to the above, the National Education Policy is 
based on the Education Structural Reforms (ESR) embedded in the PRSP 
document. The main thrust of ESR in each province and in each district of the 
country is to achieve the goals and targets of the education policy being
implemented under the National Plan of Action (NPA). The main objectives of 
the NPA are:
a) “To reach the disadvantaged population groups in rural and urban 
areas with emphasis on girls and women”
b) “To promote community participation and ownership of basic education 
programs at the grassroots”
c) “To improve relevance and quality of basic education through 
enhancing learning achievements of the children, youth and adults” 
(PRSP 2003, chapter 4, p.69)
When I arrived in Abbottabad district, my first task was to meet key officials of 
the district education department who were dealing directly with primary 
education. In 2009, after an initial round of interviews and in line with PRSP 
and national education policy (1998-2011), the district education department 
had prepared a ‘project digest’ commonly known as the Planning Commission 
Proforma (PC-1).55 After acquiring this information, I came to know that the 
actualisation of the ‘project digest’ was reflected in the District Plan of Action 
(DPA). The DPA attempts to meet the challenges of primary education 
identified in the PRSP. Moreover, a special unit was established, termed the 
                                                       
55 Planning Commission Proforma 1 (PC-1) is a detailed project document which provides 
information on project objectives, targets, monitoring mechanisms, detailed costs, 
implementation strategies and actions. The Proforma is developed by the district education 
department in order to receive funding for the attainment of EFA goals and its objectives in the 
district. This Proforma is not a public document and it was prepared back in 2001. The district 
education department did not have a copy of the document. I got a copy of it through my 
personal contact with a senior official in the district finance and planning office.
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Education For All unit (EFA),56 in district headquarters, which is supposed to 
perform certain functions such as overseeing, monitoring and taking the 
necessary steps in achieving policy prescriptions and goals in the district. 
When I met the focal person who knew about policy goals, she informed me 
that education policy in the district focuses on improving access to schools for 
children between ages 5 and 7 (especially for girls living in rural areas); 
reducing dropout; appointing teachers from a union council for specific 
schools falling within that union council; reducing qualification and age limits in 
areas where no qualified female teacher is available; and improving 
performance of existing schools by ensuring optimum utilisation of resources. 
One way of knowing how policy objectives in the district have been 
implemented was to approach the front-line managers. 
2.1 Official functioning of primary education
The education policy is implemented by the district education department in 
rural and urban areas of the district. In the beginning, the organisational chart 
was not very useful, as I discovered from an official who advised me to meet 
officials rather than get facts and figures from official documents. After 
meeting several officials who were in charge of implementation, I came to 
know that the district education department is an institution which has a 
hierarchical administrative structure. The department is headed by an 
Executive District Officer (EDO). On the basis of formal interactions with 
senior officials, I came to understand that the formal functioning of primary 
education can be split into two domains, headquarters and the field. In the 
headquarters, the formal authority and decision-making rests with senior 
officials of the education department. The higher-ranked officials in the 
department are senior in grade and experience, and spend most of their time 
in the headquarters. It also appeared that senior officials undertake very few 
                                                       
56 The EFA unit is officially mandated. However, its functioning is not formal, as the progress 
on goals and targets is usually discussed within the education department and not with other 
members of the forum. The monitoring of targets and goals is performed by the Assistant 
District Officers (male and female) and Mentor teachers. Mentor teachers have been assigned 
additional responsibilities which are to visit and monitor 3 to 4 schools close to the school
where he/she teaches (District Education Officer-elementary and secondary).
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visits to schools and there is also no strict criterion for visitation. Personal and 
coincidental encounters were also useful in coming to know other officials in 
the hierarchy and their functions. These officials were Assistant District 
Officers (ADOs) subordinate to Deputy District Officers (DDOs). The primary 
responsibilities of ADOs are monitoring, supervising and reporting on the 
performance of children and teachers57 in their respective circles.58 On the last 
Friday of each month, ADOs hold meetings with DDOs to discuss the overall 
progress of schools, teachers’ performance in terms of their attendance in 
schools, and other matters relating to the formal functioning of schools. As 
encounters with bureaucracy continued, I thought that it would be a good idea 
to approach actors in the field.
The field is characterised as the actual service delivery unit. It includes both 
male and female schools situated in rural and urban areas. The male teachers 
teach in the male schools and the female in the female schools.59 Primary 
school teachers are appointed by the head of the district education 
department on the basis of provincial government policy, which lays emphasis 
on merit and qualifications. The policy states that 75% of candidates be 
recruited from the union councils in rural areas, and 25% be hired on the basis 
of merit (ADO-female). The reason for this disproportionate percentage is to 
take into account illiteracy and inadequate educational facilities in rural areas. 
The policy is crafted to achieve two specific objectives. The first is related to 
encouraging competition among applicants, which means applicants 
appointed on merit are given preference for teaching in schools which fall in 
the urban areas.60 The second one is supposed to minimise absenteeism in 
rural schools because the majority of the applicants are recruited from rural 
                                                       
57 The teachers in public schools have a secondary school qualification which is equivalent to 
‘O’-levels, and a nine-month mandatory Primary Training Certificate (PTC).
58 There are 20 circles in the district. The circles are divided into rural and urban union 
councils. Female schools in a circle are headed by a female ADO and male schools by a male 
ADO. In each circle, there are more than 50 schools (DDO female).
59 During field visits to schools I came across only one mixed school.
60 During interviews with male and female teachers, I came to know that most of them are 
living in urban areas, and that education facilities and better living conditions are the key 
factors in opting for urban schools.
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union councils. For example, a teacher would be recruited from a union 
council in which he/she resides. Moreover, teachers are supposed to teach in 
a school for a period of three years.61
In the field, schools in urban and rural areas are divided into the following two 
categories: 
A) Government Girls Primary School (GGPS) Urban and Rural
B) Government Boys Primary School (GBPS) Urban and Rural
The schools in urban areas (both male and female) are situated in rented 
houses, since the education department cannot afford to construct schools for 
children in urban areas. Based on my interactions with teachers, I was not 
surprised to learn about the issues affecting the quality of elementary 
education. Teachers in schools emphasised teacher absenteeism, the dearth 
of facilities in schools, and a high dropout rate particularly in the rural areas of 
the district. The education department had taken a number of steps to 
overcome these problems, the most significant of which include: identification 
and training of Mentor teachers, which is an internal arrangement for 
monitoring the performance of teachers, and the establishment of a Parent 
Teacher Council (PTC) in each school. In different interaction settings 
involving field-level bureaucrats and institutional mangers, I was able to 
explore how officials interacted with citizens.
2.2 Official–citizen interactions
The interaction of education department with citizens is held through forums 
known as Parent Teacher Commissions (PTCs). These have been 
implemented by the provincial government which sought to formally 
institutionalise the interactions of teachers with the community, as well as 
promote civic engagement in overseeing the delivery of elementary education 
in each school. Civic engagement in the form of the PTC is considered a 
                                                       
61 According to the posting and transfer policy of the Provincial Government (2009, p.1) “the 
normal tenure of posting shall be three years subject to the condition for the officers/officials 
posted in unattractive areas, the tenure shall be two years, and for the hard areas the tenure 
shall be one year”.
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highly effective way of exerting the citizen’s voice on the quality of service. 
Moreover, the incorporation of societal actors in the PTC is supposed to hold 
the state officials accountable for their actions and to monitor teaching 
practices at the community level. In addition to the above, the constitution of 
the PTC at each school is meant to ensure transparency in the utilisation of 
state resources. The forum is constituted to resolve citizens’ complaints 
pertaining to the quality of primary education, discourage child dropouts, 
ensure regular attendance of teachers, and to spend state resources on the 
needs and at the discretion of the PTC (PTC guide book 2007). 
The official guidelines on the PTC refer to its constitution in each school. The 
PTC consists of eight members, including the head teacher (principal or 
headmistress), four elected members from the community, an influential 
person from the same community, a retired government official residing in the 
same locality, and a councillor from the respective gender belonging to the 
same locality where a school is situated (PTC 2007). The most important 
aspect of the constitution of a PTC is the election of chairman/chairperson by 
the members. 
The process of interaction and the specific role of PTCs are pre-defined in the 
official documentation. Here I will briefly explain its salient features. As a 
primary step, a meeting between the head teacher who represents the school 
and the PTC is supposed to be held on a quarterly basis at least. Moreover, 
the head teacher is assigned the responsibility to formally schedule these 
meetings in the school. In a formal meeting, the head teacher informs the 
members of the PTC about the problems faced by the school, such as low 
attendance of children, inadequate strength of teachers, teacher absenteeism, 
missing facilities, etc. At the end of the meeting, a resolution is passed by the 
members of the PTC on those issues which are considered to be important, 
and which require immediate actions and policy decisions. The administrative 
procedure then is to put into concrete terms the decisions taken and agreed 
upon, with appropriate justifications by the members of the PTC. Citizen’s 
involvement is meant to promote active participation in investigating, 
evaluating and making judgements on issues impeding the expected delivery 
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of elementary education and resources, and in taking corresponding remedial 
measures. 
Before introducing the case study on water supply, the following section 
provides a brief description of the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA). The 
reason for introducing the TMA is to enable the reader to understand the 
structure and functions of tehsil administration, how and why urban services 
such as water and sanitation had been restructured after the introduction of 
decentralisation reforms in 2001, and what changes have been made in their 
provision as a result. 
3. Tehsil Municipal Administration
After independence in 1947, water supply and sanitation were provided by the 
provincial governments. In all four provinces of the country, the Public Health 
Engineering Department (PHED) was responsible for the management, 
operation, maintenance and supervision of both water supply and sanitation. 
After the establishment of local governments in 2001, the entire management 
operation and maintenance of these urban services is handed over to TMAs. 
The creation of tehsils in the district is conceived as a means to improve 
access to water by adopting certain measures such as decentralised decision-
making in the delivery of urban services, as well as to improve efficiency and 
the capacity of this tier in managing access, and to promote equity in the 
distribution of resources. In Abbottabad district water is managed and 
provided by the TMA in the urban areas of the district, while the rural areas of 
the district manage the water supply through community-based infrastructure 
projects initiated by the government. At this point, a brief introduction to the 
political and administrative structures at the level of the TMA is essential in 
order to comprehend administrative and decision making linkages concerning 
the provision of urban services. 
The TMA is composed of government officials and elected representatives 
known as tehsil62 councillors. The political structure of the tehsil63 council 
                                                       
62 A tehsil comprises all the union councils formed in both urban and rural areas. A union 
council is made up of villages of different sizes and population (Chief Officer Nawansher).
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embodies all union Naib (Deputy) ‘Nazimeen’ (Mayors) of a tehsil, and an 
elected Tehsil Nazim and Naib Tehsil Nazim. The administration structure of 
the tehsil comprises the government officials working under the Tehsil Nazim. 
In Abbottabad district, the political head of the TMA is the Tehsil Nazim and 
the administrative head of the TMA is the Tehsil Municipal Officer (TMO). 
Having established this background, in the following sections I explain the 
case studies of water and refuse management. 
4. The case study of domestic water supply
The research on drinking water supply was carried out in the urban union 
council of Nawansher. When I began my research, I gathered a lot of 
information from official documents. Before meeting other actors, I decided to 
concentrate first on the background to water supply in order to establish basic 
knowledge about the management and distribution of water supply to citizens. 
International agencies, including the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and the German-owned development bank Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) have been involved in the design and implementation of 
the water supply system here. In Nawansher, a district water and sanitation 
unit collects a water tariff which is based on the actual consumption of water 
by households and is measured through water meters. This effort was 
facilitated by a grant from KfW which was instrumental in rehabilitating the 
local water supply infrastructure (IUCN Report 2009). Moreover, Nawansher 
also generates enough revenue to cover the operation and maintenance costs 
of the water supply; however, under the current institutional arrangement, only 
a small amount of revenue is allocated to the water sector. The reason for this 
is that excess revenue goes to the TMA, and therefore leaves insufficient 
funds for maintaining infrastructure in Nawansher. 
As I used to frequently visit local residents of Nawansher, I became aware that 
several residents were complaining about access to water. These 
conversations highlighted community debates on questions concerning 
                                                                                                                                                              
63 Here it is worth recalling that in Abbottabad district there are two tehsils: Abbottabad and 
Havelian. Furthermore, Abbottabad is a district as well as a tehsil.
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distribution and management of the existing water supply by the town 
committee.
4.1 Town committee in Nawansher 
The town committee was established in 1867-68 by the British, who 
introduced municipal services and appointed local staff to look after them 
(former Nazim of Nawansher). Despite the fact that water supply is now the 
responsibility of the TMA, the town committee in Nawansher retains its 
eminence, particularly since rural and urban services in the past have been 
run by elected committees similar to it. Both administrative and financial 
functions were also delegated to the members of these committees, which 
were headed by a chairman. Moreover, decision-making and local issues 
were resolved by the elected chairman as well as the rest of the members 
who elected him. For a long time, water management in Nawansher was 
based on the pre-eminence of locally elected people and their ability to 
manage the expectations of the local population, and therefore local people 
have had a close association with the town committee since its inception.64 In 
2001, though, the decentralisation reforms altered the structure, functioning 
and central role of the town committee. 
After the creation of sub-district tiers, the town committee and its functions 
were transferred to the TMA. This further led to the absorption of local 
employees in the TMA. These employees were locals and have family and 
social relationships within the community of Nawansher. The town committee 
is now an institution with formal rules and consists of officials who perform 
different functions under the overall authority of the TMA. The direct control of 
the town committee by the TMA has restructured the authority and 
management functions of the town committee. Although the town committee 
works under the authority of TMA, it is now headed by a public official known 
as the Chief Officer (CO). As a frequent visitor to the town committee, I 
noticed that there are other technical and administrative officials working 
                                                       
64 This was narrated to me by the cousin of the serving Nazim of Nawansher, who at the time 
was writing the history of Nawansher.
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directly under the chief officer. Based on my several informal and formal 
meetings, I learned that their official functions and responsibilities are not laid 
out in any official record. In addition to the above, there are also no job 
descriptions or performance evaluation criteria for these posts. In fact, the 
LGO of 2001 outlines broad parameters under which the chief officer in the
town committee provides urban municipal services including water and 
sanitation. 
4.2 Management and operation of the water supply system
In Nawansher there are two main sources of water: a natural spring, and tube 
wells. The natural spring water has an underground source, the precise nature 
of which is unknown. There are different stories about this source, accepted 
by some and rejected by others, and due to this indeterminacy I have decided 
not to discuss them but to focus instead on the water distribution system and 
the key officials responsible for it. The natural spring water is stored near the 
three main pumping stations situated in the main city, walking distance from 
the office of the town committee. From these pumping stations, water is 
channelled through pipes into the main city overhead tank. The other source 
which provides water to local residents are tube wells constructed at different 
locations. They draw water from beneath the ground. 
The officials of the town committee assume a central role in the management 
and operation of the water supply system. The senior technical supervisor is 
the most senior official in the town committee. Moreover, he is also 
responsible for the provision of drinking water supply to the households in 
Nawansher. Besides official assignments, his extensive dealings with 
international NGOs in the past have earned him a great deal of respect in the 
local community, with members of the town committee and amongst local 
political figures such as the Nazim and councillors.65 The senior technical 
supervisor deals with all kinds of projects in Nawansher related to the 
construction of overhead water tanks, and the water distribution and supply 
                                                       
65 Councillors are elected representatives consisting of different categories such as 
male/female peasants, farmers and minorities.
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system. In case of a conflict over access to water and its management, the 
senior officials of the town community and the chief officer66 summon him for 
explanation regarding the technical aspects of water supply and its distribution 
to the households. The senior officials in the main municipality also seek his 
guidance and rely on his information, expertise and local knowledge when a 
water supply project is implemented in Nawansher. Moreover, pipe fitters and 
pump operators also seek guidance and advice from the senior technical 
supervisor in situations when they have to provide explanations to the senior 
officials such as the TMO in the TMA and to the head of the town committee. 
In the past, Nawansher has been a centre of attraction for donors, and a water 
supply system based on natural spring water was designed, financed and 
implemented by an international organisation67 to improve access in terms of 
meeting the demands of the community (former Nazim of Nawansher). In the 
context of operation, water is stored near three pumping stations and 
channelled through underground pipes to the biggest reservoir.68 The 
operation of the water supply involves two different crucial responsibilities 
which are simultaneously performed by the pump operator, namely pumping 
water from the underground source to the main water reservoir, and ensuring 
its release at predetermined timings. The management of the water supply is 
also based on two interrelated tasks, namely operating the pump and 
releasing water to different hamlets according to the system of zoning.69
Operation further involves opening the valve at designated places, which 
blocks the water supply to certain hamlets and diverts it to others. It must be 
                                                       
66 Nawansher is a non-tehsil urban headquarters unlike the other three union councils which 
fall directly within the jurisdiction of the tehsil administration. All those urban union councils 
which do not fall within the limits of headquarters are called units.
67 According to the by-laws prepared by the GIZ Company, the water supply system and the 
provision of water was strictly meant for the residents of Nawansher, keeping in view their 
demands and future needs.
68 The biggest overhead water reservoir is located at Lakpati Choak. Lakpati Choak is a 
junction which bisects old and new Nawansher.
69 Zoning means that certain populations will receive water at certain times. Nawansher is 
divided into different zones according to the logic of water distribution, which is to ensure the 
water supply to different houses and colonies in old and new Nawansher.
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noted that if the valve is not opened on time, the water will continue to flow to 
those hamlets which have already received water. In Nawansher, the 
functions of pump operator and valve operator are performed by the same 
person. When a pump is switched on, the pump operator travels a long 
distance to open the valve. During my informal interview with a pipe fitter, it 
came to my knowledge that the senior management in the town committee 
had sent written requests to the TMA, demanding an increase in the number 
of valve operators. However, the TMA declined these requests. One major 
reason for not fulfilling their demands, according to the pipe fitter, was that the
TMA “is not willing to send additional staff because they would have to work 
according to the prevailing social and political logics of water supply in 
Nawansher”. During visits to the town committee, I met a person who told me 
that he was a meter reader who performs multiple tasks, including visiting 
each household to take a reading of the water meter; preparing and 
distributing water bills among households; and maintaining a record of 
revenue generated from water consumption.
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Figure 2. 
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5. The case study of waste management
The problem of refuse collection is a major challenge for the sanitation staff of 
the town committee. Walking through certain hamlets, heaps of solid waste in 
the main streets and in the water channels creates an unpleasant situation for 
local residents. This presents a complex reality, in which people’s cultural 
habits in terms of their waste disposal practices indicate a lack of concern for 
public sanitation. Many residents told me that the cultural habit of the local 
community is to keep their houses clean and dump refuse at places where it is 
convenient for them. This narrative became evident as I walked through a 
street with the objective of observing how people dump their refuse. After 
walking through several houses, I saw a lady who came out of her house and 
dumped domestic waste in an empty plot beside her house. This incident also 
affirmed that dumping of refuse in designated places called the ‘secondary 
collection points’70 was rarely practiced by the residents. Some residents
would take their refuse and dump it in the designated points, but as I 
witnessed, in most cases people used open spaces. People walking through 
the locality have to pass by various illegal and inappropriate sites where 
refuse has been dumped. Children playing near these sites is another 
everyday observation.
The improper disposal of refuse raises questions about the existing 
institutional arrangements for collection and removal of waste. The existing 
facilities, such as wheel-barrows, spades and a tractor for transporting refuse, 
are rarely used. There is a disagreement between local citizens and officials 
over the use of existing facilities for the proper dumping of refuse. This 
disagreement is more obvious in the case of citizens living in new 
Nawansher.71 The citizens criticise the sanitation staff for not visiting their 
colonies and it is precisely for this reason that they dispose of their waste in 
open plots. The officials narrate that they face two critical problems. The first 
is about the low number of officers, which makes their task of visiting the 
                                                       
70 A four-walled structure of medium height used for dumping solid waste.
71 In my empirical chapter I explore why this disagreement is less obvious in the case of old 
Nawansher.
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colonies of new Nawansher difficult. The other is about poor incentives to 
improve performance. Throughout the urban environment, the accumulation of 
plastic bags and waste lying close to the water channels is a major concern 
for those residents who were willing to accept an external intervention by 
exhibiting their willingness to contribute socially and economically to manage 
the problem of solid waste disposal in their colonies. This is documented in 
the report of the international organisation International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in introducing Environmental Fiscal Reforms72
(EFR) to deal with the problem of ineffective refuse management in 
Nawansher.
5.1 Brief introduction to IUCN and LokParya
The IUCN was created in 1948 after bringing together 82 states, over 850 
NGOs, around 10,000 scientists and experts from over 180 countries to 
encourage societies in conserving nature (Pakistan Environmental 
Programme, Ministry of Environment73). IUCN is the world’s largest 
environmental knowledge network, credited with implementing national 
conservation and biodiversity projects in over 75 countries (ibid). The areas in 
which IUCN specialises are: environmental assessment, awareness raising, 
education, policy making, capacity building, and technical support in the 
development of environmental conservation strategies (EFR progress report 
2009). Prior to the implementation of the refuse management project, the 
Project Steering Committee (PSC) conducted extensive research and held 
several meetings with district officials, the community and professional experts 
with a view to seek technical input on design and implementation of a pilot 
project to improve the existing sanitation system and its management.
IUCN subcontracted its project activities to the local NGO LokParya. LokParya
works in Pakistan on solid waste projects and has a high reputation of 
                                                       
72 The EFR study was a broader initiative of IUCN and its development partners in Abbottabad
district. The refuse management project was first implemented in Nawansher on a pilot basis.
73 This information is drawn from a brochure named ‘Pakistan Environment Programme’,
which does not mention the year of publication.
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engaging local communities and officials in the management and disposal of 
solid waste through training, advocacy, community awareness and building 
the local capacity of residents and state officials in refuse collection and its 
disposal (team leader, LokParya). The project model which the NGO followed 
was based on the introduction of fiscal reforms in households to improve the 
capacity of local residents in generating sufficient income to employ people 
locally for collecting solid waste. The project was designed in view of the 
existing problems in the management of refuse in Nawansher, which was not 
generating sufficient income. 
5.2 EFR goals and strategies
The driving agenda behind the IUCN refuse management project was to 
reduce poverty through Environmental Fiscal Reforms (EFR). In 2009, with 
the financial assistance of the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC), IUCN 
designed a pilot project on refuge management in Nawansher (IUCN Report 
2009, p.1). IUCN conducted detailed research, engaging local officials, 
influential personalities and other international consultants to explore the 
possibilities of introducing EFR, which involved the following key goals and 
strategies for intervention:
i. Introduction of user fee, taxes and incentives for garbage collectors;
ii. Making the TMA accountable as a result of community mobilisation in 
refuse selling/collection.
iii. Extension of support to TMA sanitary staff in effective collection and 
disposal of solid waste; and
iv. Income generation from selling solid waste to pro-poor initiatives, thus 
creating employment.
The project was implemented by LokParya in October 2009 and ended in 
December 2009. Before the implementation of the project, LokParya designed 
a comprehensive questionnaire to acquire information on communities and 
households’ knowledge of solid waste and disposal practices. The team 
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leader of LokParya, assisted by female staff, initiated the survey which was 
known as the Community Attitudes and Practices (CAP) survey. The 
objectives of the survey were three-fold. The first was to determine the 
number of residents in each household; the second was to calculate the 
average production of solid waste in the houses surveyed; and the third was 
to acquire information from the residents on their cultural habits in disposing 
solid waste. The survey was conducted in the month of September in old and 
new Nawansher, adopting a process of random sampling. The survey was not 
restricted to households but also included local shops. The results of the 
survey revealed that between 15 to 16 tons of solid waste was produced in 
Nawansher each day.74 In addition to acquiring information on the quantum of 
refuse, the NGO was able to explore the cultural habits and practices of the 
local community. The cultural habits indicated the dumping of solid waste by 
the local residents outside their homes which was then collected by the 
sanitation staff the following morning. The NGO also perceived certain 
problems in the management of solid waste when circulating the questionnaire 
and conducting the survey. These problems were related to the lack of proper 
dumping points in old and new Nawansher, insufficient sanitation staff to 
collect solid waste from the entire population of Nawansher, and the lack of 
awareness among the local residents about the environmental hazards of 
solid waste. All these problems became part of project activities.
6. Rationale and context
This section engages with the rationale of selecting the three case studies. In 
so doing, I have adopted Harry Blair’s (2010, p.3) framework which sets out 
three different routes to accountability in the delivery of public services to 
people. The routes to accountability75 are as follows:
                                                       
74 The results were based on the CAP survey.
75 I am aware that routes to accountability are a construct and not a reality, but for my purpose 
they provide a useful framework in explaining the context of the case studies.
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(i) Long route to accountability
The long route to accountability presented by Blair shows how citizens 
develop linkages with political leaders in order to secure benefits and access 
to public and collective services across wider constituencies. In the long route, 
citizens acting as principals initiate their needs through elections of political 
leaders who, acting as agents, promise certain benefits mostly through public 
policies. Public policies are then implemented through ‘compacts76’ by the 
bureaucracy. This is the case in advanced countries where political leaders 
are elected, and if they fail to deliver the citizens hold them accountable by 
voting them out of office (Blair 2010, p.3). Another dimension of the long route
to accountability, according to Blair, is the lack of access to essential 
information on policy and the mechanism of utilisation of state resources in 
schools.
(ii) Short route to accountability
The short route, which Blair also terms the direct route to accountability, 
enables citizens to avoid the long route by directly dealing with service 
providers. Blair (2010, p.4) further suggests that there are two short routes, 
characterised as ‘choice’ and ‘voice’. The ‘choice’ route is associated with the 
use of ‘client power’, when citizens are able to hold service providers directly 
accountable for their performance. The ‘voice’ route serves as a platform 
through which citizens are directly involved in state decision making.
(iii) Middle route to accountability
Blair (2010, p.5) argues that, between the long and short routes, civil society 
can be considered a middle route to accountability. Blair further asserts that 
civil society is different from the short route primarily in that it can operate 
independently without acquiring support from the state. However, Blair 
mentions that civil society depends on the assent of the state to operate. 
Moreover, civil society does not belong to the state–citizen relationship in a 
                                                       
76 A compact is defined by the World Bank as a “long-term relationship of accountability 
connecting policy makers to organisational providers” (World Bank Report 2004, p.48).
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formalised sense. It is distinguished from the long route because of its ability 
to focus on specific objectives as opposed to adhering to the broad agendas 
of political leaders as presented in their party declarations and manifestos.
To explore the relationships between officials and citizens, the three routes to 
accountability model helps in exploring the interconnections between the state 
and society and the interactions of officials with citizens at three different 
levels. In the case of primary education, there is a long route to accountability, 
one of elected leaders and state officials. The state bureaucracy takes 
advantage of the long route and provides bureaucrats with opportunities to 
develop different kinds of relationships with political leaders. Bureaucrats 
operate in a relationship framework based on patronage. The provision of 
education services promotes the personal agendas of political leaders as 
opposed to giving importance to rights and entitlements. Thus services 
rendered by officials are tilted towards the benefits they receive from 
politicians, and also tend to promote citizen’s cooperation with service 
providers—for example, teachers and their informal relationships with parents 
in the community. In the implementation of education policy, local citizens 
interact with district officials who manipulate policy agendas and hide 
information from citizens. So in the case of education, the long route to 
accountability implies greater policy distance between citizens and political 
leaders.
In the case of water supply, there is a short route to accountability because 
citizens have direct dealings with a locally elected person—the Nazim. The 
Nazim is known to the people in their community because of his position and 
personality. Moreover, increased social proximity to public officials enables 
citizens to raise their concerns through voice over issues of access. In case 
they are unable to use ‘client power’, the Nazim uses his political authority by 
mediating between citizens and service providers. The short route to 
accountability is more direct when citizens attempt to get access to urban 
services by approaching the Nazim and when these services have to be 
delivered effectively. Local citizens have extensive knowledge of the practices 
of local officials since they share the same social space and their interactions 
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with Nazim are rooted in their own local customs and norms. They also know 
that they can rely on the social position of the Nazim in case of dissatisfaction 
with the performance of officials. The short route to accountability allows us to 
understand access. Moreover, the short route to accountability has a distinct 
advantage in observing how an access situation produces different kinds of 
power relationships between a political leader and officials with respect to the 
administrative practices of local citizens in getting access to water.
The case of refuse management was not originally planned. One reason for 
choosing this study was that it coincided with my research in Nawansher on 
water supply. The most important reason was to describe the social 
exchanges and complex relationships between local actors and an NGO 
involved in the area of urban sanitation by concentrating on their concerns, 
modes of expression and interactions. The case study is a useful one to 
document how an external intervention fails to take into account deeply 
entrenched management and local customary practices of sanitation staff. 
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7. Conclusion
Education Structural Reforms and the long-term goals and targets of 
education policy are envisaged to improve elementary education and are 
considered to be the key determining factors in alleviating poverty in the long 
run. The policy targets and key initiatives of the district education department 
attempt to improve both access to and the quality of primary education. The 
establishment of parent teachers’ councils is an evolutionary step to ensure 
civic engagement at the level of service delivery, with increased funding, 
community participation and oversight. The case study of water supply by the 
town committee shows a complex system concerning an urban resource 
which represents how access to water is managed and operated by the town 
committee. Moreover, the town committee is directly responsible for meeting 
the expectations of citizens in terms of ensuring access to water. The waste 
management case is an international effort to improve the management 
practices of sanitation staff through specific project activities. The external 
intervention justifies itself based on the existing inadequacies in the disposal 
of solid waste, its impact on the environment and how they can be effectively 
tackled through different localised strategies. The wider rationale emphasises 
that there are three different routes to accountability and further engages with 
the structural dynamics of civic and official interactions across the three 
different case studies.
At different levels, the case studies demonstrate how bureaucracies, 
grassroots associations and international NGOs interact in the delivery of 
public and collective services. The case studies of water supply and refuse 
management present two distinct common grounds. The first one relates to 
the study of social interactions and the structure of negotiations encompassing 
a local political elite, public officials and non-state entities in the same locality. 
The second one pertains to personal relationships and administrative 
practices in an urban locale. The empirical examination of water supply and 
refuse management presented in the following chapter focuses on the 
aforesaid common grounds, encompassing social interactions highlighting the 
significance of kinship connections and moral attachments. The empirical 
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examination of education presented in chapter seven will enable the reader to 
observe, beyond the urban locale, the wider connections between informal 
social norms, personal connections and actors’ interests, and gain a deeper 
understanding of different sets of relationships and administrative practices.
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Chapter Six
Social and Administrative Practice: The Significance of 
Personal Relationships
1. Introduction
This chapter will demonstrate how formal access to water is undermined by 
institutional practices, kinship ties and social relationships. This chapter further 
engages with the examination of complex social relationships, compromises 
and resistance surrounding the management of refuse involving state officials 
and a non-state entity. In the case of water supply I have concentrated on how 
access is provided to local citizens, as it involves inclusion and exclusion. 
Instead of focusing on financial constraints and other technical problems in the 
management of and access to water supply, I have focused on the 
administrative practices and the interactions of citizens with officials in dealing 
with citizens’ complaints, and how they are resolved. Access to drinking water 
supply therefore illustrates the concepts and theoretical debates on access 
advanced by Schaffer and Wen-hsien (1975) and Schaffer and Lamb (1974). 
According to Schaffer and Wen-hsien (1975), the actual experience of access 
and distribution exhibits personal loyalties and the sort of tactics to which 
dissatisfied applicants resort.
In the case of refuse management, I pay attention to the institutional practices 
of sanitation staff, and discuss the reasons why the project could not achieve 
its intended objectives. The analysis of an external intervention presents a 
classical case in which refuse management becomes an arena for officials 
and others to sidetrack project objectives through different social and political 
strategies. In addition to the above, this chapter aims to understand the role of 
the Nazim,77 his dealings and interactions with the local community and with 
the officials of the town committee.
                                                       
77 Since only a brief introduction to the role of Nazim is provided in chapter five, here it is 
therefore important to engage with his role in more depth.
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2. Access
Access to water supply is the responsibility of the town committee and the 
technical staff who deal with its management and distribution. Up until 2006, 
citizens of Nawansher apparently had access to sufficient water, or at least did 
not complain about issues of access to it. When I began research in 2009, I 
learned that local residents of old Nawansher face difficulties in gaining 
access to water, and this also causes problems for the town committee. Local 
residents perceive that access is related to the scarcity of water which is used 
by the town committee to favour certain segments. Moreover, when they 
register their concerns and complaints they are often not addressed in an 
impartial way. The local community also blame the pump operators for not 
fulfilling their responsibilities. The town committee meanwhile has its own logic 
and accuses the community of illegal appropriation, while also citing lack of 
rainfall, financial constraints and an increase in population which has widened 
the gap between demand and supply. There are diverse actors in the 
provision of water, and they all contribute to the social construction of how and 
under what circumstances access to water is undermined by institutional 
practices and personal connections. Despite the presence of a town 
committee and the fact that the water supply system is managed locally, the 
problems of access became aggravated when residents of the hamlets78
Shoaib Zai, Musa Zai, New Muhala (New Hamlet) and Khalil Zai in old 
Nawansher79 did not receive water, due to the loop system discussed below.
2.1 The loop system
The problem of access to water partly reflects the design of the distribution 
system, in which water flows in a loop. This makes access for certain hamlets 
easy, and for others problematic. Here I attempt to describe the way the actual 
system of distribution benefits certain residents, and the sharp reaction by 
                                                       
78 Hamlets consist of houses (between 150 to 350) and each hamlet in old Nawansher is 
named after the sub-castes of Jadoons.
79 A schematic illustration of the loop system is provided on p. 150 to get a better 
understanding of the areas served by the system.
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those who are deprived. The water from the biggest reservoir is released to 
residents of new and old Nawansher. When the water from the main 
source/tube is released, it flows towards the end and then takes a U-turn 
towards those houses which fall within hamlets Shoaib Zai, Musa Zai, New 
Muhala and Khalil Zai. When water is released, the residents residing along 
the side of old and new Nawansher receive water in a straight line without any 
detours. The water is consumed by these residents for domestic and non-
domestic purposes since the system of distribution enables them to get 
access conveniently and more expediently. After meeting the domestic and 
non-domestic needs of those residents, the water flows towards the rural 
union council Damtour, and also to those areas which do not fall within the 
urban limits of Nawansher. The residents of Damtour and others take 
advantage of the distribution system before the water is diverted to hamlets 
Shoaib Zai, Musa Zai, New Muhala and Khalil Zai.80 An obvious disadvantage 
faced by the aforementioned hamlets in securing access is that they are 
situated on a slope. 
                                                       
80 In old Nawansher, people living in different hamlets locally known as khallils have retained 
their ancestral names.
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Figure 3.
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Access to water supply had been a persistent problem and complaints relating 
to accessing water by the local residents were in fact happening routinely. In a 
series of complaints about pump operators, I observed a particularly relevant 
meeting between residents and officials of the town committee. The residents 
of hamlets Shoaib Zai and Musa Zai collectively lodged a complaint to the 
officials dealing with water distribution about the negligence and callous 
attitude of the pump operator, who fell asleep during the night and caused a 
major conflict between them and officials dealing with water. These residents 
were assured by the town committee that they would be provided water 
despite their peculiar situation. The conflict further escalated when these 
residents made reference to repeated complaints. During the conflict over the 
distribution of water, I heard from one resident that he was receiving water for 
only a few hours during the day. The same resident mentioned that access to 
water is also provided to those who are not legally entitled.81 Speaking on 
behalf of other residents, a vocal resident residing in the hamlet of Shoaib Zai
said that they had been facing water crises for the past two years, and 
everyone in the town committee knew how they had spent their last summer in 
the severe heat.82
The Chief Officer (CO) tried to pacify the disgruntled residents by saying that 
officials provide services to all local residents. He further mentioned that the 
pump operators are locals, and the officials are concerned when they do not 
provide water to their own people. One resident asked the chief officer and the 
senior technical advisor to take immediate action against the pump operator. 
The chief officer assured the residents that he would take disciplinary action 
against the pump operator.83 Since the affected residents knew about the 
                                                       
81 According to the by-laws of town committee, water is meant for the local residents. 
However, it is also provided to commercial institutions such as a medical college. This 
observation was ignored by the chief officer and the matter was not pursued further.
82 In summer, domestic consumption of water for drinking increases, and people also 
frequently take showers as most do not have air-conditioning in their homes. 
83 The chief officer was recently posted in Nawansher and did not belong to the same 
community. He was least aware about the complaints levelled against pump operators. The 
chief officer, for the most part of the day, is preoccupied with official duties such as record 
keeping, checking the staff register, hearing complaints by citizens and making short field 
visits.
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protracted problem of access, they asked the CO why the town committee had 
not considered putting a valve at Ghari Pana84 which would divert the water 
towards them instead of flowing out of Nawansher. The CO was unable to 
provide a convincing answer. Instead, he and other officials responded by 
referring to technical problems. These excuses were rejected by the residents, 
who were not convinced by their reasoning.
After hearing these complex debates relating to the problem of access, at a 
later stage I talked to the residents of Shoaib Zai and Musa Zai to learn the 
story behind the loop system. These residents held the ex-Nazim of 
Nawansher responsible for the difficulties they faced. The following 
statements illustrate their concerns: “we have told the ex-Nazim that you have 
betrayed us and we are not going to vote for you in future” (Resident). Another 
resident said, “the problem that we are facing today is because of the ex-
Nazim”. The problem of access was linked to the social and political dynamics 
behind the construction of the loop system.
2.2 Social and political dynamics
The approach adopted in this section is based on two hypotheses. First, 
infrastructure projects provide opportunities for local political elites to benefit 
from these projects. Second, these elites extend favours to those who have 
close association with them viewed in terms of kinship ties and social 
relationships. Thus, social and political dynamics promote personal as well as 
other political interests. Viewed from this perspective, therefore, access to 
water and its distribution is not just a matter of public concern, but also relates 
to private interests. The construction of the loop system privileged those 
politically affiliated with the ex-Nazim, i.e. the Nawaz Sharif group (a sub-
division of mainstream political party the Muslim League), and his primordial 
ties with the people of Damtour. In Nawansher, primordial loyalties are part 
and parcel of the community and people frequently make reference to these 
loyalties in terms of social expectations and obligations from their leaders, 
both in the past and in the present. Moreover, the ex-Nazim was the chairman 
                                                       
84 This place delineates the boundary between Nawansher and rural areas around it.
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of the town committee,85 and since he enjoyed considerable support among 
other members of the committee, he constructed the loop system and 
provided access to allied people of rural areas who lacked access to water. 
The loop system also served the private interests of the ex-Nazim. Across the 
boundary of Nawansher there is a poultry farm which belongs to him. To run 
the poultry farm water was an essential commodity, and without it the Nazim
would not have been able to promote his private interest. Moreover, the loop 
system also stretched the political constituency beyond Nawansher and raised 
his public profile among those who benefited from the construction of the new 
system. The senior technical advisor informed me that social and political 
relationships played a key role at the time when the loop system was 
implemented by the Germans in 1998. As a consequence, the loop system 
enabled the ex-Nazim to build a large clientele based on kinship ties and 
facilitated by the members of town committee. 
At this stage, it is important to mention how the ex-Nazim was defeated by the 
current Nazim in the elections of 2005.86 The ex-Nazim belonged to the sub-
caste of Imran Zai and the incumbent Nazim87 belonged to the sub-caste of 
Muhammad Zai. The local government election of 2005 was actually an 
election between two competing patrons who belonged to the tribe of Jadoons
but had different casts (tribal lineages). The ex-Nazim lost the election to the 
incumbent Nazim who was voted into office by people of his own caste and 
family members residing in New Muhala (New Hamlet). As a result, the 
kinship ties of the Nazim with his own caste reinforced social cohesion and 
                                                       
85 Prior to the introduction of the local government system in 2001, the town committee was
headed by the ex-Nazim.
86 The elections were conducted prior to my research, and officials and residents cite different 
reasons for the defeat. The key reason which directly contributed to the loss of the ex-Nazim
was the splitting of votes within the tribe of Jadoons. The other reason is the additional votes 
casted in the favour of the Nazim elected in 2005 by the Awan tribe living in old Nawansher.
87 From this point onwards, I use ‘Nazim’ to avoid repeating the word ‘incumbent’ in the 
remaining sections of this chapter.
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strengthened the social position of the Nazim within his own Biradari.88 Here I 
would revert back to the conflict between the residents who were affected by 
the loop system. It was interesting to observe that during the conflict, the 
Nazim entered the office where the entire social event was unfolding. After a 
prolonged debate between the Nazim, the chief officer and the unhappy 
citizens, the Nazim told the chief officer that he would talk to the pump 
operator and tell him to perform his duty, and that the overhead tank which 
was under construction would soon be made operational to meet water crises. 
The Nazim was aware of the local practices of pump operators who used to 
leave the pumping stations unattended during official hours. Moreover, the 
Nazim reassured the affected citizens that they would be provided access 
from an additional source of water.
3. The politics of access 
In this section, I discuss the politics of access by examining the role of Nazim
in the operationalisation of a water supply project known as the National 
Urban Development Project (NUDP). This project was an additional source of 
securing access to water by the residents of Shoaib Zai, Musa Zai, New 
Muhala and Khalil Zai (ATO water and sanitation). The project was awarded to 
a private contractor, and entailed the construction of an overhead tank and the 
installation of a tube well at the source of water. After its completion, the 
management and operational functions of the project were to be transferred to 
the town committee. These were the formal procedural activities in the 
implementation of the project. While I was out in the field, I encountered a 
different reality. The Nazim called the private contractor to install the water 
pump at the source of water. To assist the private contractor, the Nazim also 
called the senior technical advisor and pipe fitters to lay the pipes overnight, 
and connect them to the water pump.
                                                       
88 I use the terms Biradari and tribe interchangeably in order to inform the reader that the term 
Biradari is used in the context of kinship ties based on family linage among the tribe such as 
Jadoons.
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The aforesaid activities and the strategy deployed by the Nazim were in 
contravention of the contractual agreement of the NUDP. To make the project 
operational, the formal bureaucratic procedures did not matter. Under the 
project agreement, unless a project is completed and a completion certificate 
is granted by the provincial government/TMA, the town committee cannot 
formally take over the management of the project. The project was still 
underway when the Nazim put pressure on the water supply staff. The most 
interesting and surprising fact was that the Nazim used the project for the 
residents who were associated with his own Biradari and his followers at the 
cost of hamlets Khalil Zai and Musa Zai.89 Schaffer and Wen-hsien (1975, 
p.21) emphasise that “different access can actually produce different 
politics … for example the establishment of system of distribution can be 
intended or appear to provide access for some who would otherwise be 
excluded”. Schaffer and Wen-hsien have developed an original approach to 
study access but do not pay attention to the pressures on officials in the field 
which give rise to illicit transactions, fears and conflict of interests.
The Nazim enjoyed immense power over the water staff and they were under 
insurmountable pressure to negotiate a bribe. Electrical wires were needed for 
the transformer so that electricity could be provided to the water pump in order 
to discharge water. The cost of wires in the market was Rs 2,000 per feet, 
which was a costly option. The Nazim approached the Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA)90 but they informed him that they did not 
have the wires. The Nazim either had to wait, or get the wires from the market. 
Afterwards, it transpired that WAPDA was playing a tactical game of trying to 
get a bribe from the town committee. The Nazim instructed the supervisor to 
get the wires from the WAPDA as someone inside the institution was asking 
for money. The institution had the wiring, which had been stolen from the 
store, and someone inside the institution sold it to them privately. When the 
                                                       
89 Residents of these hamlets voted for the ex-Nazim in the 2001 elections, and they basically 
formed and served the constituency of the ex-Nazim. He must have also received votes from 
other hamlets. However, while conducting research, I focused on the problem of access.
90 Electrical wires are usually provided by the state institution WAPDA, which undertakes 
projects relating to the construction of dams and small water supply schemes.
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technical supervisor and his aid (pipe fitter) decided to leave, I offered them a 
lift since they had no transport. The Nazim told me to stay behind because he 
feared that my presence would be a hindrance for them in negotiating the 
price for the wire. I told the Nazim that I would wait in the car and let the water 
staff deal with the transaction.91 The Nazim agreed and we drove to the office 
of WAPDA. 
When we reached our destination, I waited in the car and the technical 
supervisor and his aid went inside the office. After a short while, they came 
back and we drove back to the construction site. On our way, I asked them 
rather casually whether they had been successful in getting the wires. The 
technical supervisor informed me that officials of WAPDA were asking for Rs 
9,000, but that they had offered them Rs. 5,000 which was accepted. 
The Nazim wanted the interests of his own family and followers to be 
promoted at all costs, which involved extra-legal practices and ensuring the 
compliance of water supply officials to execute the project. As narrated to me 
by one official, the Nazim only cared about his own people in accessing water, 
and was less concerned if certain people were excluded. In addition to the 
above, during my informal discussion with water supply staff, I was informed 
that they had executed the project, but that when the town committee receives 
the bill for using the electricity, they will be unable to pay.
The operationalisation of the NUDP project by the Nazim and water supply 
staff also triggered a concern among the water supply staff. They feared an 
audit inquiry from the main municipality and provincial government concerning 
their unofficial practices. The technical staff had to protect their jobs as they 
feared that, if an organisational inquiry into the operation of the water supply 
project took place, they would be implicated for violating the project 
agreement and official norms. Moreover, the senior technical supervisor 
termed the entire situation an attab (curse) on him and his aides. The 
following views highlight how officials respond to pressures:
                                                       
91 I was fully aware of the research ethics involved in pursuing this type of research. However, 
the technical supervisor and his aid had to get the wires with or without me.
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“On a daily basis, I face a lot of pressures while performing official 
and routine tasks. They come from the Nazim, community, and 
from my immediate boss [chief officer unit]. In case of a conflict 
between chief officer and the Nazim, I advise the former to manage 
the conflict through negotiations so that we are able to perform our 
duties properly. In implementing the project, the chief officer was 
aware of what we were doing on site. He has kept himself out 
because he did not want get involved in politics”. (Water technician 
and pipe fitter)
In the water supply project, the Nazim is rarely described as ‘corrupt’. Instead, 
he is often described as acting ‘justly’ or ‘rightly’. This raises the question of 
examining the nature of moral relationships. 
3.1 Analysis of moral relationships 
The project was executed by the senior technical supervisor and his primary 
aids. The officials were constrained to obey the instructions of the Nazim
because the Nazim has 12,000 people behind him, and he instructed the 
officials to do what the community demanded (pipe fitter). The water supply 
staff were caught between the political interests of the Nazim and the 
bureaucratic norms underpinning their official duties. For instance, the Nazim
articulated his interests in terms of relationships and necessity. In the 
execution of the project, the role of the Nazim clearly revealed his political aim 
of securing the loyalty of his voters and family. The technical staff’s 
bureaucratic procedures and standardised rules could not have made any 
difference in challenging the rationality of the Nazim. Bureaucratic rationality 
was equally problematic due to social and kinship relationships, and rational 
accountability was dependent on actors’ formal responsibilities. In reality, 
officials had to respond to the demands of the community, driven by its moral 
relationships with the Nazim. The Nazim was an elected person who made 
promises during an election campaign, and after getting elected with a huge 
mandate he did not assign importance to the local institution (senior technical 
158
supervisor). This became apparent when the Nazim expressed his actions 
and ambitions in the following words: 
“I represent the people and I am their spokesperson. The people in 
the town committee are government servants. They are paid by the 
government to perform their responsibilities. In case they fail to 
meet the expectations of the community, it is my responsibility to 
monitor them and even ‘force the officials’. People know that there 
is no scarcity of water, rather the problem lies with the pump 
operators who are not performing their responsibilities. In the past, I 
have taken action against pump operators who were found sleeping 
on duty”.
The above observations were made to describe how people of Nawansher 
perceive the working of officials in rendering services. It must be noted that 
Nazim exercised de facto control over pump operators. The Nazim was aware 
of their actual practices such as leaving the pumping stations unattended and 
running local tea shops during working hours. The pump operators were locals 
and they were often monitored by the Nazim. The chief officer of the town 
committee seldom visited the pumping station, and when faced with no water 
the community relied on the Nazim’s intervention to manage access. 
Moreover, the technical staff dealing with water only intervened in the case of 
serious problems such as pipe leakages, and when they had the budget to do 
so. Therefore, the formal reliance of citizens on the officials on the town 
committee was relatively less, and more focussed on the Nazim because of 
‘political understanding’.
The Nazim belonged to the local community, in which kinship ties play a key 
role in fulfilling the social expectations of the people. Moreover, for the Nazim, 
this was a matter of honour as he did not want to compromise his own 
reputation of being a strong man who sticks to his promises. The above 
illustration, highlighting the involvement of the Nazim in administration, clearly 
demonstrates that local governance is dominated by differences in power 
relations based on politics and imbued with moral arguments. In an 
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ethnographic study conducted in a district of Punjab, Nadeem (2009, p.1005) 
argues in a similar context that “beneath the surface, Nazim largely benefit the 
members of their own biradari and people who would vote for him”. The Nazim
was only interested in providing access for his own people, and can be 
characterised as being situated within a milieu of moral relationships. In the 
Nazim’s view, the interests of his political/personal clients were more 
important than following official norms and formal processes of service 
provision. As pointed out by Blundo and Le Meur (2009), personal 
acquaintances, kinship relationships, informal rules and family ties are above 
the ‘bureaucratic universe’ which is based on formal rules and procedures. It 
must be acknowledged that the traditions of moral obligations and kinship ties 
are deeply entrenched in Nawansher. As a consequence, officials of the town 
committee are always aware of the priorities of the Nazim. In fact, there was a 
general understanding among the officials based on their past experience and 
dealings that they had to take into account the kinship ties and social 
relationships of the Nazim. 
4. Unwarranted intrusion of relationships in administration  
In this section, I attempt to discuss the problems faced by officials in dealing 
with citizens’ complaints in securing access to water through formal channels. 
When the water supply system was initially designed in 1996, water was in 
abundance and met the daily requirements of the community. The increase in 
population since 1998 has contributed to the problems of access as 
experienced by the citizens of Nawansher. When I was walking through the 
hamlet of Khalil Zai, people gathered around me and narrated their problems 
in getting access to water. For instance, many residents felt that their 
complaints had not been dealt with by the town committee despite making 
several visits. A resident who was a teacher stated that, “I teach in the 
morning and when I return home, there is no water. The water staff is least 
bothered about my situation”. In the same hamlet,92 some residents informed 
                                                       
92 I visited this hamlet in particular since it continuously faced a shortage of water. In other 
hamlets, people had their own water pumps privately installed inside their homes. It seemed 
that they were less dependent on the official provision of water.
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me that they had to walk for more than two hours to get water. These random 
and personal encounters with citizens showed that their complaints were 
either ignored or not effectively dealt with. This led me to examine the 
processes of treating complaints. 
There is a complaint register which is kept in the office of the town committee. 
The formal process is that each complaint is allocated a number. For example, 
people will either call to register their complaint or visit the town committee in 
person. These complaints are supposed to be addressed by a simple rule, i.e. 
on a first-come-first-served basis, by a local administrator. The formal system 
of treating complaints follows a professionally driven system of service 
provision and does not consider relationships and the structural constraints of 
bureaucrats when dealing with citizens. In reality, however, the system was 
heavily politicised. In treating complaints, the administrator would receive 
phone calls from the Nazim and other political personalities such as union 
councillors,93 telling him and the water supply staff, for example, to 
immediately repair a pipe which was a major concern for their relatives in 
terms of securing access to water. People could not exercise ‘voice’ 
(Hirschman 1970) because they were politically well connected. This means 
that people move out from an impartial, rational administrative system to a 
system which functions along lines of personal loyalty and association. On the 
other hand, certain people resorted to ‘exit’ option (Ibid.) by not participating in 
or relying on the formal system (see footnote 94).
The formal system was not workable in practice because political relationships 
and loyalties had permeated into the formal system and official practices. 
These relationships and personal loyalties are embedded in the society; 
however, they are invoked by certain personalities when they expect 
exceptional treatment. Therefore, the professionally devised system of treating 
complaints is circumvented by local political elites who attain powerful 
positions.
                                                       
93 Councillors “constitute the electoral college for the election of Nazim and deputy Nazim” 
(Khan 2000). Councillors are divided into different categories such as peasants, farmers etc.
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Officials informed me that treating complaints in a systemic manner would 
have conveyed a message to political elites that their relatives were denied 
preferential treatment in favour of formal institutional practices. This would be 
considered by political leaders as a different form of interference. This kind of 
interference would have adverse consequences for the officials and citizens 
alike. As one informant put it, “if we follow formal administrative practices by 
treating complaints in an orderly fashion, the Nazim and councillors will 
complain to the chief officer about our performance in negative terms” (Pipe 
fitter). When official rules are followed, political elites develop an egoistic 
approach towards an official by resorting to ‘dirty politics’. Numerous false 
accusations would be levelled against the officer, inter alia that the officer is 
not performing official duties and has been spotted in the city during office 
hours. These accusations are communicated to senior officials such as the 
chief officer and the Tehsil Municipal Officer (TMO). To avoid such negative 
assessments, water supply staff are forced to be compliant. The only option is 
to extend preferential treatment to political elites, although this is not done 
willingly. But by doing this, they attract negative judgments from other 
members of society. The administrative practice and performance of these 
officials is therefore directly linked to the assessment of political relations.
5. Appropriation and intermediation
One day, I visited the office of the town committee to get some documents on 
the water supply scheme in Nawansher. After I arrived at the town committee, 
I went to the office of the officer who dealt with water connections, complaints, 
record keeping and inquiries. During our discussion, three people walked into 
the office. Among the three, one was an old man. Two persons sat next to me 
and the old person sat opposite me. The persons sitting on my right knew 
each other: they were talking to each other and it appeared that they had 
some official business in the office as I saw an application in the hands of one 
of them. I was not expecting that what would transpire afterwards would be a 
dispute between an old man and the other persons.
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Dispute between an old man and two persons
The dispute involved five people. An old man and two other persons, one of whom 
was an applicant who had come to get a water connection, and the other who was 
accompanying the applicant. The other two persons involved were an officer and a 
pipe fitter. The old man and the other two persons belonged to the same community 
and lived on the same street in one of the colonies located close to the famous and 
the oldest mosque in Nawansher, known as the Iliyasi Mosque. 
The old man had lodged a complaint a day earlier, complaining that he was not 
getting water as he used to because a lot of people had been granted water 
connections. During the conversation which took place between the old man and the 
other two persons, the old man constantly reiterated and reemphasised that the 
water staff (referring specifically to the pipe fitter) had laid an additional pipe which 
had been connected to the main pipe from which he was receiving water. There are 
now 12 new households in his street, and the residents of these households had
been granted water connections via the additional pipe line. From the perspective of 
the old man, the supply of water has been reduced, because previously he and some 
other residents had been receiving water from the main 12-inch pipe. When the 
additional pipe was laid, other residents had taken connections from the same pipe.
The old man was furious at the staff of the town committee and suspected that the 
pipe fitter had taken a bribe in granting additional water connections to other 
residents. When he uttered those words to the pipe fitter, the pipe fitter got very 
annoyed and angry. In a high-pitched tone, he started yelling at the old man that he 
had accused him of taking a bribe. The pipe fitter asked the old man to narrate his 
problem and stop accusing him of something which he had not done. The applicant 
told the official that the old man had came to complain against him and others for 
providing water connections. The person accompanying the applicant said that the 
old man was pumping water illegally, and that other people in his street were also 
following the same practice.
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It was quite apparent that people had been able to get water connections from 
the additional pipe. The additional pipe was laid to provide water to other 
residents who then either made legal or illegal water connections to it. When 
more connections were granted from the additional pipe, the water was 
distributed and the old man could not get the same amount of water he used 
to. 
During the conflict between the old man and the person accompanying the 
applicant, two issues became evident. The first was the informal appropriation 
of water. Under the rules, no one could get direct access to water from the 
main pipe line. Instead each household received water from a distributive 
system which is supposed to ensure even distribution of water to each 
household. As narrated by an official, informal appropriation means that 
people want to get direct access to the main pipe so that they have more 
water pressure, without realising that other people would thereby be affected. 
The second was the granting of additional water connections to the residents 
of Nawansher by the town committee after following official procedure.94
However, the real problem of not getting water was being aggravated because 
of informal appropriation. 
Citizens used strategies crafted according to social connections to appropriate 
water. This had become an accepted norm in the community. The informal 
appropriation of water involves different strategies. There were people who 
appropriated water by installing water pumps over the main water supply line. 
The pump sucks the water and lifts it to the overhead tank constructed in a 
house. When water is released to a particular community, the households 
below the house which illegally appropriates water either receive less than 
their due share or do not get water at all, depending on how many people are 
illegally appropriating water in the street. This particular strategy became 
apparent to me when I was accompanied by water supply staff during a visit to 
                                                       
94 The official procedure/requirement for getting a water connection involves filing an 
application form, proof of identity, documents which proves the applicant’s ownership of 
property, and a connection fee.
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a hamlet. As we passed through many houses, we came across a local 
resident who greeted us and reported, “we have not been getting water for the 
past few days and I am appropriating water informally”.
The officials in the town committee are informed about these incidents but no 
formal action is taken. A resident pointed out that someone had informed the 
chief officer by identifying a person who was appropriating water informally. 
Instead of taking legal action against the person, the chief officer simply 
visited the house and requested that the dweller remove the pump. The same 
resident then further asked, “why has the official not disconnected the water 
connection of the resident?” As recounted from my interactions held with TMA 
officials and citizens, the chief officer could not disconnect the water 
connection because the resident would approach the Nazim and other 
influential personalities and would quickly get his connection restored. The 
formal authority of the chief officer is undermined by social relationships and 
the personalised management system that dominates and often results in 
informal appropriation of water. Moreover, the town committee is well aware of 
these practices, and when someone in the community reports these incidents, 
they are usually ignored or dealt with by the Nazim. 
The chief officer is aware that these people belong to a community which has 
links to the Nazim, and therefore these practices are tolerated and dealt with 
through local community customs and traditions. On the other hand, those 
who had family and personal ties with the Nazim would use their relationships 
to avoid sanctions. The informal appropriation of water is a socially and 
culturally driven practice dominated by patrimonial and personalised 
relationships. The appropriation of water using water pumps was not the only 
social practice which caused major problems to the community in getting 
uninterrupted access to water. There were other social practices which 
created problems for the town committee when they visited houses to get 
meter readings: 
“When a person in a house finds out that a meter reader had come 
to record a reading, he/she would remove the magnet placed on 
the water meter which stops the meter. In other cases, people in 
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the house would remove their meter and when a meter reader visits 
at the end of the month, they would reinstall the meter”. (Meter 
reader)
Reverting back to the matter of dispute, the dispute also highlighted the role of 
intermediation in getting an additional water connection. During the 
conversation between the old man and the other two persons, a local 
councillor came into the room and told the old person to stop complaining. I 
was surprised to observe that the old man all of sudden became receptive. 
The old man became silent because he knew that he would lose the argument 
in the presence of the councillor. The councillor was an elected person from 
the same community, and because of his social position he was known to the 
members of the town committee. 
In Nawansher, it is a customary practice that when a councillor accompanies 
someone, the members of the town committee extend preferential treatment 
to an applicant. The councillor in this case had close contacts with the 
applicant and told the officer to process the case of the applicant for an 
additional water connection. In the process of intermediation, the applicant 
was able to legalise an illegal water connection. The illegal water connection 
was validated when the tax collector of the town committee came into the 
room and saw the heated debate between the old man, the two persons and 
the pipe fitter. The tax collector commented: 
“The applicant is trying to legalise what was illegal in the first place 
since the applicant had brought his water bill. He was justifying his 
connection from the pipe which was connected to the main pipe 
and from which the old man was receiving water. There is no need 
to get angry over something which was not done according to the 
procedure and which is now been legalised. You should be patient 
in getting another connection by filling an application form and other 
formalities” (Tax Collector)
The above account could be interpreted as the applicant having a legal water 
connection because he had brought the water bill. In fact, the applicant had 
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already been granted an additional water connection without proper 
paperwork. These are those connections which are granted without official 
approval, usually by paying a bribe to a pipe fitter. At night, the pipe fitter 
would make a new connection for the person who paid the bride. Since the 
connection is granted without official approval, no water bill would be paid by 
the resident unless he is caught. In this process, if a member of the town 
committee is involved, he would demand a bribe, and an applicant would 
usually pay a higher bribe to legalise an illegal water connection. In the 
context of the case, it was quite obvious that the councillor had granted a 
favour in a situation when an illegal water connection was legalised through 
intermediation. Ironically, the dispute also confirmed the statement of the old 
man that many people had been granted illegal water connections by paying 
bribes to pipe fitters.
Corrupt practices are justified through different strategies involving 
justifications of one’s own behaviour and counter-accusations against the 
accuser. As argued by Blundo and de Sardan (2006, p.86), corrupt practices 
are constructed along two axes. One is extended along the path of legalising 
an illegal practice, and the other is extended along the path of legitimising an 
illegitimate practice. Depending on the context and situation, corrupt or illicit 
practices are aligned more with “a negotiated classification of behaviours than 
[to] an … inherent quality of behaviour” (Chibnall and Saunders 1977, p.139). 
These negotiations inform us of how existing rules are negotiated between 
social actors towards a desired end. The aspect of negotiation is important. 
They are never clear-cut cases and the negotiations take place at a practical 
level such as in the implementation of the water supply project. The logic of 
negotiating a bribe could not be termed as a simple economic transaction. 
Rather, negotiation involves the negotiation of stable rules and their 
acceptance on all sides. They also occur at other levels, for instance when 
people are accused of having or considered to have legitimised an illegitimate 
demand. They also feed into the logic of negotiations. Importantly, everyone is 
involved in negotiations, including the Nazim. This inevitably involves 
manipulation of official rules, which imply gaining financial benefits. 
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6. The refuse case
The local NGO ‘LokParya’ initiated its project activities in the colonies95 of new 
Nawansher for two primary reasons. The first reason was that these colonies 
had no secondary refuse collection points. The second reason was that the 
existing waste collectors in Nawansher were catering for the hamlets of old 
Nawansher. The NGO saw this as an opportunity to initiate project activities 
and to develop new Nawansher as a model town, and then to replicate it in old 
Nawansher. The NGO intervention faced several problems in making new 
Nawansher a model. The project was soon engulfed in bureaucratic 
procedures. The contractor of Lokparya was stopped by a TMA official in the 
new colony when he was constructing a secondary collection point. The 
contractor informed the team leader of LokParya that he could not build the 
collection point without the permission of the TMO.96 The team leader was 
disappointed for two reasons. First, the Nazim had selected the construction 
site, and second a local resident at the time of construction stopped the 
contractor and argued that the site was in front of his property. The team 
leader informed the chief officer of the town committee that they were facing a 
problem in constructing the collection point. The chief officer told him that he 
had chosen the wrong site as it was private property, and that the site was 
also very close to the tube well and so might contaminate the water.
Identifying an appropriate site is complicated and the political interests of the 
Nazim play an important role. The Nazim wanted the NGO to work in the 
hamlets of old Nawansher because he knew that the existing resources were 
insufficient to manage the disposal of refuse. The Nazim distanced himself 
from the incident when the contractor was stopped by an official during the 
                                                       
95 The term ‘colony’ must not be confused with the colonisation of an area. I have used this 
term to retain the original nomenclature of making reference to residents residing in new 
Nawansher.
96 As already mentioned in chapter five, the officials of the town committee work under the 
jurisdiction of the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA). The TMA is headed by an official 
known as the Tehsil Municipal Officer (TMO). Prior to the implementation of a project, the 
project is discussed with the TMO which then grants a formal approval on behalf of the TMA. 
If necessary, the TMO can inquire about any aspect of the project as and when it gets 
reported or notified.
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construction of a secondary collection point.97 The team leader of LokParya 
informed me that after the incident, he tried to contact the Nazim but did not 
get any response. The primary motive of the Nazim was that the NGO should 
invest and divert its resources towards old Nawansher because it was his 
political constituency and had close ties with the members of the town 
committee, and in particular with the sanitation staff. 
The interaction of the chief officer with the team leader of LokParya also 
reveals the importance of the Nazim. The team leader was instructed by the 
chief officer98 to initiate work in old Nawansher because the sanitation staff 
were primarily working there. In addition, they also had the advantage of 
having secondary collection points. The chief officer informed the team leader 
that they did not have wheelbarrows that the spades were broken, they 
needed new brooms, and they did not have enough fuel for the tractor which 
was currently parked. As I came to learn afterwards, the chief officer created a 
false impression that their equipment was damaged. Therefore, access to 
NGO resources by certain members of the town committee could not have 
been achieved without the support of the Nazim. The refuse intervention was 
seen by certain members of town committee as an opportunity to capture 
NGO resources by developing different relationships and strategies. The 
following incident was narrated to me by the team leader.
                                                       
97 It was the ex-Nazim who suggested to the NGO that it initiate project activities in new 
Nawansher. 
98 When I began research on the sanitation and water supply in October 2009, the chief officer 
of the town committee belonged to Nawansher. He was afterwards transferred and replaced 
by a chief officer who did not belong to the same locality.
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Mutual Capture of NGO Resources
When the team leader contacted the chief officer to ask about the cost of 
repairing the trolley, the chief officer quoted a price of approximately Rs 45,000.
The team leader told the chief officer that the International Union for Conservation 
of Natural Resources (IUCN) could review the cost. The next morning, when the 
team leader was examining a collection point, he received a phone call from a 
sanitation officer who wanted to meet him. The team leader asked the officer to 
meet him at the collection point. After a while, the sanitary inspector and three 
other people appeared. One of them was a citizen of Nawansher who 
manufactures water pumps. This person was known to the team leader and he 
was also a very close friend of the Nazim. The sanitary inspector had a file in his 
hand which calculated that the repair of the trolley could cost Rs 95,000. The 
team leader was shocked when he realised the price had doubled. He 
immediately called the chief officer and asked him about this unanticipated 
increase in the original quotation. The chief officer replied that the increase
reflected tax costs. 
Afterwards, the team leader informed the sanitary inspector that IUCN already 
paid tax. The inspector and the others all of a sudden realised that they had
made a blunder. The inspector told the team leader that he would go back and 
amend the quotation. Before leaving, a copy of the quotation was retained by the 
team leader. The reason for retaining a copy was to check where the quotation 
came from. Afterwards, the team leader went to the vendor from whom the 
quotation was acquired. The team leader informed the vendor that he had 
investigated the matter of the false quotation, and would take legal action against 
the vendor. The team leader further added that the quotation would be checked 
by an IUCN representative. The vendor disclosed that the sanitation officer had 
asked him to provide three different quotations.
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The issues of capture reveal how mutual accommodation and resistance are 
encountered in the provision of social services. As argued by Li (2005), 
schemes being implemented inevitability meet resistance, compromises and 
create new forms of knowledge based on the practices of various actors such 
as the officials and those who are affected by them. Moreover, different logics 
and interests influence key assumptions of an intervention which is thought to 
be in conformity with official practices. 
7. Informal practices and social norms: the problem of incompatibility
Based on my interactions with local citizens, officials and observations, it 
became clear that the NGO intervention was based on inadequate knowledge 
about the existing management of solid waste, everyday routine activities and 
the social practices of sanitation staff. The project made little impact on 
institutional practices and accountability, two crucial objectives of the 
intervention. Here I will first discuss why the project did not succeed in 
improving the institutional practices. The project did not take into account the 
social practices of the sanitation staff. The sanitation staff were working 
privately in the houses of local councillors and did not strictly observe official 
timings. After 10 am, the sanitation staff used to work in the houses of the 
local councillor and the Khans.99 Cleaning their houses, streets, gutters and 
removing waste from their houses were a source of additional income for the 
sanitation staff. This was more important to them than carrying out their formal 
duties. 
Apart from financial gain, there is another reason why routine tasks are not 
carried out in an effective manner. When sanitation staff do not render a 
service to influential and known personalities, complaints directed at them are 
conveyed to senior officials in the TMA and to the Tehsil Nazim. The 
complaints are fabricated in order to acquire personal services. The senior 
officials in the TMA either telephonically or verbally inform the head of the 
sanitation staff, to ensure that sanitary workers obey the orders of political 
                                                       
99 Khans are those people who are traditionally well-off due to their historical roots, social 
capital and inheritance of land from their forefathers.
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personalities. Hence, political pressure on the sanitation staff is similar to the 
pressure on water supply staff. The non-compliance of orders coming from 
senior officers results in transfer from their posts usually because they are 
accused of poor performance. Similarly, the sanitation staff could not refuse to 
grant services to the Nazim or the councillors. The head of sanitation staff 
asserted that councillors are elected people and do not know anything about 
administration and how sanitation staff work. They are only concerned with 
their own interests and are obliged to look after their own. A sanitary worker 
narrated to me that they receive calls from influential and well-off people to do 
personal jobs. During focus group discussions with the sanitation staff held in 
August 2011, it was interesting to note that when the tenure of local 
government ended in March 2010, the sanitation staff seemed less compelled 
to offer personal services to elected representatives. This was due to the fact 
that elected representatives exercised indirect influence over state officials, 
i.e. using personal connections and contacts with senior officials to transfer an 
official from his/her post who refused to grant services.
In addition to the above, the formal practices of the town committee for refuse 
collection had several loopholes. The head of the sanitation staff informed me 
that they had 16 employees, and out of these, only 12 were performing duties. 
The rest of the employees were doing informal jobs such as running small 
businesses by taking advantage of their personal connections with the Tehsil
Nazim. The senior official of the sanitation department told me that the 
employees carrying out informal jobs were the people of the Tehsil Nazim. As 
a consequence, the municipality and town committee were unable to put 
pressure on these employees. Moreover, certain female sanitary staff were
getting a regular salary but were not reporting for duty. There were also 
frequent complaints by the sanitation staff that the petrol was insufficient to 
dispose waste on a daily basis. According to official records, the town 
committee was getting 36 litres of petrol. The actual consumption of petrol 
was always misreported. By co-operating with the head of the sanitation staff, 
the petrol was stolen by the driver and sold afterwards. As a result, solid 
waste used to accumulate because of the misappropriation of petrol.
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In old Nawansher, the Nazim seldom discussed these issues because it would 
have meant confronting the social practices of sanitation staff and the 
personal services that he and the councillors accrued from them. The 
sanitation staff seldom visited the residents of new Nawansher. One resident 
said, “sometimes I have to go after them to take the waste from my street. 
When they come, I have to pay him or sometimes, give them food. The rest of 
the residents follow the same practice”. The residents of new Nawansher 
lacked the ability to take collective action because of their heterogeneous 
composition. For them, it was much easier to manage solid waste by paying 
the sanitation staff a certain amount of money or giving them food as 
incentives. Within the system, an informal way forward was invented because 
the residents of new Nawansher lacked trust in the provision of sanitation 
services. The informal institutional arrangements by the people indicate that 
there were no meaningful “voice” and “exit” options. Also, when people lack 
solidarity, they behave individually. 
In improving the management of existing sanitation services, accountability 
was also an important feature in terms of imposing penalties on citizens to 
discourage the illegal dumping of waste. Under Local Government Ordinance 
2001, the chief officer has the authority to impose penalties on those who 
spread dirt around. The chief officer was constrained to sanction local 
residents when they used to dump solid waste outside the designated places. 
Two logics prevailed in this instance. The first one pertains to when illegal 
dumping is not reported, and the other relates to when it is. In the first 
situation, illegal dumping was a recognised and accepted social norm. In the 
second situation, the official could not impose penalties because local 
residents would have resisted the enforcement. Both situations illustrate the 
political influence of the Nazim and the everyday management of sanitation 
and collection of waste. The reason for non-sanctioning was that citizens in 
old Nawansher were predominantly Jadoons who have family and kinship-
based relationships with the Nazim. Moreover, the social structure of old 
Nawansher embodied ancestral solidarities illustrating a confrontation 
between official norms and prevailing traditional traits. 
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8. Conclusion
This chapter illustrated that despite being an independent institution with 
formal rules, the town committee has been unable to meet the expectations of 
local communities in acquiring urban services because of primordial loyalties 
and personal relationships. I have engaged with different access situations 
which are related to social and political interests and which significantly 
departed from meeting the expectations of citizens. The politics of access 
allows local politicians to become even more powerful actors by establishing 
full control over the official functioning of town committee and state officials. 
The lucid accounts of the Nazim in the operationalisation of the water supply 
project elucidated the fact that officials of the town committee were not just 
impotent, but caught between public and private interests. The Nazim was 
clearly committed to fulfilling the demands of his clients and addressing the 
interests of his own kin group. 
The significance of social relationships and the intrusion of political 
personalities compounded the problems of local citizens seeking access to 
water. Through familial influence, officials were subjected to different kinds of 
pressures and they were unable to resist intimidating accusations. The conflict 
between the old man and the two persons highlighted how state and society 
operated through intermediation, bribes and mechanisms through which 
bribes are negotiated between officials and citizens. The conflict implicitly 
conveyed the fact that local citizens rely on local politicians for favours. In 
other cases public services are acquired through negotiation, illustrating how 
extra-legal practices become justified. The informal appropriation of water is 
widely practiced and could not have been stopped, because those involved 
were part of a community which relied on its personal relationships with the 
Nazim. The informal practices were justified either on the pretext of necessity 
or of depriving people of their basic rights to get access to water on the 
assumptions of equity and equality. The case study on water supply 
demonstrated that access was instead negotiated and managed by the Nazim
in line with his social and political ambitions.  
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The case study on refuse showed the gap between the conceptions of 
problems and their solutions. By influencing and subverting the authority of the 
state, the issue of capture reveals how mutual accommodation and resistance 
are encountered.  External intervention was unable to change the social habits 
of residents in dumping waste because the attempt to transform them had 
deep social and political implications.
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Chapter Seven: 
Clientelism and Administrative Practice beyond the Local
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I narrate the case of education and focus upon the actual 
implementation of education policy by the district education department. In so 
doing, I attempt to describe how the administration really works, at different 
levels, by exploring the concept of clientelism and its manifestation in different 
contexts. The reason for engaging with clientelism is to highlight the diversity, 
subtleties and experiences of clientelistic practices. I further attempt to 
demonstrate that clientelism needs to be examined in terms of its modalities, 
and not just as an explanation for a generalised dysfunctional bureaucracy; 
and I advance arguments intended to explain the ineffective performance of 
public officials. In the literature, authors (Clapham, 1982; Scott, 1972; Legg 
and Lemarchand, 1972) frequently use the concept of clientelism, but do not 
conduct empirical analyses of the realities they refer to. The arguments of 
these authors are weak in important ways. They do not account for how 
clientelistic practices influence officially sanctioned tasks, nor the official 
norms of state bureaucracy under which they are supposed to perform official 
duties. Moreover, they do not explore the types of clientelistic exchanges 
which take place between civil servants and the users of the state. In this 
chapter, I pay special attention to the examination and understanding of 
clientelistic exchanges within and across different structures and domains. 
Throughout this chapter, I will refer to diverse social actors, deconstructing 
meanings and analysing different sets of relationships.
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2. Actual functioning of administration
In dealing with administration, there are two governance domains to consider: 
the headquarters domain and the field domain. In contrast to the official 
functioning of the administration (see organogram), the examination of the 
actual functioning of the administration reveals informal practices, obligations 
and expectations. In the field, the head-teacher and teachers informally 
interact with local community and politicians. In the headquarters, the formal 
functioning of administration is also inconsistent with the actual functioning. 
The inconsistency is related to diverse sets of informal practices linked to 
clientelistic relationships. Similarly, in different situations, the administration in 
the field affects the official functioning of the headquarters implying deviations 
from official norms, challenging official decisions, and an acknowledgement of
how expected official behaviour gets compromised. Before discussing the 
actual administration in two interrelated governance domains, it is essential to 
briefly engage with the official norms under which state bureaucracy performs 
its everyday functions and routine tasks. 
Official norms are those norms which bind the actions and decisions of state 
officials to predetermined rules, regulations, job descriptions and other 
responsibilities formally enshrined in the rules of conduct (service rules, 
appointment rules, official laws, sanctioning, posting and transfer rules100) of 
state officials and other official responsibilities and administrative practices. 
The actual functioning of the administration reflects the routine and everyday 
behaviour of civil bureaucracy and administrative practices. The organisational 
charts and rules of business do not provide us with a clear understanding of 
the everyday functioning of administration. They do not account for the actual 
practices of the civil servants. Moreover, written documents, reports and 
official observations give only a partial insight. Although there are relatively 
clear state regulations, organisational structures, rules and procedures 
devised on Western models, they are rarely followed in letter or spirit by state
                                                       
100 These different rules are laid out by the state to regularise and set the duties and rights of 
state officials. All officials must adhere to these rules and any change(s) in these rules must 
be formally sanctioned by the provincial and federal government.
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officials and service users (Olivier de Sardan 2008). In terms of actual 
behaviour, the actions and decisions of public officials in both domains, 
depending on the context and situation, are not in line with the official norms 
and administrative practices of the state bureaucracy. As argued by Olivier de 
Sardan (2008, p.4) “a significance divergence is observed between official 
norms that govern these institutions and the actual behaviour of their 
employees”. 
The actual functioning of administration is also related to the examination of 
different sets of relationships, which in certain cases are horizontal and in 
others are more vertical in nature. Horizontal relationships are related to family 
and kinship ties. Over a long period of time, families develop bonds of affinity 
and associations based on their family linage, language, and cultural norms 
and traditions. Horizontal relationships can be imbued with moral obligations, 
and generally comprise personal relationships derived from the recognition of 
family or kinship ties within and across immediate and extended families. This 
inevitably creates pressures on political elites and state officials placed in 
powerful positions as it requires them to look after the personal interests of 
their ‘family members’. Vertical relationships are those which operate on the 
principles of patron–client relations. These relationships are diffuse and 
impersonal.
State officials develop social and political relationships based on patron–client 
understandings in bureaucratic institutions and between state officials and 
citizens. These relationships have little to do with official job responsibilities, 
appointments, assignments and documents which regulate the official 
behaviour of state officials. Moreover, the decentralisation reforms have 
created a well-established system from top to bottom and have thus 
strengthened pre-existing forms of clientelism and also created new ones. In 
the post-decentralisation context, horizontal and vertical relationships have 
merged. For instance, an individual is given a public office in order for him/her 
to grant personal favours to a member of the family, such as access to state 
resources.
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3. Clientelism
In this section I define ‘clientelism’, which manifests itself in different ways 
such as extending favours based on loyalty and family ties, adopting illegal 
means in earnings, and cheating the system by neglecting what an official has 
been officially recruited for. Clientelism is institutionalised at the provincial and 
district level. The senior officials of the district education department either 
have political associations, close contacts with political figures in the province, 
or are known to the politicians by having the same family background. When a 
political party comes into power, local politicians post their favoured officials 
and teachers in the district. The use of family connections is one of the most 
important means for securing senior positions in the district. Other 
qualifications and abilities such as the importance of education and 
competencies do matter, but they are given less consideration. In Abbottabad 
district, a local politician of the Abbasi tribe posted a senior official to the 
district education department. In the department, the official is known for 
having family connections and looks after the interests of the local politician, 
such as extending preferential treatment to teachers who have political 
connections with the political leader. Similarly, when I was trying to contact an 
Assistant District Officer (ADO) through his colleague, I was informed that the 
official in question was related to a local politician, and that he habitually 
wakes up at 10 am and comes late to the office. The official, I was told, have 
been less concerned about his official duties. The value of family connections 
lies in the fact that they are exploited by senior officials to work in the 
district,101 and this grants them status and protection. 
In the case of junior officials such as teachers, a senior female official 
informed me that none of them take official responsibilities seriously. In some 
cases, teachers pass exams either through bribes or seeking help from 
someone inside the system to get the certificate that allows them to become a 
teacher. Moreover, they treat professional training as a formality instead of 
seeing it as a vital skill. When they acquire the requisite qualification and 
                                                       
101 The provincial government can post any officer (EDO, DEO and DDEO) in the district, 
which means he/she does not have to be a native.
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mandatory training, they use family relationships to abuse the system. In one 
school, five teachers were working in the same school because they were
close relatives of two local politicians and the Nazim of the district. The 
teachers were not attending school, but were regularly receiving the monthly 
salary from the department. An understanding of family connections is 
therefore central to understanding clientelism. In the literature, clientelism is 
defined as an exchange relationship between actors based on asymmetric 
power and involves material favours in return for political support (Legg and 
Lemarchand, 1972; Scott, 1972). This definition becomes problematic when 
clientelism is organised around horizontal relationships used for placing family 
members in official positions in return for their loyalty and mutuality. The basic 
principles of these relationships are not monetary, but are based on moral 
sentiments and responsibilities. The political figures and state officials placed 
in powerful positions are under obligation to look after the personal interests of 
their family members. Family relationships are therefore used for maximising 
and strengthening bonds of affinity and expectations. 
Familial relationship is not the only channel through which one can acquire 
either employment or preferential treatment in the district education 
department. In the local community, particularly in rural areas of the district, 
there are people who act as brokers between people and politicians. A broker 
has deep roots in the local community which enables him to perform several 
functions. For instance, a broker may put an official in touch with a politician 
and play an active role in gathering support among the local community to 
vote for a political leader. This route enables officials to establish personal 
connections used for acquiring a recommendation from the politician in order 
to get a preferred post or to get himself/herself transferred from a remote area 
to an urban area. The Assistant District Officers (ADOs) informed me that the 
offices of senior officials such as the Executive District Officer (EDO) and 
District Education Officer (DEO) are full of politicians connected to brokers. 
The local politicians do not visit senior officials in the organisation, instead 
their front men or touts visit the officials in the organisation responsible for the 
posting and transfer of teachers.
181
The aforementioned situation became clear to me one day when I drove to the 
district education department to meet an official. We decided to hold our 
meeting in the office of a senior official which was located a short distance 
from the headquarters of district education. On the same day, I was also 
meeting other officials of the same rank. When we were driving out of the 
main office, a car passed us. As we crossed paths, the official accompanying 
me smiled at the person who was driving the car. I asked the official whether 
he was one of those officials whom we were meeting or someone else. The 
official replied, “that man in the car is a ‘broker’ who carriers a list of clerks, 
school guards and local teachers. He is going to present the list to the head of 
the district education department and take their appointment and posting and 
transfer letters from the official”. There are a number of people who are known 
as ‘brokers’ and they are distinct from teachers. The ‘brokers’ are essentially 
political henchman. Political leaders in the district acquire benefits from 
brokers102 and in return brokers distribute promised services. This route also 
creates an environment of mutual moral obligations and clientelistic 
exchanges between patrons and clients.
In the district education department, senior officials such as the Executive 
District Officer (EDO), the District Education Officer (DEO) and the District 
Officer (DO) often feel compelled to perform their administrative duties in a 
manipulative and clientelistic manner. The following case is a good illustration. 
In 1996 a ban was imposed by the then government on the recruitment of 
teachers in the district. Despite the ban, teachers were still appointed because 
the ministry of education issued contracts on a fixed-term basis103 to fill vacant 
                                                       
102 The broker in return gains several benefits from the politician, such as money. A broker 
also mediates between a teacher (who is personally known to him) and his superior in case of 
extra-legal practices, i.e. appropriation of state resources for personal gains. This information
is based on the experiences of the officials.
103 Two types of recruitment are made in the public sector. One is the regular appointment 
made through public service commission, and the other is contractual appointment. The 
difference between the two is that regular appointments are permanent appointments with 
fringe benefits of an annual increment and pension at the end of 25 years’ service. The 
contractual appointments are temporary appointments without benefits and for a fixed term,
after which the employee is relieved from his/her service. The contractual appointments are 
regularised by the provincial education ministry over a period of time.
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posts104. Normally these bans are imposed to avoid political interference, but 
in reality they are imposed in order to appoint clients (voters) on a contractual 
basis. The Chief Minister, who is the Chief Executive of the Province, imposes 
a ban on appointment but normally comes under pressure from party 
colleagues and Members of Provincial Assemblies (MPAs) to lift the ban so 
that politicians can appoint their clients to different vacancies. The clients 
meet the private interests of their patrons through electoral support in return 
for getting official favours. This further implies that official rules oriented at 
maintaining recruitment based on official policy is seen by political leaders and 
their clients as constraining the advancement of their particular interests. 
Those interests can only be met if they manage to exercise political control 
over state structures. The following citation captures how political leaders and 
state officials advance their personal agendas.
“The minister gave a list of twenty teachers to be appointed on a 
contractual basis. To that list, the district education department 
added another ten names. The district education department knows 
that additional names would not be rejected by the provincial 
government since the department was recruiting twenty teachers 
on the recommendation of the minister”. (Mentor teacher)
In this manner, clientelistic networks are created and reproduced. More 
recently, the decentralisation reforms initiated in 2001 have opened up 
different channels/routes for clientelism and the formation of clientelistic 
networks. Under Local Government Ordinance 2001, the power to appoint 
primary teachers is delegated to the District Government (DG). The purpose 
of this delegation was to streamline different procedures involved in the
appointment of teachers. For instance, prior to decentralisation the 
appointment of teachers was usually referred to the Provincial Government for 
approval. This caused delays in appointments. After decentralisation, political 
elites are directly involved in district administration, as they can easily 
influence the officials of the Education Department because the majority of 
                                                       
104 The vacant posts could not be filled through regular appointments unless the ban was 
lifted.
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those officials have secured their postings through political influence and 
recommendations by political leaders. As a consequence, decentralisation has 
increased the opportunities for public representatives (MPAs) to appoint their 
clients and loyal followers. 
District education organisation is also represented by networks consisting of 
bureaucrats. Through these networks, local politicians acquire electoral 
support which strengthens the bureaucrats and the political stature of 
politicians in their respective constituencies. The networks consist of members 
of the Primary Teacher Union (PTU). The PTU serves as a political platform 
for local politicians canvassing support when they run for elections. In certain 
instances, the PTU is used by officials to promote their private interests. In this 
process, official norms and decisions by senior officials get undermined. I 
illustrate this by citing a case of misappropriation of state recourses, 
highlighting the intrusion of the PTU in administration. 
In accordance with official norms, a female Deputy District Officer (DDO) in an 
urban girls’ primary school inspected the utilisation of funds reserved for the 
Parent Teacher Commission (PTC). During inspection, the officer found gross 
misappropriation in the utilisation of PTC funds. According to the bank 
statement, the total fund was Rs 359,000. The school’s head teacher informed 
the officer that she had spent the entire sum on repairing a bathroom, painting 
the classrooms, and constructing a path from the main gate of the school to 
the stairs of the school building. The officer inspected the quantum of work 
through a team which consisted of a head clerk (dealing with finance), the 
Assistant District Officer (ADO) for Planning and Development, and a clerk 
who was working directly under the ADO. After three days, they presented a 
report to the female officer which indicated that the work would not have cost 
more than Rs. 50,000. The senior female officer summoned the head teacher 
and showed her the findings of the report. The female officer asked the head 
teacher about the remaining sum. The head teacher insisted that she had 
spent the entire amount on the work she did in the school. Upon further 
investigation, the female officer found that the receipts for the work done were 
in fact false. When the case was further probed, the head teacher disclosed 
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that she had given the contract of constructing the path to her unemployed 
brother. The female officer informed the head teacher that the 
misappropriated amount would be recovered from her by paying Rs 5,000 
every month from her salary. The head teacher tried to put pressure on the 
official through various channels, i.e. contacting her family members and other 
officials in the department. The officer was firm and did not change her 
decision. Afterwards, the head teacher pressurised the officer to reconsider 
her decision through the PTU. When the officer refused to do so, the members 
of PTU went to the local politicians. Those politicians went to the Education 
Minister and, without conducting an impartial inquiry, the senior officer was re-
posted away from the district.
4. The system of patronage
In district administration, an inclusive patronage system is formed between 
local teachers (based in schools) and senior officials (based in the 
headquarters). The inclusive system of patronage operates by incorporating 
these officials into the administration. The inclusive system has certain 
characteristics. Unlike an exclusive system of patronage in which only a few 
members are permitted into the inner circle, the inclusive system consist of a 
variety of interlocking pyramids, since competition between patrons and the 
distribution of benefits among lower-level clients are marginal. Therefore, 
lower-level officials attempt to develop close contacts with different patrons in 
order to maximise their chances of accruing highly competitive benefits 
(Nelson 1996, p.45). Teachers and lower-level officials such as school guards 
and clerks have direct linkages with local politicians and they extract different 
types of benefits from those politicians in return for their votes and loyalty. 
This patronage system operates according to tribal connections, or other 
forms of close relationship. A symbiotic relationship emerges between 
politicians who propagate their own position, and their people. There are three 
major tribes in the Abbottabad district, namely Jadoons, Sardars, and Abbasi. 
The political structure and the formation of clients in the patronage system 
enable patrons and clients to advance their mutual interests. However, this 
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patronage-based system is even more complex. Clients such as senior 
officials in the headquarters have patron–client relationships outside their own 
immediate tribe. By definition, patron–client relationships are developed in a 
vertical structure dominated by patrons and with clients placed at the bottom. 
Patron–client relationships within these structures become complex since 
ongoing competition between different patrons re-configure these structures.
In district headquarters, patron–client relationships are established among 
people who do not belong to the same tribe. Rather, senior officials in 
headquarters require several patron–client linkages. Senior officials in the 
headquarters secure interpersonal relationships with political leaders beyond 
their own tribe, which leads to the formation of multiplex relationships. The 
reason for securing the allegiance of other political leaders is to increase the 
chances of a senior official being appointed to a particular post. For instance, 
an official writes an application to a local politician so that he may be 
appointed to the post of ADO. Acquiring a recommendation from one politician 
is not sufficient, because senior posts are limited and there is always stiff 
competition in securing them. Therefore, if an official is able to get an ‘informal 
endorsement’ or ‘political recommendation’ from more than one politician, it is 
a huge advantage. During focus group discussion with male ADOs, one 
official said, “This political channel of appointment is the first disease in the 
organisation”. In the headquarters, senior officials promote their superiority 
and privileged status by adopting this informally recognised process of 
developing clientelistic relationships. 
4.1 Favouritism: positioning of clients and impunity
In the exchange of favours, which may be financial as well as political, the 
bureaucracy engages in preferential treatment with those who have access to 
higher authorities. On the other hand, patron–client relationships are exploited 
by clients in different ways to extract various types of favours. Favouritism 
manifests itself in different forms. The local political elites manipulate 
constituencies by appointing teachers who have supported or fetched votes 
for them during election campaigns. In line with official recruitment policy, 
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teachers are initially appointed in their own union councils which mostly fall in 
the rural areas of the district. Senior officials then receive verbal or written 
instructions from local politicians to re-transfer their clients from a rural union 
council to an urban union council. This is how political leaders manipulate 
constituencies and extend preferential treatment to their clients. For instance, 
without the recommendation of local politicians, teachers cannot be 
transferred from schools. In some cases, teachers become so powerful that 
they cannot be sanctioned and held accountable for their non-performance. 
The higher officials know these teachers are ‘well connected’ and do not 
check their performance. If at times they are checked, they impose penalties 
in the form of freezing remunerations or recommending re-postings. These
administrative actions are withdrawn because of political connections. The 
teachers simply approach the minister and local MPA of their community who 
then bail them out. Moreover, clients use their political connections to avoid 
working in rural areas, which entail extra living costs and also require them to 
leave their family settled in the main city of Abbottabad. This has made a 
significant contribution to the lower standard of education in government 
schools, specifically in rural areas.
Politicians and senior officials in the district fulfil their mutual interests as they 
tend to engage in favours through clientelistic and personal relationships. In 
district headquarters, a female ADO informed me about an anomaly related to 
additional teachers. When the officer checked the register, she found that 
against two posts, three teachers had been deputed. In this particular case, 
two teachers got themselves transferred from rural schools by using their 
political connections. The transfer was verbally conveyed to a senior official. 
The verbal transfer was not officially conveyed to the ADO.105 When the ADO 
investigated the verbal transfer, she received a call from the Executive District 
Officer (EDO) “to let them teach as the matter would be discussed with the 
officer at a later stage” (ADO). In this case, the official rules and policy were 
neglected because the EDO knew that political contacts had been used. The 
                                                       
105 In order to get transferred, a teacher ought to follow official rules. The teacher must present 
an application to the ADO, who then goes through the case and forwards it with his/her 
remarks to a senior official for appropriate action.
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politician’s interest was not resisted by the senior official, who avoided the risk 
of possible replacement in his post. Similarly, the ADO did not take action as 
she wanted to stay away from political intrusion in administration. Interestingly, 
the EDO used his position to favour the third teacher.
During fieldwork, I was offered a unique opportunity to read an inquiry report 
which was a classified document. Reading the report, I was shocked to learn 
that a school which had not been damaged in the earthquake of 8th October 
2005 had been knocked down, and that the teacher had been absent from 
duty since then. The community informed the inquiry officer that there were 95 
girls in the school. The report stated that the absent teacher was regularly 
getting her salary from the department. Moreover, the ADO who was in charge 
of that circle had reported the matter to the senior officials but no action had 
been taken. The inquiry officer told me that the teacher had contacts in the 
main office and she suspected that the teacher enjoyed informal/personal 
relations with senior officials. In this case, favouritism was facilitated by 
personal relationships. The positioning of bureaucrats and treating them as 
clients gives rise to favouritism and to a culture of impunity. Impunity is directly 
related to clienetelism, as imposing sanctions is resisted because of loyalty. 
Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006), writing from a different perspective, 
argue that sanctioning is seen as a threat to the entire system represented by 
networks. This is why “impunity is the rule and sanctioning the exception” 
(2006, p.94). In general, the extension of favouritism by local patrons to their 
clients in different forms and the professional negligence of officials are 
accepted as long as there are no threats of sanctioning and accountability. 
5. Interface with teachers
In this section, I discuss what was happening in the field from local 
perspectives, based on my interactions with teachers in both urban and rural 
schools. I began by observing accounts, language and perceptions. Actors are 
endowed with knowledge and experience which is constantly shaped by what 
they encounter on a daily basis. During visits to schools, I noticed that certain 
teachers were trapped in an environment from which escape was not only 
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difficult, but which resulted in negative impacts on their actual behaviour. On 
the other hand, there were teachers who used political contacts to obtain 
preferential treatment. Teachers who lacked political connections faced a lot 
of difficulties. Their primary concern was “political interference” in their official 
duties. In the same vein, certain teachers used terms such as ‘political 
connections’ and ‘politics’ to convey their dissatisfaction and concerns about 
administrative performance in schools. It must be noted that these concerns 
were evident in all the schools that I visited in rural areas.106 Here I attempt to 
narrate the consequences of ‘political interference’ in terms of its impact on 
the motivation of teachers and the quality of education.
During a visit to a boys’ school situated in the rural union council of Kakul,107
the teachers made frequent reference, either in impersonal or personal terms, 
to “political connections”. The head teacher was quite frank in stating that 
“there is a lot of political interference in the Education Department. Politics 
must be taken out from this department”. When I asked him to elaborate on 
what he had told me, the head teacher explained that when the education 
department appointed teachers in their respective Union Council (UC), those 
who have political connections get transferred from rural UCs to an urban UC. 
As a result, the school in the rural UC loses quality teachers. 
He went on to explain the case of his brother, who was transferred from his 
UC to a far-flung UC to which he had to commute daily. The head teacher said 
that his brother is an honest person but the department is making him ‘morally 
corrupt’ because he is unable to reach the school on time. Most of his time is 
spent travelling difficult terrain. His brother has told him that he wants to work 
with dedication, but that under current circumstances he is unable to do so. 
He has been unjustly transferred because a local politician wanted to place 
                                                       
106 The impact of ‘political interference’ in urban schools was less significant for certain 
reasons. First, in urban schools, there were more children due to the adequate strength of 
teachers and better educational facilities such as teaching aids, desks and chairs. Second, 
urban schools were frequently visited by district officials. As a result, teacher absenteeism and 
teaching practices were frequently monitored. 
107 I was curious to know what counted as the “political interference” that had been the topic of 
discussion in a number of prior school visits.
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someone else in his old position. Upon hearing this story, another teacher 
said: “Jis Ki Lathi Us Ki Behance”, meaning “might is power”. Teachers in rural 
areas use political connections and those who lack them suffer the most. The 
brother of the head teacher became less dedicated, and since he had no 
political contacts he had to wait for a change in government to get his position 
back.
One day I travelled with a female ADO and a head teacher to visit a 
community model school for girls. This school was located in a village called 
Sumwala, in the UC Mojohan which falls in the tehsil of Hawalian. When we 
reached Hawalian, we took a left turn towards Sumwala. This road was 
narrow and also quite steep. After driving for a short while, we reached a point 
where I had to park the car because of hilly terrain. I walked to the school built 
on a small hill. When we reached the school, we were received by the head 
teacher and the school guard. After getting inside the school, I was introduced 
to other teachers. This school had six classrooms. I went to each class and 
interacted briefly with students. Five classrooms had furniture and proper 
chairs. In one classroom, I noticed that the playgroup children108 were sitting 
on the floor. I asked the head teacher why these children were sitting on the 
floor in the veranda. She told me that “we do not have an additional room for 
them. This is the only place for them”. The head teacher further stated that 
“there are only three teachers in this school. We have six classes and this 
school is supposed to have six teachers. We have 250 registered students 
and 40-50 unregistered students. Unregistered students belong to the play 
group. It is extremely difficult for us to teach six classes”. When I was taken to 
class 4, a teacher in that class said, “I am taking two classes at the same time 
and it is very difficult for me to concentrate”. 
After visiting all the classes, I sat in a veranda outside the office of the head 
teacher contemplating the inadequate capacity of teachers. Meanwhile, the 
head teacher appeared and sat beside me. I asked the head teacher whether 
                                                       
108 Children in play group are below the age of 5. They have been admitted to school to get
them used to the school environment and to develop the habit of attending school on a regular 
basis.
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the model school109 meets the expectation of community, i.e. whether the 
school has the right facilities for the children and has the required number of 
teachers. The head teacher replied:
“This school has eleven sanctioned posts.110 Now they have only 
four teachers. Out of eleven posts, seven posts are vacant. One 
teacher is on maternity leave and there is no replacement teacher. 
We also have mobility problems as we have to walk from other 
villages. I try to reach school on time but it is difficult for a female to 
commute from a long distance. In this UC,111 there are ten to fifteen 
schools and all of them are closed. Initially, teachers are appointed 
to the schools but because of political connections, they get 
themselves transferred as soon as possible”. (Head teacher)
The teachers teaching several classes were demoralised when requests to 
send additional teachers are treated unfavourably. On the other hand, 
teachers also made reference to certain teachers having close ties with “clout” 
in the headquarters. The “clout” consisted of senior officials above the rank of 
ADO. The senior hierarchy was extremely powerful in making decisions and 
their official authority cannot be challenged by junior officials. Junior officials 
were constrained to initiate action against a teacher or even a school guard. 
They receive phone calls or are informed verbally by senior officials to treat 
cases against official norms. According to an ADO, “we have no option but to 
obey the orders of senior officials. This is not only a difference in power 
relations but also misuse of power by the senior officials to put pressure on 
lower officials resulting in circumvention of official rules and responsibilities”. 
                                                       
109 Community model schools are built with USAID funding in rural and urban areas. As per
policy, a model school is supposed to have 6 teachers, i.e. one teacher per class. 
110 In each school, there are sanctioned posts against which teachers are appointed/posted. 
Sanctioned posts are regular/permanent gazetted posts under the appointment rules of the 
government. People appointed to these posts get annual increments and also a pension after 
retirement. Sanctioned posts cannot be left vacant unless someone retires or gets transferred. 
In the case of a transfer, the education department is supposed to send a teacher to fill the 
vacant post.
111 A union council comprises a group of villages of approximately equal size.
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The intrusion of clientelistic practices into official norms is political as well as 
administrative, and initiated either directly or indirectly by the political elites. 
The direct route relates to the local politician contacting the junior official and 
the indirect route relates to the local politician contacting the most senior 
official, i.e. the Executive District Officer (EDO). In the case of the indirect 
route, the EDO instructs the ADO to take decisions which subvert his/her 
official authority in treatment of cases.
Clientelistic practices in administration directly contribute to poor education. 
The children in schools faced deplorable conditions. In schools I visited, 
children were sitting on the floor and were without uniforms. Some of them 
had developed health problems because of inadequate facilities in the 
classrooms. Since most of the female schools were closed in the rural areas, 
the girls used to walk a long distance to a neighbouring school early in the 
morning. I also observed children cleaning the school courtyard. Moreover, 
during school hours, the head teacher would nominate someone in a class to 
teach the rest of the children. A teacher narrated to me during a visit to a 
school that she saw a teacher literally abusing a child. She strongly 
disapproved of the teacher’s inappropriate behaviour and its impact on the 
rest of the kids. My informant informed me that teachers were unconcerned
about child dropout and low enrolment rates. She further revealed that the 
primary interest of the teacher is to get a job. She is little concerned about the 
children’s education in the present system. What matters is that “the teacher 
should be going to the school and must keep her superior happy” (head 
teacher). The head teacher alluded to personal relationships of local teachers 
with their superiors. These relationships were closely related to acts of 
reciprocity. For instance, a head teacher would be asked by his superior (the 
ADO) to collect information from different schools, which is normally the 
responsibility of the ADO. In return, the head teacher would get personal 
favours either in the form of approval for promotion, nomination for training or 
getting salary in advance. 
From the preceding discussion, it can be argued that senior officials had 
developed relationships of reciprocity with certain teachers and that they were 
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rewarded because of reciprocal obligations. The reciprocal obligations are 
rooted in patron–client relationships. This means that even at the micro-level, 
patron–client relationships are pervasive. 
5.1 Interpersonal relationships
In certain rural and urban schools, interpersonal relationships developed 
between the head teacher and the rest of the staff. These relationships were 
based on mutual respect, empathy and trust. Due to interpersonal 
relationships, discrepancies in official responsibilities do not get reported. The 
mentor teachers carrying out supervision of schools and the rest of the 
teachers had been colleagues. As such, the dynamics of interaction was 
different between the mentors and the rest of the teachers. As “externals” with 
different social status, the mentor teachers had to be treated carefully 
because they had close contacts with political leaders and senior officials. 
Mentor teachers were supposed to perform certain functions, such as 
ensuring the proper maintenance of the school register.112 For several 
reasons, it is rare that these functions are strictly performed.  First, mentor 
teachers avoided reporting teacher absenteeism because it would trigger 
adverse consequences, such as freezing of the teacher’s salary. In one 
school, a mentor teacher found that the number of children in the class did not 
match the figure recorded in the register. After asking about this, she was 
informed that in order to “save their neck” the teacher had entered fictitious 
names. Taking formal action against the teacher involved an official inquiry 
leading to possible transfer from the school and not getting the annual 
increment. Second, when a teacher needed sick leave, it had to go through 
several bureaucratic procedures,113 so instead teachers preferred to make an 
                                                       
112 There are two registers in the school. One register is kept for children and the other for 
teachers. The children register shows name of the child, his/her class, presence and absence,
and total attendance during the reporting month. The other register shows information on 
teachers’ attendance, and the total attendance at the end of the month. All this information 
must be properly fed into both registers by the head teacher.
113 The application had to first be endorsed by the head teacher and then by Assistant District 
Officer (ADO). The same application also required the approval of senior officials such as 
DDEO and DO. This meant waiting for an approval from different officials.
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informal arrangement with the head teacher. The teacher would attend the 
school for a few days and then take a few days off. As a teacher narrated, “the 
department is not going to pay me for the days I am sick”.114 Similarly, in one 
school, the teacher who was on leave did not have her application stamped by 
the head teacher. The head teacher granted the teacher leave without fulfilling 
official requirements. These interpersonal relationships demonstrated the gap 
between formal responsibilities and what was happening in practice.
5.2 Perceptions and confessions: the social cost of integrity 
In addition to interpersonal relationships, the state actors highlighted 
challenges related to the social environment in rural areas. The teachers 
mentioned problems in the present education system. They spoke about the 
absence of checks and balances, rewards and punishments, in the following 
terms:
“All teachers are not treated equally. Only the blue-eyed who have 
political connections and fetch votes for MNAs and MPAs are 
rewarded. I am “powerless”. I can’t even ask my school guard to do 
something. If I tell a school teacher that he is not coming on time, I 
create a hassle for myself. The ADO will ask me to put in writing a 
complaint against the teacher and if I do so, there is serious 
possibility that the rest of the teachers will connive against me by 
fabricating false stories and I will be penalised instead of the 
teacher. There is a lot of political interference in this department 
and we are all frustrated with the current system. The ADOs are 
also politically appointed. They hardly care about us and the 
performance of schools. If I talk about the problems in my school, I 
only expose my own inefficiency. I am trying to informally manage 
                                                       
114 Medical bills were not paid on time, and in certain cases the finance officer in the 
headquarters was not very receptive to these claims as he suspected that these claims were 
not genuine. This may be true in those cases where a teacher acquires a fake certificate from 
a local doctor to process false claims. In other cases, the finance officer would be holding out 
in the hope of some “incentive” (financial) before processing the claim.
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the administration in the school by keeping cordial relationships 
with everyone”. (Head teacher)
During a visit to a boys’ primary school, a local teacher volunteered to take me 
to a school in UC Banda Pir Khan. We had to drive through a narrow valley 
surrounded by lush green mountains. While driving, I wondered how people of 
the valley managed to get to the main city and whether schools in this part of 
Abbottabad were visited by the district education department. After driving for 
almost two hours, we reached the school, situated in a village known as 
Tarnawai. The school was built on the land of the head teacher, who was a 
local and lived in the same village. When we entered the school, I saw 
children playing outside and most of them were sitting on the steps of the 
school which had two rooms. There were two teachers in the school who 
warmly welcomed us and were particularly pleased to see me. I instantly knew 
that these schools had not been visited by outsiders. It was a co-education 
school115 which had six classes and there were three teachers, including the 
head. I told the teachers about my research and my interest in access to 
quality education and the factors which impede this. I explained that during 
previous visits to boys’ and girls’ schools, I had been told that parents who 
could afford to, sent their children to private schools. It seems that there is
lack of trust among the general public about the quality of education in public 
schools. The teachers agreed with my observations. However, the teachers 
had other insights and perceptions. The head teacher noted: 
“The environment [referring to the quality of education] is better in 
urban areas as compared to rural areas. The literacy rate in rural 
areas is low and the parents of school children are mostly illiterate. 
They do not pay attention to the education of their children. The 
children have no books and we provide them copies from the 
Parent Teacher Council (PTC) funds”. (Head teacher) 
                                                       
115 Girls were also admitted to this school because the education department did not have a
girls’ school in the village.
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Another teacher stated that the salary of a government teacher is not enough 
to meet daily expenses. I told him that a government teacher earns more than 
a teacher of a private school.116 Therefore, salary cannot be the sole reason 
for the poor quality of education. After hearing my response, the teacher 
uttered these words:
“There are no checks and balances and accountability in public 
schools. Our teaching methodology is evaluated without taking into 
account the capability of a teacher. Teachers are not getting the 
post according to their qualification. I have a Master’s degree and 
am serving in grade 9. Whilst there are teachers with lower 
qualifications serving in grade 12”.117 (Teacher)
I asked the teachers why there was no “accountability” in their profession. The 
volunteered teacher replied: 
“Even if the teacher is present in the school, he does not pay 
attention to his profession. We receive our salary whether we teach 
or not. In fact, we get a salary for sitting outside in the sun. We 
would be happy if someone in the department visits us and 
inquires118 about our performance”. (Teacher)
These perceptions and confessions indicate a clinetelistic system which 
undermines decision making and challenges the authority of officials who feel 
“powerless”. They further imply that officials exploit clientelistic relationships to 
secure monetary benefits. The experiences and the language of state officials 
affirm the lack of accountability and illiteracy as key factors impeding the 
quality of education. 
                                                       
116 I gathered this information from the principal who was running a private school in 
Nawansher. 
117 The gradation system means that officials serving on higher grades get more salary and 
annual increments.
118 The schools located in far-flung areas were rarely visited by officials because of terrain, 
lack of transport and budgetary constraints.
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6. State–citizen interfaces
In this section I draw upon my interactions and discussions as held in different 
villages with head teachers and citizens who were members of the Parent 
Teacher Commission (PTC). As I began to attend PTC meetings, I observed 
that members were not regularly attending meetings. In all the six meetings 
held with committee members and the head teacher, I found that members of 
the PTC did not know about their role and responsibilities. The community 
members were called to these meetings to simply legitimise the claim that the 
PTC was functioning, and exercise voice and accountability over lower-ranked 
bureaucrats. In the majority of cases, PTC meetings were held between the 
chairman of the PTC and the head teacher of the school. Instead of electing 
chairpersons, the common practice was that the head teachers in male and 
female schools nominated the chairman of the PTC. The chairman of the PTC 
was either an influential person or someone who was easily accessible. 
James Manor offers insights into committees such as the PTC. Manor (2004, 
p.197) asserts that the nominated citizen is under an obligation to the public 
nominating official, and this process of personalised selection weakens the 
capacity of other members, often the non-poor, to raise their concerns and 
interests.
During discussions with citizens in rural areas, I observed that the process of 
selecting a PTC chairman revealed a different reality. In rural areas, the 
majority of the parents were illiterate. Hence, they felt that they were not in a 
position to discuss the performance of their children. The situation in the urban 
areas appeared slightly better because of the literacy rates. Moreover, the 
functioning and the constitution of PTC revealed the social practices of the 
head teacher. The social practices of the head teacher in the utilisation of PTC 
resources reveal the level of interaction between the head teacher and the 
nominated chairman. As explained by a senior official, “the head teacher 
selects a chairman who is ready to sign cheques without asking too many 
questions”. In one meeting, the head teacher revealed that “the chairman is a 
very respected and honest person, and he is the one who interacts with us 
and attends our meetings”. According to a senior official, “a teacher captured 
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the chairman of the PTC by rewarding him with a certain share from PTC 
funds. When the ADO probed the misappropriation of funds, the chairman 
said that he had been asked to sign the cheques”. In certain cases, the 
chairman is a chokidar (school guard). To spend PTC funds, it is more 
convenient for the secretary (head teacher) to get the signature of the school 
guard who is a permanent employee in the school.
During focus-group discussions held in an urban boys’ school known as 
Thanda Chok in UC Nawansher, the chairman of the PTC told me that he had 
discussed with the head teacher “about the late coming of teachers in the 
school and about the fact that no one paid attention to him”. I asked the 
chairman what would happen if he lodged a complaint against a teacher who 
belongs to the same community. He said “I do inform the head teacher that 
such and such teacher is not coming on time and he must report the matter to 
higher authorities. I am helpless as no action is then taken”. After hearing 
these assertions, a young person stated that “the teachers are from our own 
community. If the chairman lodges a complaint against a teacher, that teacher 
will visit the chairman’s house. The chairman will receive him warmly because 
he has a soft spot for him. As a consequence, it is very unlikely that the matter 
of the teachers’ absence will get reported”. The chairman had held his position 
for the past ten years and admitted that he had had many interactions with the 
head teacher. The chairman further revealed to me that the rest of the 
members had informed him that they would “put their thumb prints on any bill 
that requires their consent”. The local community had absolute trust in the 
chairman, and as such they did not feel any need to attend meetings. The 
head teacher had been interacting with the chairman, because the teacher 
belonged to the same community and thus was known to the chairman.
In a meeting held with community members in a rural school in the village of 
Dotar, I experienced a different reality. This school had only two rooms and 
the children were sitting outside because of insufficient space in the school. 
There was no water, no electricity and the school building had been damaged. 
There were three teachers teaching six classes. I asked the community 
members about teachers’ punctuality. The majority of the members said that 
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the teachers were punctual because the children of other villages also come 
to the school.119 I observed that the chairman and one more member were 
more vocal about lacking facilities in the school and the inadequate ratio of 
teachers, i.e. 1:30. During our conversation, I asked the rest of the participants 
whether they had attempted to resolve the issues in the PTC meetings. There 
was complete silence, which confirmed what I had been hearing in previous 
meetings about ineffective PTCs. When I asked the Chairman how the 
expenditures of the PTC account are monitored, audited and decided upon, I 
received an unanticipated and innocent reply:
“The PTC has a joint account and in order to withdraw money from 
the account, I and the head teacher sign the cheques. I am told that 
the amount is spent on stationery, copies and office registers. I 
have just signed cheques but I do not know whether those items 
have been purchased or not. I have not even seen the actual bills. 
We do not know what we are supposed to do. The head teacher 
should have informed us about the role of PTCs. I am also not 
aware of the actual amount allocated to this school”. (Chairman 
PTC)
This statement highlights the routine social practices of the head teacher who 
deliberately withholds information and does not require approval to utilise 
state resources. The above also explains that state officials propagate their 
own interests by managing administration in a non-transparent manner which 
in turn gives rise to mistrust among citizens. Moreover, PTC meetings were 
not held in a formal way because the head teacher and other teachers did not 
directly report to the community. Therefore, in practice ‘accountability’ and 
‘voice’—two major aims of the PTC—were ineffective, even if the PTC 
members had been assertive and questioned the local teachers about the 
quality of education in schools. 
                                                       
119 This village had three schools and one of them was under construction. The second school 
had two teachers and it was built far from the village. It seemed that this school was more 
accessible for children.
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7. Accountability in clientelistic structures
This section deals with accountability120 within the framework of patron–client 
relations. In doing so, I introduce the institutional framework developed by 
Hirschman (1970), who argues that social actors express their preferences 
and concerns through a number of mechanisms when participating in public 
policies. These mechanisms are:
(a) Voice
In public sector organisations, the ‘voice’ mechanism enables citizens to raise 
their concerns when faced with a degree of unhappiness about the quality of 
social services and other problems associated with their delivery. According to 
Hirschman (1970, p.30), service users attempt to change existing practices 
and policies to escape from an objectionable state of affairs. This is achieved 
either individually or through collective action. In both situations, citizens 
appeal to higher authorities either directly or indirectly with the intention to 
induce a change. Voice is used as a mechanism of feedback as well as to 
identify institutional deficiencies in the provision of service. Voice exemplifies 
discontentment and the inability of the poor and disadvantaged segments in 
the society to enforce their demands on the state.
(b) Exit
The second mechanism through which citizens show their discontent about 
the quality of a service is ‘exit’, which means that they seek alternative 
services. The option of exit is usually taken by citizens when the voice option 
is unable to have a positive impact on service delivery. As Hirschman argues 
                                                       
120 Through different mechanisms of accountability, the general interest of the politicians and 
the state bureaucracy are aligned with the interests of the public. Accountability means 
answerability and enforcement (Ackerman 2004). According to Schedler (1999, p.14),
answerability means “the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they 
are doing” and enforcement means “the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions 
on power holders who have violated their public duties”. These mechanisms of accountability 
prevent, in principle, corruption or rent-seeking in the provision of public services. In addition, 
the public knows how institutions perform and how state polices are implemented. The public 
is also able to monitor institutional performance which closes the gaps between principals and 
agents.
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(1970, p.37), citizens will delay an exit option if they are convinced about the 
effectiveness of voice. In the case where citizens are faced with 
circumstances in which the voice option is least effective or desirable, they 
may switch to an alternative service, thus exercising exit. 
(c) Loyalty
The third mechanism is ‘loyalty’. According to Hirschman (1970, p.78), a 
person remains loyal to an organisation whether the organisation is 
performing well or not. He further argues that a person becomes loyal to an 
organisation when the option of exit is too costly, and the voice option requires 
inventing new ways of introducing changes into an existing state of affairs, i.e. 
improving organisational effectiveness. In situations where both voice and exit 
are least-considered options, people stay loyal to an organisation because the 
organisation serves their interests well enough. 
Having briefly described the concepts of exit, voice and loyalty, I now describe 
and analyse three relevant cases.
(i) The story of a female teacher
Sharing her teaching experience of twenty-five years, one particular female 
school teacher’s story is informative. The teacher came from Nawansher. She 
taught in a primary school for seven years in Tehsil Hawalian, which is 
approximately 20 km from her hometown. She used to commute daily to the 
school where she taught. Since teachers are normally transferred after 2-3 
years, I was curious to know why she served in the same school for so long. 
She replied that her husband is also a civil servant and that he had told her 
that she had to remain dedicated and work with honesty even if posted in 
rough and inaccessible areas. To her that meant not only getting to the school 
on time but also sacrificing her own health. She informed me that extensive 
travelling had caused her backache. Despite suffering from backache, she 
continued to work with the same vigour. 
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She had also served in 1998 in one of the most difficult terrains in a rural 
village in Abbottabad district called Damtour.121 She used to walk up and 
down the hill for an hour and half from the village of Damtour to the school, 
which was situated behind a mountain. She served in that school for two 
years. She used to get home late at night because there were only two jeeps 
used by the public to commute from her town to Damtour. One jeep used to 
bring milk from Damtour and she had to sit on the milk containers at the back 
of the jeep in order to get home, late at night. The teacher further mentioned 
that female teachers in the school where she was serving used to come to the 
school on alternative days because it was extremely difficult for females to 
walk such a long distance. She had also been transferred to other rough 
terrains where she had worked for many years. When I asked her about the 
official policy pertaining to transfer of teachers, she replied, “it’s all about 
political connections”. 
The teacher was unable to make effective use of her agency122 because her 
husband had told her to stay out of politics. In the case of an appeal for 
transfer, it would not have been considered by higher authorities as they were 
least concerned about the social circumstances and the difficulties faced by 
teachers. Rather, senior officials dealt with those cases which involved 
political and personalised favours. 
This case highlights that the female teacher did not compromise her 
professional competence and tried to remain neutral. She knew that she was 
serving in a system in which professional conduct, posting and transfer were 
associated with clientelistic relationships. Despite possessing knowledge 
about local teachers’ practices and associations, the female teacher was 
caught in a deeply entrenched patronage system over which she had no 
control or influence. Senior officials operated under the patronage of powerful 
political leaders which subverted the possibility of inculcating a culture of 
                                                       
121 A rural union council located on the border of Nawansher.
122 Agency is attributed to what social actors do, the social process, and the everyday 
experiences which enable the people to use their capacity to cope with extreme 
circumstances (Long 1992, p.23). Social actors use their agency to create room for 
manoeuvre using different means such as social and political relationships and practices. 
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official rules and policy. In reality, clientelistic relationships determined the real 
“rules of the game”, as political leaders controlled the management of 
administration.
(ii) Disgruntled citizens of PhalKot
This case pertains to a meeting with unhappy citizens in a school situated in a 
far-flung rural union council called PhalKot. This meeting was unforgettable, 
as it entailed a forty-minute drive from the main city of Abbottabad, and a walk 
that lasted for more than an hour. Walking was quite tiring, because the path 
leading to the school was steep. Accompanied by a local teacher, we had to 
break our journey twice before reaching the school, which was built on a small 
hillock. There were three teachers in the school and the head teacher had 
gone to Mecca to perform Hajj.123 After visiting the classrooms, I sat in the 
office of the head teacher with the three teachers. During our conversation, a 
school teacher informed me that he had invited the PTC members and few 
other local residents. After a short while, I saw elderly people (male), perhaps 
in their sixties, coming to the office of the head teacher. I introduced124 myself 
and briefly talked about the objective of visiting them. 
In this meeting, I came to understand from the PTC chairman of the 
Government Girls’ Public School (GGPS) Upper PhalKot,125 that despite 
reporting 3-4 times to the education department about a female teacher who 
                                                       
123 Hajj means pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. It is obligatory for every Muslim to 
perform Hajj at least once in his/her lifetime.
124 My introduction was very simple as I knew the PTC guidelines would not make much 
sense to them. Instead, I drew their attention to the common problems that were observed by 
me in other schools, such as few teachers and children going to private schools, and the 
reasons behind them. I further told them that that I was more interested in knowing whether 
they were happy with the quality of education in the schools in their villages. The purpose 
behind this approach was to get their views and perceptions in general, and more specifically
on the role of PTC members. One person said “an angel has visited them who would listen to 
their problems”. They thought that I would inform the education department and so resolve 
their concerns.
125 The school in which this meeting was held was a government boys’ school. In UC PhalKot, 
there are 7 primary schools. Out of these 7, 4 are boys’ schools and 3 are girls’ schools.
PhalKot consists of two areas, i.e. Upper and Lower PhalKot. The primary school for girls in 
upper PhalKot was located even higher than the boy’s school in lower PhalKot.
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visited the school once a week, the department had not paid any attention to 
the complaint. The chairman informed me that he and other residents of the 
community had also collectively reported the irregularity of the teacher, but no 
one in the education department had shown willingness to pay attention. After 
making repeated appeals, their school was visited by male and female ADOs. 
The officials told the PTC to appoint teachers locally. Since then, the local 
community had appointed two female teachers to the school who were paid 
Rs 25 daily. I asked the chairman how local people could afford to pay the 
salary of the new teachers. The chairman asserted: 
“We are poor but quite concerned about the future of our children. 
Those who can afford pay the salary of the teachers, and those 
who cannot afford do not pay”. (Chairman PTC, Upper PhalKot)
The citizens of PhalKot seemed extremely unhappy, even furious, with the 
existing state of affairs, especially the indifferent behaviour of the education 
department. In this particular case, the citizens tried to raise their concerns 
through voice. The option of voice was, however, least effective because they 
belonged to the tribe of Awan and no one from their constituency was 
politically important. As such, there was a greater policy distance between 
them and political elites. They could only verbally convey their dissatisfaction 
over the performance of the institution by exercising voice. However, since 
voice was least effective, the citizens opted for an exit option which entailed 
costs. By exiting from the system, the citizens not only further isolated 
themselves from the department, but also now have to sustain a privately 
managed service provision.  
(iii) The case of patron–client brokerage
A joint inquiry126 conducted in a school by two officers is related to the 
misappropriation of funds reserved for orphans. When the officers investigated 
the case, they found that a school teacher had withdrawn money from the 
fund by declaring a boy who was not an orphan. The teacher was found guilty 
                                                       
126 Taking into account the sensitive nature of the case, the inquiry officers were reluctant to 
disclose the date of inquiry and the name of the school.
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and the inquiry officers were able to recover the appropriated amount from the 
teacher. After recovering the money, the investigating officers officially 
recommended the transfer of the teacher to another school. The education 
department acted on the proposal and the teacher was transferred to another 
school which was located in a far-flung area. After a week, the perpetrator 
visited the investigating officers and handed them the cancellation order of his 
transfer. When the officers asked the teacher about the cancellation of the 
transfer order, the teacher replied that the Member of the Provincial Assembly 
(MPA) had called the higher authorities and informed them that the teacher 
who had been transferred was one of their men and belonged to their 
constituency. I was informed by the officials that the case relates to certain 
teachers who act as brokers.
This particular case reveals how brokers perform functions such as 
canvassing and mobilising political support for the MPA in his constituency.127
The general practice of election campaigning is predominantly based upon 
personnel connections. The teachers in the district are actively engaged to 
secure wide support for politicians by using their contacts in the local 
community. The effectiveness of the broker depends on his existing 
relationships and ability to obtain votes for the politician. As narrated to me by 
an official, the teachers are also appointed as presiding officers in the general 
elections where they provide help to candidates contesting elections, even 
allowing casting votes on fake identity cards. Moreover, the teacher has status 
and he is also respected in the community. Similarly, the profession of a 
teacher enables him/her to socially interact with the community. Through 
social interactions, local teachers use students and parents and others in the 
community to capture votes for their preferred candidate. This is how they 
develop relations with influential people of the area. Moreover, and 
unfortunately, a public school serves as a political platform for local teachers. 
Political elites of the community usually visit local schools for different 
functions arranged by the students. A politically active local teacher can easily 
                                                       
127 Since I was not conducting research during an election campaign, the information 
disclosed to me is based on the experiences, discussions and general observations of the 
officials.
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convince the elites of a community to vote for a preferred politician. The 
teachers are voters of local MPAs and actively participate in their elections. As 
such, MPAs are under obligation to reciprocate their loyalty acquired through 
votes. Conceptually, patron–client brokerage is based on personal loyalties, 
mutually binding expectations and responsibilities. The mechanism of loyalty 
therefore contributes to un-official practices and its formal institutionalisation in 
the administration.
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8. Conclusion
This chapter examined the actual functioning of administration. I have 
discussed the prevalence of widespread clientelism, its penetration across 
state institutions in diverse socio-political contexts, and its influence over the 
official behaviour of state officials and service-delivery processes. The actual 
functioning of administration shows how the structures of state have been 
occupied by patrons and clients, each seeking mutual benefit. It further 
reveals that the actual behaviour of state bureaucracy is a product of complex 
interactions between officials, citizens and political elites. Tribal and family-
based associations at the district and provincial levels penetrate state 
structures in the form of networks. 
Clientelistic practices and relationships overshadow official norms, sanctions 
and other officially assigned responsibilities. As a result, personal preferences, 
rule-avoidance and personalised forms of transactions dominate over official 
norms and expected forms of administrative practices. Therefore the official 
functioning of the administration is distorted due to the extension of favours. 
Teachers have shown their dissatisfaction with the current system of 
education. Their views reveal that in order to survive, political connections are 
necessary. Those who lack political connections are seldom rewarded for their 
professional conduct. The interrelationships of teachers make manifest the 
ways of performing administration informally. The interactions of head 
teachers with PTCs highlight how un-official practices are legitimised as well 
as revealing the explanations which are associated with them. These aspects 
are important in understanding state–society relationships which are pervasive 
and all embracing, and which are powerful in terms of distribution of resources 
and entitlement claims.
This chapter further analysed accountability through the concepts of exit, 
voice and loyalty. Based on the analysis of three cases, I argued that 
accountability in patron–client relationships is different as it depends on the 
nature and structure of relationships of state officials and service users with 
political leaders.
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Summary and Conclusion
1. Introduction
This thesis attempts to address two central research objectives. The first 
concerns the everyday practices of state officials in the delivery of social 
services, and the second the examination of social norms and their intrusion 
into official norms. In empirical chapter seven, I set out the formal hierarchical 
structure of the district education department. While this structure remains 
publicly intact as the vehicle for the formal functioning of district education, the 
actual functioning of district education (see appendix eight) highlights the 
everyday functioning of district education. The analysis and contextualisation 
of the actual practices of state officials enables us to acquire a deeper 
understanding of the actual functioning of the district education system. This 
can be applied to the other case studies. The case of water supply and refuse 
management reveals that the actual practices are influenced by various forms 
of social norms which contribute to the shaping of everyday governance. In 
this thesis, through an analysis of why the actual practices of state officials are 
not in conformity with their expected official behaviour, I am thus critically 
examining the wider problems of governance in the state of Pakistan. I have 
endeavoured to show that in Pakistan there is an unrealistic understanding of 
the problems of governance. The first objective is achieved by undertaking 
empirical analysis to understand the actual behaviour and unofficial practices 
of state officials in different social and institutional contexts. The second 
objective is achieved by demonstrating how administration is actually 
performed within the state on a quotidian basis. In this concluding chapter, 
these objectives are discussed using primary data and a review of literature 
under the following headings: problems of subtractivist approaches, distinct 
but interpenetrating spheres, broader conclusions, and implications for 
change.
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2. Problems of subtractivist approaches
In the mainstream development discourse and from the point of view of 
positivists128, the problems of governance in Pakistan are evaluated, judged 
and debated with respect to subtractivist approaches. I use the ‘subtractivist’
approaches as a critique by taking ideal-type bureaucratic behaviour as the 
normative point of comparative reference. These approaches conform to a 
model of formal governance which is too normative. The notion of ‘good 
governance’ is based on the features of modern Western rational states and 
governments. The formal good governance model relates to technical 
expertise, requisite competencies, effective public sector institutions and a 
vibrant civil society. The good governance discourse has very little to say 
concerning how the state interacts with society, and what happens at the 
interface between the service providers and service users. The official norms, 
organisational charts and job descriptions do not make sense when there is a 
gap between the rhetoric and reality. The officials deviate from official norms, 
and their behaviour is best understood within the context of clientelistic and 
other forms of relationships, through which they seek to gain certain benefits 
such as appointments, to appropriate state resources for personal gains, and 
to secure access to state services. 
Subtractive approaches also imply the universal application of an ideological 
framework across states, without examining pre- and post-colonial history, 
and thus neglecting facts about how administration was carried out in the 
Indian sub-continent in earlier periods. The subjugation of the local 
communities and the introduction of the modern bureaucratic rule in the sub-
continent, which were previously non-existent, alienated the local population 
from the rulers. When the British occupied India, they were confronted with a 
huge alien population of heterogeneous groups spread over a vast land mass 
which had to be properly administered. The main objective of the colonial 
rulers was to prevent rebellion and keep their hold over the local population.
To meet this challenge, the British sought the help of local Rajas and big 
                                                       
128 Positivism is an epistemology but not an insightful one in such contexts as these. 
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landlords, granting them special powers, such as total administrative 
control over the population in their areas, in return for allegiance to the British 
crown.  
According to Alavi, the post-independence state was dominated by three 
property classes and a civilian-military oligarchy. These continuously 
undermined efforts to build a strong civil society and corresponding political 
institutions. The military and civilian regimes in the post-colonial state created 
a system of political patronage which led to the politicisation of state 
bureaucracy. In the state of Pakistan, political parties and their adherents 
have shaped the political culture through patron–client relations. The 
penetration of party politics into administrative structures created extensive 
opportunities for “patronage-based politics practiced by democratic and 
military governments” who relied on networks and biradari to remain in power. 
As a consequence, they failed to meet the needs and expectations of the 
people (Lodhi 2011, p.50). In addition to the above, state bureaucracy not only 
enjoyed considerable power over the community but also developed close ties 
with ruling parties to capture lucrative positions. The invariable use of political 
contacts with politicians negated the criteria for appointments, promotions and 
performance. As a result, the actual practices of the state officials became 
inconsistent and indeed incommensurate with their expected official 
behaviour.
Another significant limitation of the subtractivist approach is that it does not 
take into account the notion of the clash of rationalities. The Western notion of 
bureaucratic rationality is based on the Western-inspired model of rational 
states which lays emphasis on rule-based decision making. Applied to the 
case of Pakistan, this notion is also normative, and does not provide a 
nuanced understanding of the way in which structures are not static but in fact 
fluid and dynamic. Devine (1998, p.257) refers to Wood’s notion of parallel 
rationalities, which he uses as a term to describe cases characterised by the 
competing rationalities of different actors, each presenting their own logic and 
explanations of actions, constraints and decisions. Power emerges from the 
clash of rationalities. This inevitably gives rise to conflict between the 
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conceptions which underlie development interventions and those who pursue 
their particular interests. This means that we are examining the perspectives 
of officials dealing with conflicts of interests through a variety of social and 
administrative strategies. Thus, it can be argued that a particular strategy 
entails the capacity of the state officials to deal with contradictory interests. It 
is through the notion of competing rationalities that we are able to better 
understand how social actors in a particular milieu attempt to manage 
conflicts, identify their limitations, and justify their unofficial practices. 
3. Distinct but interpenetrating spheres
What emerges from this research is that while state and society are usually 
treated as two distinct spheres, in fact they are interpenetrating. The state 
sphere consists of official rules and regulations “making up the state” (Willott 
2009). The private sphere represents informal social norms. It is the private 
sphere which accurately captures the official business of the state. In the 
private sphere, there are people and groups who pursue their independent 
interest in opposition to the independent functioning of the state (Clapham 
1982). How state institutions perform in reality, how official authority is 
subverted, and how people struggle for rights and entitlements are embedded 
in the private sphere. This has been more succinctly conceptualised by Ekeh 
(1975) in the notion of two republics: the “civil” and the “primordial republic”. 
Authors such as Wood, Oliver de Sardan, and Blundo draw on their own 
research to show the contestant interpenetration of the private sphere into the 
public sphere. In this thesis, I argue that the problems of governance in 
Pakistan are less researched with reference to the interpenetration of the 
private sphere into the public sphere. As argued by Gretchen and Steven 
(2004, p.727), “in contrast to official norms, which are communicated, written 
and widely accepted as official”, informal social norms enable us to get a 
better understanding of how they affect the expected official behaviour of the 
state officials. Reflecting on how official business is performed in the state of 
Pakistan, I have observed that informal social norms such as clientelism, 
kinship ties and social relationships penetrate into the public sphere which 
contributes to a realistic understanding of the functioning of public 
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bureaucracies in the everyday state. As discussed across the three cases, 
officials have to deal with conflictive demands coming from citizens and 
politicians. In contrast to strictly operating according to official norms, civil 
servants are confronted by informal social norms. The ensuing difficulty faced 
by officials in the provision of public and collective services is to maintain a 
clear separation between public and private realms. The officials are being 
confronted by situations involving asymmetric power relationships, political 
interests and pressures from multiple sources which constitute the “real” 
functioning of public administration. At the heart of this discussion, a crucial 
point needs to be mentioned. The notion of governance refers to how public 
and collective services are being provided. This requires an appreciation of 
the complex processes concerning social interactions, the professional culture 
of civil servants, and the conversations that take place between state officials 
and citizens. The formal governance model adopts a highly normative and
judgemental approach and does not deal with this complexity. 
The key elements of governance are analysed by others primarily at an 
abstract level. In this thesis, I am offering a micro-level insight. The models of 
public administration in relation to public sector institutional performance 
remain inadequate. Public performance is actually much more complex. It 
requires an examination of the routine practices of state bureaucracy, informal 
social norms, and their wider implications for citizens’ needs and preferences.
For Pakistan, my research fills this void by documenting and analysing the 
multifaceted nature and the micro-dynamics of actual governance. This is 
achieved through the notion of political clientelism, which is perhaps the 
biggest contribution of this research.
4. Broader conclusions
The three case studies present a complex institutional landscape consisting of 
different social actors in diverse social and political milieu. They are arenas for 
encounters between bureaucrats and citizens in which the state bureaucracy 
adheres to two sets of norms: official and social. Official norms are based on 
the idea of a rational human behaviour which emanates from formal 
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institutional rules, policy and processes. Social norms are associated with 
clientelism, social relationships and moral attachments. In this thesis, I have 
argued that social norms grossly undermine the expected official behaviour of 
public officials. The experiences of the state officials in steering administration 
reveals a system of reciprocal exchanges, affinities, and acts and decisions at 
odds with legal-bureaucratic rationality. What officials were supposed to do, 
and what was happening in reality represented the professional culture of the 
civil servants. On the other hand, the narratives of certain officials expressing 
a desire to perform in accordance with official norms clearly meant that those 
officials made reference to operating according to organisational norms and 
institutional practices. This dichotomy relates to the co-existence of official and 
social norms. The significance of social norms cannot be ignored, as they 
continuously intrude into official norms. Thus, in providing basic services, the 
civil servants experience a different reality which is inconsistent with their 
professional practices and standardised procedures. The description and the 
analysis of the routine functioning of administration across three case studies 
enabled me to understand social norms and how they contribute to unofficial 
practices. 
The case of primary education reveals an institution which operates 
significantly through clientelistic relationships. The actual functioning of district 
education shows features such as the pervasiveness of clientelistic practices, 
discrepancy between formally assigned tasks and actual undertaking of tasks, 
culture of impunity and a widespread exchange of favours. Other important 
elements include: personalised transactions between official and citizens in 
capturing state resources, exploitation of community relationships in 
responsibility avoidance, and adhering to unofficial practices embedded in 
interpersonal and patron–client politics. Moreover, administration in the district 
education department was functioning on a system of patronage and loyalties.
As a consequence, citizens’ concerns were ignored and they faced extreme 
difficulties in articulating their interests. This led to the negation of official rules 
and maintaining impartiality in public dealings. Citizens were also not familiar 
with official rules and laws. Moreover, due to a “long route to accountability”, 
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there was a natural dependency on technical-bureaucratic knowledge and the 
ways in which officials treated citizens’ complaints. 
The case of water supply presents a different reality which is embedded in
social relationships and kinship connections. They encourage social 
expectations and obligations to immediate family and others expressed 
through concentric circles of moral attachment (see appendix nine). Access to 
water supply strongly points to the interest of the Nazim in ensuring access for 
his immediate family by deploying emotional bonds and validating actions 
using moral arguments. During an informal encounter with the Nazim, I learnt 
that people in Nawansher meet the Nazim at his house on daily basis. These 
frequent interactions reveal the context of social expectations and political 
obligations. The Nazim informed me that people, women and minors of his 
biradari narrate their problems to him. He further stated that people of his 
community are without hope, and they have no expectations from the state 
agencies. The everyday problems that people face could not be ignored, and it 
was his responsibility to resolve them. In this process, the Nazim mediates 
between the state and society in effect providing a “short route to 
accountability”. 
The waste management project underscores the lack of adequate knowledge 
by non-state entities about the prevailing social relationships embedded in the 
local moral economy. Non-state entities attempt to justify their interventions on 
different presumptions and conceptions. The external intervention illuminates 
the necessity of understanding dissimilar interests and deep-seated 
solidarities among people. The project demonstrates that any development 
intervention imposed from outside meets with strategies of resistance and 
accommodation, behind which there are political and economic 
considerations. These projects do not meet their objectives because they are 
side-tracked by state and non-state actors through different means and 
decision-making processes. The outside intervention enhanced my existing 
knowledge about the customary practices of the sanitation workers, and how 
an outside intervention gets caught in bureaucratic circuits and local politics. 
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5. Research implications 
An important conclusion of this thesis is that it is necessary in particular to 
deal with the problem of how to improve the management practices of state 
officials. This entails introducing reforms aimed at bridging the gap between 
policy and practice. There are numerous evaluations and studies on 
Pakistan’s dysfunctional public sector performance which indicate that there 
are management inadequacies, problems of competencies in human 
resources, and incapacities of state officials to implement policies and 
development projects. The current situation in the country is replete with donor 
capacity-building programmes, reforms in civil service and decentralisation of 
service delivery. The problems with these solutions and taxonomies are that 
they constantly engage with technical and quick-fix solutions to improve 
human behaviour. 
The most admired strategy advocated by the government to improving 
management practices in the country relates to civil service reforms which are 
based on ideal-type administration. In considering the question of reforms, 
there is no ‘magic bullet’ to improve public sector performance in Pakistan. In 
my view, one has to start by examining how informal social norms can be 
researched and through what methods. This leads to the consideration of 
some options and implementation strategies.  
Participatory Action Learning (PAL) and Action Research (AR) are two 
possible available options to change human behaviour and to improve 
management practices. I will not go into the details of PAL and AR here since 
the objective is not to discuss these methods. However, a very brief 
introduction to these methods is essential. The attributes of PAL are that it 
empowers the stakeholders to be able to assert what they have been doing, 
acknowledging the significance of knowledge and people’s realties, and 
learning through “hands-on” practice (Mukherjee 2003, p.32). Action Research 
brings together knowledge and experience of diverse audiences for self-
reflection, and developing future courses of actions for improving practices 
(Brian 2001). Both methods are based on psychological and sociological 
inquiries that aim at knowing things and understanding them through face-to-
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face interactions. The overarching goal of these options is to create a common 
understanding among political leaders, state officials and citizens, to self-
evaluate their own performance and practices based on what I have 
discussed and documented in the empirical chapters (i.e. six and seven). This 
is undoubtedly easier said than done. From the researcher’s point of view, this 
may be an optimistic endeavour; whereas from the officials and citizens’ 
perceptive, it will be a difficult task. From my perspective, the task can be 
achieved through optimism and developing modalities, and building 
relationships of trust and constant engagement. The question is how we can 
implement these methods in a society like Pakistan. In Pakistan, bureaucracy 
is often discouraged by a ‘workshops’ mentality and training. These 
workshops are focussed upon official norms, without diagnosing the actual 
problem, which is to change unofficial behaviour.
In the first phase, PAL and AR can be implemented through the process of 
“vertical slicing”.129 Vertical slicing is a process of dissecting vertically the 
target audience, from occupational groups such as senior and junior 
bureaucrats down to the level of citizens in local villages. It also includes those 
people who are clients rather than citizens. The application of an untested 
idea of vertical slicing as a diagnostic tool is favoured, as it offers a better 
prospect for understanding and taking ownership of the key problem identified 
in this thesis, i.e. that state and society are not distinct but permeable. The 
reason why I favour vertical slicing is that, in some sense, it reflects on my
ethnographic work. Through the process of PAL and AR, this means to 
engage with the problem in an applied way. I am essentially telling the readers 
about an alternative approach to the usual idea of putting pressure on the 
state through civil society, and thus implicitly understanding them as distinct.
Prior to implementing PAL or AR, a broad consensus among different 
stakeholders will be developed at different levels. The first level is the federal 
level where policies are crafted. The target audience of this level comprises 
political leaders, the secretaries, joint secretaries and the newly appointed civil 
                                                       
129 The term “vertical slicing” is not commonly used; it has been invented by Wood, who is 
currently doing experimental work with the World Bank in Bangladesh.
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servants. Politicians and senior officials play a pivotal role in policy making. 
They are directly involved with donors in the implementation of projects such 
as Poverty Reduction Strategy initiatives. The implementation of Poverty 
Reduction Strategies is centralised at the federal level since it is there that 
resources, goals and targets are determined. The federal level also directly 
implements projects in the districts. Such projects do not take into account 
how citizens navigate their way to acquire access to public and collective 
services.
As shown in the case of primary education, lack of information on state 
policies and bureaucratic processes restrict people in holding officials and 
elected leaders accountable for their actions. This research would be most 
beneficial to the senior officials at the federal level as they need to be aware of 
when policies do not achieve their intended results. This approach requires 
personal effort and getting formal approval from senior officials. When they 
are convinced concerning the viability and the benefits of these methods, the 
process can be initiated across other levels of public sector institutions.
Civil Service Academies in Pakistan, namely the National Institute of Public 
Administration (NIPA) and the Peshawar Academy for Rural Development 
(PARD), are the two main institutions where senior and mid-level officers are 
trained on public administration and good governance. These institutions have 
been established to train civil servants of the future, as well as those who are 
waiting to be promoted having already served in different ministries, inter alia
education, health, social policy etc.  There is a discrepancy between what is 
being taught and what is subsequently practiced. Most of the courses are 
designed around disciplines such as democracy, decentralisation, public 
sector management techniques, etc. Therefore there is a dire need to change 
the mind sets of these officials in evaluating their own perceptions and 
behaviour. By targeting provincial institutions, there will be a recognition of the 
issues discussed in this research, and this therefore will become the basis for 
triangulation and justification in introducing PAL and AR. This process will lead 
to a broad understanding of the gaps between policy and practices, and how 
they can be evaluated at federal and provincial level.
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The next level is the district, where policy goals and development 
interventions are implemented by the front line managers. In a district level 
workshop, front line managers and the staff working below these officers will 
be grouped according to their official status and respective sectors. The 
objective of this workshop will be to encourage the officials to reflect upon 
their own practices and behaviour through a process of interactions. The 
workshop will provide an opportunity to share with them how I have been able 
to collect and analyse unofficial practices in different contexts and situations. 
Diagnosing problems by these officials themselves will be an innovative 
approach to developing possible solutions to improving their own behaviour 
and management practices. This will be achieved through constant 
engagement and long-term involvement for continuous monitoring of their 
practices. The workshop will enable the participants to locate issues of 
permeability and accountability within their own professional cultures. The 
most important objective of this workshop will be to tackle the problem of the 
“long route to accountability”. This route is a critical factor in achieving policy 
targets, and to reflect upon official dealings with neglected and disadvantaged 
citizens, particularly in rural areas.
The same process will be replicated at the sub-district level, where junior 
officials and technical staff are constantly interacting with citizens and 
communities. The chances of success of reforms at the sub-district level, 
which is the meso level, are greater. The primary reason for this is because 
citizens are in direct contact with local politicians and thus there is a “short 
route to accountability”. This research shows that the short route to 
accountability creates pressure on locally elected politicians to improvise, and 
take deliberative action to resolve issues faced by the citizens. Whereas the 
local politician favours his own people, the same politician and the local staff 
can work together after creating a sense of ownership of responsibility and 
accountability between citizens and officials. The short route to accountability 
suggests that PAL and AR will be more sustainable and will produce quick 
results, since local citizens are aware of the social norms and the practices of 
local officials, and how citizens’ complaints have been addressed. As 
discussed in chapter six, the external intervention did not succeed in achieving 
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its intended goals, because the intervention was designed and implemented 
without acknowledging the significance of personal relationships and 
administrative practices. Therefore, reforms can be initiated at the sub-district 
level by informing the local staff of their own behaviour and how agency is 
constructed. By bringing the Nazim (the elected leader) into this entire 
process, it will lead to developing mutually agreed solutions to local problems, 
and make people aware of their rights and entitlements.
The final level of introducing PAL and AR is at the community/citizens level, 
which is the micro level. My empirical findings suggest that there are 
disadvantaged and poor segments in the society whose interests are 
neglected when policies are crafted and projects are designed. Through PAL 
and AR, the first step will be to know about the community problems, how 
state officials deal with the concerns of local citizens, and about the ways in 
which the public sector operates in particular. The diversity of classes and 
tribes can therefore be better understood when local citizens are empowered 
through voice, complemented with specific and targeted legal reforms and 
interventions. Through this research, I learnt that local citizens can be 
mobilised to improve local services by empowering them through knowledge, 
access to state decisions, and information on state priorities and policies. The 
purpose of PAL and AR at the citizens’ level is to collect basic statistics and 
information pertaining to deficiencies in the implementation of social services. 
The gathering of information from citizens can reveal major shortcomings in 
the three case studies that I have examined, and the gaps between targets 
and considerable difficulties involved in their achievement.
After describing the first phase of diagnosis, the second phase entails seeing 
different levels in relation to each other. The second phase will put those
levels into a dialogue with each other. This means, for example, that a 
politician would be brought to the micro level to engage in a series of dialogue 
with the service users. These dialogues would then lead to a preliminary 
analysis and then to embarking upon a realistic strategy in the distribution of 
state resources and rethinking of policy commitments. Similarly, the state 
holders at micro level would be put in contact with the meso level to attain a 
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better understanding of the pressures and constraints on the state officials in 
performing routine tasks. In a series of workshops, these dialogues would 
have to be facilitated and sustained over a period of time. Hopefully, through 
participatory action processes, stakeholders at different levels would identify 
problems faced in the conceptualisation and implementation of policy.
The methods of PAL have been used by researchers working with NGOs in 
Pakistan, but they have been not been used in the manner that I have 
outlined: which is to share what I have done in the field, to deploy these 
research findings, and conduct triangulation at different levels. The implication 
of this research would not just be beneficial to the government, but can also 
be extremely useful to donors, particularly the World Bank and the 
Department for International Development (DFID). Both organisations are 
already investing huge amount of resources in Pakistan in attempting to 
improve public sector performance.  
6. Recommendation for further research 
I have concentrated on three different case studies in a specific district of a 
province in Pakistan. There are three other provinces where different 
languages are spoken, and the governments in these provinces operate in 
different social and political contexts. If my analysis of the problems of 
governance through political clientelism is correct, this research may be 
conducted in other provinces. However, I would recommend that a study on a 
particular sector such as health, education or agriculture be undertaken, 
focusing upon policy and analysing in more depth how policy can be 
reconceptualised at the level of conception and implementation using 
anthropological and ethnographical methods. Ethnography enables the 
researcher to acquire knowledge of social and institutional practices. In 
traditional societies, cultural practices and informal norms intuitively constitute 
meanings which are often expressed through practices and actions. Unlike 
other methods, ethnography can create linkages between the macro and 
micro-level practices through a prolonged ethnography of the bureaucratic 
processes of service provision.
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In recent times, Oliver de Sardan (2005, p.63) has emphasised the 
importance and heuristic advantages of anthropology in relation to social 
change and development which is ‘actor oriented’. The first gives pre-
eminence to the logic, actions and strategies at the disposal of social actors 
which determine different rationalities, conceptions and, thus, behaviour. The 
second heuristic advantage is associated with an anthropological approach 
termed ‘methodological individualism’, which does not presuppose singular 
rationalities and logic but rather broadens the research canvas to gaze at 
several aspects of the rationalities and constraints under which people 
perform under various norms. The anthropology of development and social 
change can be used to obtain detailed knowledge of bureaucratic processes, 
informal social norms and rationalities in justifying actions or constraints which 
can lead to the development of other analytical concepts. The two biggest 
problems in Pakistan are education and health, and thus they are critical 
sectors for further research.
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Appendix 1
Focus Group Discussions
(Refuse Management)
Introduction:
Welcome the group members, introduction of self and brief on the PhD 
research topic. The purpose of the focus group discussion and how the 
discussion would benefit my research. How long the discussion would last and 
what would be discussed in the group. How ethical issues would be handled. 
The sharing of information would be restricted to the research and would not 
be disclosed to outsiders. Names would not be disclosed and complete 
anonymity of the participants would be ensured.
Opening questions:
1. Brief introduction of the sanitation staff and ask each member about 
their official responsibilities.
2. Briefly describe what are the key three problems in refuse 
management.
3. What in your view were the reasons for the IUCN solid waste project to 
improve the existing management of refuge in old and new Nawansher.
Sharing of research findings:
1. The project did not improve sanitation practices and management of 
solid waste in Nawansher.
2. Resistance from the community to cooperate in the project. 
3. No accountability and sanctioning of local citizens in dumping waste in 
the streets and open plots.
4. The official tasks, job description and responsibilities do not match with 
the actual practices.
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5. General Questions:
1. Describe what kinds of pressures you face when performing official 
responsibilities.
2. What incentives do you get to perform to official tasks and what is your 
opinion on these incentives.
3. Describe how your official responsibilities are sidelined by official 
directives, informal relationships, compliance with orders of senior 
officials and other non-official personalities.
4. Describe how political connections/approaches and acts of mediation 
by senior officials or non-officials affects your formal responsibilities.
Ending Questions:
1. How power differences and relationships influence treatment of cases, 
decision making, accountability and sanctioning.
2. Describe the kinds of relationships that you face which affect official 
responsibilities.
3.  The sanitation staff is often sent on ‘fatigue’. What is ‘fatigue’ and 
describe what the sanitation staff does when they visit house/people 
and sites after office hours.
4. Does the group agree with the findings or would like to add something 
to the findings which would help me to revisit them?
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Appendix 2
Primary Education
ADOs (Male and Female)
Introduction:
Welcome the group members, introduction of self and brief on the PhD 
research topic. The purpose of the focus group discussion and how the 
discussion would benefit my research. How long the discussion would last and 
what would be discussed in the group. How ethical issues would be handled. 
The sharing of information would be restricted to the research and would not 
be disclosed to outsiders. Names would not be disclosed and complete 
anonymity of the participants would be ensured.
Opening questions:
1. Brief introduction of the group members and ask each member about 
their official responsibilities.  
2. Briefly describe what are the key issues and problems in achieving the 
goals and targets of primary education in your respective circle.
Sharing of research findings:
3. Political personalities intrude in the official provision of primary 
education.
4. Political appointments, social relationships, kinship ties, moral 
obligation, tribal and political interests over and above the formal state. 
5. State bureaucracy keeps its prestige and position and makes 
administrative adjustments to avoid political inconvenience.
6. The official behaviour is intruded upon by social norms and distorts 
expected official behaviour
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7. Formal institutional processes are sidelined by unofficial practices and 
therefore formal accountability of public officials and of elected leaders 
cannot be assumed.
8. In the absence of formal accountability, the state official captures and 
misappropriates state resources in cooperation with community and 
non-state actors. Thus, they affect institutional performance and 
implementation of policy.
General Questions:
5. Describe what kind of pressures you face when performing official 
responsibilities.
6. What incentives do you get in performing official tasks and what is your 
opinion on these incentives.
7. Describe how your official responsibilities are sidelined by official 
directives, informal relationships, compliance with orders of senior 
officials and other non-official personalities.
8. How do political connections/approaches and acts of mediation by 
senior officials or non-officials affect your formal responsibilities?
Ending Questions:
5. How power differences and relationships influence treatment of cases, 
decision making, accountability and sanctioning.
6. Describe the kinds of relationships which in your view affect official 
responsibilities
7.  Describe a situation, examples or cases in order to understand your 
views on politics and administration. Do you treat them as separate or 
is politics part of administration and official practices?
8. Does the group agree with the findings or would it like to add something 
to the findings which would help me to revisit them?
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Appendix 3
Water Supply
Technical, managerial and non-technical staff 
Introduction:
Welcome the group members, introduction of self and brief on the PhD 
research topic. The purpose of the focus group discussion and how the 
discussion would benefit my research. How long the discussion would last and 
what would be discussed in the group. How ethical issues would be handled. 
The sharing of information would be restricted to the research and would not 
be disclosed to outsiders. Names would not be disclosed and complete 
anonymity of the participants would be ensured.
Opening questions:
1. Brief introduction of the group members and ask each member 
about their official responsibilities.  
2. Briefly describe what key issues and problems you face to 
ensure access to water supply.
Sharing of research findings:
3. Subversion of formal authority of the officials by the Nazim in 
access situations and when close relatives and friends approach 
the Nazim for personal favours.
4. Informal appropriation of water using different social practices. 
5. Exclusion of certain communities from access and the conflict 
between the excluded communities caused by the loop system.
6. Adverse performance appraisal in case of non-compliance with 
Nazim priorities.
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7. Illegal water connections by certain individuals and lack of formal 
accountability of the pump operators
8. Political and factional dynamics in the provision of water supply.
General Questions:
9. Describe what kind of pressures you face when performing 
official responsibilities.
10.  Describe why citizens’ complaints are not treated equally, and 
how some residents are able to get access to water supply more 
easily than others.
11. Describe how official responsibilities are sidelined by social 
relationships, local customs and kinship ties.
12. How do acts of mediation by the Nazim and local political 
personalities affect your formal responsibilities.
Ending Questions:
9. How power differences and relationships influence treatment of 
cases, decision making, accountability and sanctioning.
10. Describe the kinds of relationships which in your view affect 
official responsibilities.
11. Describe a situation, examples or cases to understand your 
views on politics and administration. Do you treat them separate 
or is politics part of administration and official practices?
12. Does the group agree with the findings or would like to add 
something to the findings which would help me to revisit them?
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Appendix 4
Informal Interview with the Nazim of Nawansher
1. Describe your views on formal and informal accountability.
2. How does informal accountability work in practice? Explain with 
incidents.
3. What are the expectations of the community from you as a Nazim?
4. How are these expectations met in situations of access to water supply, 
and in dispute resolutions over access to water?
5. Describe your views on social solidarity and social relationships within 
your community and the domination of Jadoons in Nawansher.
6. What kinds of social and political pressures are created by the local 
community on you, and how do these create circumstances to manage 
access and resolve disputes across different classes or community 
members?
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Appendix 5 
Education Sector Reforms
Universal Primary Education (UPE)
District Abbottabad
 (Officials of the District Education Department)
1. What are the main streams in ESRs? 
2. In which stream is there interaction of the education department and 
public/community.
3. What are the mechanisms of interactions of school teachers with 
members of PTCs?
4. Briefly describe your role in UPE and how long have you been working 
in the department?
5. What is the current enrolment and dropout rate in your district?
6. What are the key issues associated with enrolment rates, dropouts and 
quality education, especially in rural areas?
7. In your view, what are the key obstacles in your department for 
improving the enrolment rate, preventing drop outs and providing 
quality education in the district?
8. Are you aware of ESRs (2001-02-2005-06)? If yes: These reforms lay 
emphasis on EFA goals, what are your views on achieving the goals of 
UPE in the district?
9. National Plan of Action is a major initiative of the government to reach 
the disadvantaged population groups in rural and urban areas; to 
promote community participation and ownership of basic education, 
and to improve the relevance and quality of basic education learning 
achievements. What are your views on these objectives? 
10.What is the process of monitoring and evaluation of primary education 
targets/progress in the district? 
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Appendix 6 
Education Sector Reforms
Universal Primary Education (UPE)
District Abbottabad
(Primary school teachers)
1. What are the issues in access to quality education in schools?
2. What are the views of the teachers on their teaching practices, and 
especially teaching in hilly areas?
3. What are the primary reasons of having fewer teachers in rural 
schools? 
4. The reasons of teachers absenteeism, union-based recruitment of 
teachers in schools are the biggest objectives according to the ESR 
document. How do you view these objectives in terms of their 
implementation in schools? 
5. Dropout and quality of education in terms of learning abilities and 
missing facilities are seldom discussed in the official meetings. What 
are the reasons?
6. The education department has identified mentor teachers. Who are 
these teachers and what are their key responsibilities in each circle?
7. In many schools, teachers have been posted in the same schools for 
more than three years. Why is the official policy not followed in 
practice?
8. What are the reasons for having more teachers in urban schools and 
not in rural schools?
9. What is the mechanism of holding meetings with PTC members? When 
are they held and what is discussed in these meetings?
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Appendix 7 
Domestic Water Supply, Nawansher
1. How the town committee is managing the current water supply system 
in UC (No. of staff, shifts, timings).
2. How they insure accessibility of water in the UC—What is the zoning 
system?
3. Why certain hamlets do not get regular water and others do.
4. What are the political dynamics in the distribution of water supply in the 
old and new Nawansher?
5. How the water distribution system is being managed by the town 
committee. 
6. What are the problems in the management of the water supply?
7. How people register their water complaints in the town committee and 
how they get resolved and by whom?
8. Which hamlets are getting water and from which source?
9. What is the zoning system and what criteria were devised when the 
system was introduced?
10.Do the people in old and new Nawansher know about the zoning 
system? If not, what are the reasons behind this?
11.What is the difference between an illegal water connection and a legal 
water connection, and what is the formal process of getting a water 
connection?
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Appendix 8
Actual Functioning of District Education
Teachers
Administrative intrusion 
Actual behaviour andunofficial practices
Ineffective voice and accountability
Social practices
Community based clientelistic relationships
Headquarters
High-ranked
officials 
Parent Teacher 
Union
Mentor teachers
Field
Citizens Head teacher
Parent Teacher 
Commission
Village
Politicians
Personal 
relationships
Interpersonal 
relationships
Brokers
Teachers
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Appendix 9
Concentric Circles
Immediate followers in the 
community
Nuclear family
